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ABSTRACT 
 
The discussion of aid effectiveness continues to gain prominence in international 
development policy discourse and analysis. However, the question of why aid seems to 
be ineffective is far more complicated and remains largely unanswered. While the 
notions that aid drives donors’ interests and creates dependency are still relevant, this 
thesis confronts the problem, by examining the issues that influenced the 
operationalisation and effectiveness of aid programs in the context of Ghana’s 
Community-Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP) (2005-2011). By arguing that 
aid dependency and “aid as a concept” are different, the thesis makes the most basic 
assumption that ‘aid’ is not negative; albeit, in the knowledge that its focus on aid in 
Ghana will also bring to the fore the major issues that frame debate on international aid.  
 
Two theoretical themes emerged from the thesis. First, the thesis argues that the 
effectiveness of an aid program should be measured from the recipients’ point of view. 
This is crucial, as donors tend to use their aid to successfully achieve their strategic 
advantages, while not necessarily benefitting the recipient country, or those groups for 
whom the aid was designed to help. Second, in lieu of the instrumentality of 
international aid, the thesis found that aid effectiveness also depends upon the 
‘externalities’ (programs, degree of dependency, motives, theories, concepts; social and 
politico-cultural factors) that drive it. This notwithstanding, most of the current 
mechanisms for achieving aid effectiveness, such as Results-Based Financing, Aid-
Agenda Conferences and Program-Based Approaches, appear to pay negligible 
attention to these ‘externalities’. The researcher contends that these mechanisms are not 
enough for improving aid effectiveness per se.  
 
The thesis employed ethnographic research to investigate the outcomes of the CBRDP 
implemented in nine districts of Ghana. The findings suggest that, alongside the 
mechanisms mentioned above, prior attention must be paid to the political and cultural 
realities of the recipient country as well as the theories and complex concepts that drive 
aid programs (by staff at donor agencies). Such attention, the thesis shows, should focus 
on a clear and contextual conceptualisation of key terms such as ‘community’ and 
‘empowerment’, while at the same time embedding strategies to manage unintended 
outcomes. Efforts at making ‘aid work’ would also require further critical discussion of 
the decentralisation theories that underpin aid programs, particularly, Community–
Driven Development (CDD); in this regard the thesis found that the indicators that the 
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World Bank uses in relation to CDD (referred to as high and low functioning 
intergovernmental systems), were far removed from the grounded realities of Ghana’s 
decentralised system of local and regional politics. 
 
The concept of ‘community’ is appealing, yet deceptive. Although a complex term, 
‘community’ is often misused, and conceptualised only in the spatial sense, while it 
transcends the notion of territoriality to include an entity that has a: 1) Function that 
drives the group; 2) Opportunity for interaction; 3) Membership who identifies with and 
contributes to it; and 4) Culture that makes it distinct from others. Analysis of the 
empirical data presented in the thesis shows that the politico-cultural dynamics and 
population settlement and mobility patterns of the CBRDP beneficiary localities did not 
support interaction to the levels required for a coherent ‘community’ to exist. Put 
simply ‘community’ in the functional and geographic sense had to exist in the CBRDP 
beneficiary localities for the project to succeed. While the sense of ‘community’ can be 
developed, the World Bank and Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development, who designed the CBRDP, ignored the need to nurture it in the recipient 
localities. As a result of this top down approach there existed no cohesive 
‘communities’ to maintain the projects, and most of the CBRDPs were found to be in a 
state of complete disarray at the time of fieldwork.  
 
The term ‘empowerment’ is another complex concept the thesis examines to show how 
its many theoretical complexities can, if ignored, have dire outcomes for aid programs. 
Scholars disagree on whether empowerment is a process or an outcome or both, a 
dilemma which presents many challenges for measuring it.  The fact that 
‘empowerment’ is predicated on the concept of ‘power’ makes it even more 
complicated. The reason being that ‘power’ is not a neutral concept and cannot be 
shared in the simple terms portrayed in donor discourse; also ignored is the fact that 
‘empowering’ one group may mean disempowering others, a situation that could lead to 
conflicts. These conflicts were self evident in the fieldwork and are present in the thesis. 
Despite these theoretical realities, empowerment appears to have been vaguely applied 
in the CBRDP as the project: 1) Had no working definition of ‘empowerment’; 2) 
Targeted women and vulnerable groups, although it was meant to empower the general 
population; 3) Measured ‘empowerment’ only in term of participation, ignoring the 
conditions that perpetuated ‘powerlessness’; and 4) Had no strategy in place to monitor 
unintended outcomes. Therefore, in their bid at ‘empowering’ Ghana’s local 
government officials (Assembly and Unit Committee Members in the quest for further 
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decentralisation), the designers of the project were unaware that they were actually 
disempowering Traditional Chiefs, many of whom felt ostracised. Moreover, project 
designers were also oblivious of the fact that the local government officials did not 
function in isolation, but are part of a very complex socio–cultural system.  These 
shortcomings led to clashes between Traditional Chiefs and the newly ‘empowered’ 
local government officials. As the designers and managers of the CBRDPs did not 
anticipate these eventualities, they had no plan in place to manage resulting conflicts, 
which have ended up in protracted legal battles, leaving the CBRDPs in a state of 
dereliction, some completely abandoned. 
 
The thesis brings to the fore the need for more concerted efforts at making aid effective, 
but at the same time arguing that all stakeholders need to pay closer attention to the use 
of nebulous theories and normative, yet complex concepts in aid-program designs. It 
underscores the essentiality for programs attempting to apply concepts such as 
‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ to clearly define and conceptualise these terms within 
the confines of the political, social and cultural forces and social dynamics of 
beneficiary localities. If this were to happen development projects are more likely to 
receive community support and be more likely to be effectively maintained. The thesis 
below provides empirical insights into what becomes of aid programs that apply 
concepts and terms that are promoted by ‘development pundits’, but are at variance with 
the realities of the recipient country’s pervasive traditions, culture and indeed its success 
or otherwise in adopting Western notions of decentralisation (as was the case outlined in 
this thesis).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
DECLARATION 
 
I certify that this dissertation does not, to the best of my knowledge and belief: 
 
(i) Incorporate, without acknowledgement, any material previously submitted 
for a degree or diploma in any institution of higher education; 
(ii) Contain any material previously published or written by another person 
except where due reference is made in the text; or 
(iii) Contain any defamatory material. 
 
I also grant permission for the Library at Edith Cowan University to make duplicate 
copies of my dissertation as required at its discretion, upon requests of individuals or 
institutions and at their expense. The author reserves all publication rights. 
 
 
Signature of Author: 
                                     Kwadwo Adusei-Asante 
 
Date: January 08, 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii 
DEDICATION 
 
 
To my daughters Obaapa and Ohemaa 
 
Girls, a trail has been blazed… 
 
You can also! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I acknowledge God Almighty for His grace and the strength to go through the stressful 
and sometimes lonely years of carrying out this research. 
 
Edith Cowan University, thanks for giving me a PhD position and granting me an 
International Postgraduate Research Scholarship (IPRS) to undertake the study, and an 
ECU International Stipend (ECUIS) to cater for my living expenses throughout the 
period. I wish to thank Prof Joe Luca, the ECU Graduate Research School and Miss 
Clare Ashby of the ECU Scholarship for their respective support. 
 
I wish to thank my Principal Supervisor, Peter Hancock (PhD) for his commitment to 
my thesis.  I feel indebted to Peter for his insights and suggestions that guided me 
through the research process.  
 
My special appreciation goes to the research subjects in Ghana, who provided me with 
the ideas that have informed this thesis. My sincere thanks go the CBRDP secretariat 
for the permission to study the project, particularly, Misters K. Oppong, Adu Koranteng 
and Charles Nayram. Many thanks also go to the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning and Ghana’s Electoral Commission for providing me with statistical data, 
many of which were useful. To my Research Assistants Joshua Opoku, Linda Arhin and 
Joshua Owu, I say good job done and thanks again. 
 
The following people also played significant roles in my journey to producing this 
thesis. These include: Apostle Stephen Waye-Onyina, Apostle and Mrs Steve Davies, 
Mrs Mpare, Dr Greg Maguire, Dr Agnes Apusigah, Dr Peter Quartey, Dr Ike Annan, Mr 
Nardo Drouven, Miss Nouschka Bergsma and Miss Judith Crabbe. Dr Colin Moyle 
thanks for painstaking proofing the entire thesis. To my Mum and Dad, thanks. 
 
When I started this PhD research, Elizabeth, my wife, realised that her husband has 
changed, as I spent less time with her and our two girls. Elizabeth endured the 
loneliness, while urging me on. She managed our home and took good care of our girls, 
while I was buried in books and papers. Love, thanks! And to the girls, daddy is free 
now...so more time for see-saw and fun together.  
 
 
 
 
 ix 
TABLE OF CONTENT 
 
COPYRIGHT....................................................................................................................ii 
 
ABSTRACT.....................................................................................................................iii 
  
DECLARATION..............................................................................................................vi 
 
DEDICATION................................................................................................................vii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.............................................................................................viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENT...................................................................................................ix 
  
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................xiii 
 
LIST OF TABLES.........................................................................................................xiv  
 
LIST OF PHOTOS........................................................................................................xiv 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATION…………………………………………………………..xiv 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 1.0 Overview…………………………………………………………………….1 
 1.1 Primary Research Questions………………………………………………...3 
 1.2 Significance of the Research………………………………………………...3 
1.3 Thesis Outline..................................................................................................5 
 1.4 What is International Development Aid?........................................................7 
 1.5 Aid Effectiveness: Why Do Concepts Matter? ..............................................8 
1.6 Why Research on Community–Driven Development in Ghana?..................11 
1.6.1. Social Characteristics ...................................................................11 
1.6.2. Political Setting.............................................................................14 
 1.6.3 Ghana’s Economy and Aid ...........................................................19 
 1.7 The Case Study: The Community–Based Rural Development  
Project (CBRDP)……………………………………………………….23 
 
1.7.1 The CBRDP Implementation Strategy...........................................24 
1.7.2 State of the CBRDPs as of Fieldwork............................................28 
 
CHAPTER 2: GLOBAL AID TRENDS AND RAMIFICATIONS FOR GHANA…..30 
2.1 A Brief Overview of Aid in the Pre–World War II Period...........................30 
 2.2 The Post–World War II Period: The Birth of the Bretton Wood    
       Institutions, the Marshall Plan and the Cold War..........................................31 
 
 x 
 2.3 The 1970s: Poverty Reduction Focus, the Herald of Structural      
       Adjustments...................................................................................................34 
 
2.4 Precursors to the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment in Ghana.................35 
 
2.5 1980/1990: Structural Adjustment Programs in Ghana ………………………........38 
2.6. 2000–2010s: The Decade of Global ‘Aid Boom’.....................................................41 
2.6.1 The Publication of Influential Scholarly Works.........................................42 
2.6.2 International Aid Campaigns......................................................................43 
2.6.3 September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack on the USA.....................................44 
2.7 Ghana in the Decade of Aid Boom: 2000–2010.......................................................47 
 2.7.1 Ghana and the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative............................48 
 2.7.2 Multi–Donor Budgetary Support................................................................50 
 2.7.3 The Millennium Development Goals.........................................................52 
2.8 Conclusion.................................................................................................................57 
 
CHAPTER 3: MAKING AID EFFECTIVE: EFFORTS, ISSUES AND GAPS………58 
 
 3.1 Why Has Aid Been Ineffective?....................................................................59 
 3.1.1. Aid and Donors’ Strategic Interests..............................................59  
 3.1.2 Aid and the Dependency Theory....................................................63  
 3.2 Efforts at Making Aid Effective....................................................................67 
 3.2.1 Results–Based Financing (Tied–Aid Repackaged)........................67  
 3.2.2 Aid–Agenda Conferences...............................................................70  
 3.2.3 Program–Based Approaches (CDD)..............................................73  
 3.3 The World Bank’s Commitment to Community–Driven Development…...75 
 3.4 The World Bank’s Framework for Engaging Local Govt Structures……....80 
 
 3.5 Conclusion.....................................................................................................83  
 
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY...................................................................................85 
 4.1 Why Ethno–Methodology?...........................................................................85  
 4.2 Case Study Boundaries..................................................................................87 
 4.3 The Fieldwork Experience............................................................................88 
4.4 Limitations....................................................................................................90  
4.5 Ethical Considerations..................................................................................91 
 4.6 Data Collection.............................................................................................92 
   
 xi 
  4.6.1 Review of Literature/Documents...................................................92 
  4.6.2 Participant–Observation.................................................................93  
  4.6.3 Interviews/ Focus Group Discussions............................................96 
  4.6.4 Open–Ended Questionnaires..........................................................99 
 4.7 Data Analysis...............................................................................................100 
 4.8 Conclusion...................................................................................................102 
 
CHAPTER 5: GHANA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A DECEPTIVE ‘HIGH 
FUNCTIONING’ SYSTEM?........................................................................................104  
 
 5.1 Ghana’s Local Government System: A Brief Overview.............................105 
5.2 Is Ghana’s Local Government System ‘High–Functioning’?.....................108 
  5.2.1Decentralisation laws [that] create Autonomous Local   
  Government Structures..........................................................................108 
 5.2.2 Fiscal Decentralisation.................................................................110 
      5.2.3 Local Government Elections........................................................112 
  5.2.4 Devolution of Service Delivery...................................................115 
 5.3 Summary………………………………………………………….............116 
 5.4 The Plight of Assembly Members in Ghana……………………………...117 
  5.4.1 Managing Personal Life and People’s Expectations in an  
  Unpaid Job.............................................................................................118 
 
 5.4.2 Relating to ‘Partisan’ District Chief Executives..........................121 
 5.4.3 Working with weak Unit Committees………………………….124 
 5.4.4 Relating to Traditional Chiefs......................................................127 
 5.5 Conclusion...................................................................................................127 
 
CHAPTER 6: COMMUNITY: CONTESTED CONCEPTS AND     
MISINTERPRETATIONS...........................................................................................128 
 
 6.1 Community: Conceptual Controversies......................................................130 
 6.2 Community Conceptualised........................................................................134 
 6.3 Research Findings.......................................................................................136 
  6.3.1 Case Study I: Tease, Kwawu North District................................136 
  6.3.2 Case Study II: Tashie, Tema Municipality...................................143 
  6.3.3 Case Study III: Agbetor, Ketu Northwest District……………...150 
 
 6.4 Conclusion...................................................................................................155 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
CHAPTER 7: WHEN EMPOWERMENT DISEMPOWERS: THE CASE OF 
GHANAIAN TRADITIONAL CHIEFS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS...................................................................................................................157 
 
 7.1 Empowerment: Background and Conceptual Issues...................................158 
 7.2 The CBRDP and the Concept of Empowerment.........................................163 
 7.3 Traditional Chiefs versus Local Government Officials...............................165 
  7.3.1 Aboloo, Greater Accra Region………………………………….166 
  7.3.2 Ntoaso, Eastern Region................................................................172 
 7.4 Conclusion………………………………………………………………...177  
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION......................................................................................180 
 Finding I: The World Bank’s mistaken categorisation of Ghana’s   
  decentralisation system as highly functional negatively impacted on the 
  design, implementation and outcomes of the CBRDP……………..…180 
  
 Finding II: The lack of ‘community’ in the CBRDP beneficiary localities  
  affected the implementation and maintenance of the CBRDP  
  projects………………………………………………………………..183 
 
  Finding III: The CBRDP’s inappropriate application of the concept of  
  ‘empowerment’ led to tensions between Traditional Chiefs and Local 
  Government Official………………………………………………….185 
 
 Implication for Development Theory and Practise…………………………...186 
 
 
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................191 
 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
 Appendix A: CBRDP components....................................................................216 
 Appendix B: Questionnaire...............................................................................219  
 Appendix C: Permission to study the CBRDP..................................................221 
 Appendix D: Letter of introduction from the CBRDP......................................222 
 Appendix E: Letter of introduction from the Edith Cowan University.............223 
 Appendix F: Permission to obtain secondary data from Ghana’s Ministry of 
 Finance and Economic Planning.......................................................................224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1.1: Locating Map of Ghana on the African continent............................13 
Figure 1.2: Emblems of the two Dominant Political Parties in Ghana...............14 
Figure 1.3: Structure of Ghana’s Local Government System.............................16 
Figure 1.4: GDP– Real Growth Rate (%) in Ghana in a Decade Compared.......20 
Figure 1.5: Net ODA as Percentage of Central Government Expense................21 
Figure 1.6: CBRDP Zonal Demarcations............................................................27 
Figure 2.1: DAC Members net ODA1990–2008 and DAC Secretariat    
 Simulation of Net ODA to 2009 and 2010..........................................................41 
Figure 2.2: Net ODA received (% of GNI) of Afghanistan, Iraq and 
 Pakistan Compared..............................................................................................46 
 Figure 2.3: Net ODA to Ghana 1970–2010 Compared in USD Millions...........47 
 Figure 2.4: Ghana’s Public Debt as Percentage of GDP.....................................49 
 Figure 2.5: ODA Forms Ghana Received in a Decade compared in     
 Millions USD.......................................................................................................51 
 Figure 2.6: Current Global Distance to the MDGs..............................................55 
 Figure 2.7: Countries on Target to Achieve the MDGs, by Region....................55 
 Figure 3.1: Aid as Percentage of Ghana and Botswana GNI 1980–2008...........66  
 Figure 3.2: Characteristics of CDD Projects.......................................................76 
 Figure 3.3 World Bank Lending in Support of CDD Programs in USD 
 (Billions)..............................................................................................................77 
 Figure 3.4:  CDD as Percentage of IDA Lending...............................................77 
 Figure 3.5: Number of Active IDA–Funded CDD Operations by Fiscal Year
 from 2000............................................................................................................78 
 Figure 3.6: CDD Institutional Alternatives.........................................................80 
 Figure 4.1: Data Collection Tools.......................................................................92 
 Figure 4.2: Conceptual/Analytical Frameworks................................................101 
 Figure 5.1: Structure of Ghana’s Local Government System in the  
 Fourth Republic.................................................................................................106 
 Figure 5.2: Percentage of National Average of Voter Turnouts in District 
 Assembly Elections 1978–2010........................................................................113 
 Figure 5.3: Percentages of Voter Turnouts to Presidential Elections 1992–
 2008...................................................................................................................113 
 Figure 5.4: Number of Unit Committees with Zero Nominations per Region 
 in 2010...............................................................................................................114 
 Figure 6.1: Conceptual Framework of a ‘Community’.....................................135 
 Figure 6.1: Eastern Region: Locating Afram Plains and Kwawu South...........137 
 Figure 6.2: Afram Plains: Locating Tease Township........................................137 
 Figure 6.3: Greater Accra Region: Locating Tema Municipal      
 Assembly/Tashie...............................................................................................144 
 Figure 6.4: Tashie Presby Basic School Population by Class 2010..................146 
 Figure 6.6: Ketu Northwest District Locating Agbetor.....................................151 
 
 
 
 xiv 
LIST OF TABLES 
  
 Table 1.1: Aid–Dependency in Ghana and Sub–Saharan Compared..................20 
 Table 1.2: Implementation Processes of the CBRDP in the Area Councils……24 
 Table 1.3: Profiles of the CBRDP Beneficiary Localities in Zone IV................28 
 Table 2.2: MDBS Disbursements for the Period 2003 – 2010 (in millions)…...52 
 Table 2.3: Ghana’s Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals......56 
 Table 3.1: Classification of African Countries Context......................................81 
 Table 4.1: Focus Groups’ Sampling Structure per Project Type and  
 Beneficiary Group...............................................................................................98 
 Table 6.1: Characteristics of a ‘Community’....................................................133 
 
LIST OF PHOTOS 
 
 Photo 4.1: The researcher on a familiarisation tour in Pakro, the Eastern  
 Region..................................................................................................................89 
 Photo 4.2: The researcher interacting with pupils from the Agbetor  Primary 
 School..................................................................................................................94 
 Photo 4.3: The researcher on a farm in the Afram Plains...................................95 
 Photo 4.4: The researcher in a focus group discussion with parents in Agoe…98 
 Photo 6.1: The deteriorating Tease CBRDP Market........................................140 
 Photo 6.2: Tease traders selling the wares in the sun, while the Market 
 Project is empty.................................................................................................140 
 Photo 6.3: The renovated Tashie Presby School…………………………...…144 
 Photo 6.4: The deteriorating state of the Tashie Presby School………………145 
 Photo 6.5: The state of textbooks at the Tashie Presby School……………….146 
 Photo 6.6: The Agbetor CBRDP Three-Unit Classroom Block……………....151 
 Photo 7.1: Exterior of the Aboloo CBRDP library……………………………168 
 Photo 7.2: Interior of the Aboloo CBRDP library…………………………….168 
 Photo 7.3 Male entrance of the Ntoaso CBRDP...............................................175 
 Photo 7.4: Female entrance of the Ntoaso CBRDP…………………………...175 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 BARD: Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development 
 CAP: Community Action Plans 
 CBRDP: Community-Based Rural Development Program  
 CDD: Community Driven Development 
 DAC: Development Assistance Committee  
 DACF: District Assembly Common Funds 
 GDP: Gross Domestic Product  
 GHC: Ghana cedis 
 GPRS: Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy  
 GSS: Ghana Statistical Services 
 ILGS: Institute of Local Government Studies   
 IMF: International Monetary Fund  
 ISSER: Institute of Social, Statistical and Economic and Research 
 LGO: Local Government Officials 
 MDA: Municipal/District Assembly 
 MDG: Millennium Development Goals 
 MLGRDE: Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development & Environment 
 MOFEP: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
 MTDP: Medium Term Development Plan 
 ODA: Official Development Aid 
 OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
 PBA: Programme-Based Approaches  
 PNDC: Provisional National Defence Council 
 P-O: Participant-Observation 
 RICUs: Regional Coordinating Units  
 
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
“Donors tend to know relatively little about the communities in which they are trying to 
bring about change” 
Lancaster (1999, p. 493) 
 
1.0 Overview 
This thesis critically examines International Development Aid (aid), and shows why an 
understanding of the local context of aid recipients is crucial for achieving aid 
effectiveness.  The thesis argues that aid programs that are fashioned on contested 
decentralisation theories and complex concepts (such as ‘community’ and 
‘empowerment’), have a lesser chance of achieving positive outcomes, particularly if 
such terms are at variance with the contextual realities of the beneficiary country and 
local communities. The data was generated using qualitative and ethnographic research 
tools over seven months in nine districts and localities of the Eastern, Greater Accra and 
Volta Regions of Ghana, West Africa.  
 
A joint World Bank and Government of Ghana pilot program, the Community–Based 
Rural Development Project (CBRDP) was used as the case study. The overall objective 
of the CBRDP was to empower rural populations to participate actively in issues 
affecting their lives, while supporting Ghana’s decentralisation process. Beneficiary 
localities received fixed seed money to implement and maintain projects selected from 
predetermined categories (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006; Yaron 2008). 
Designed as a community-driven development program, the local people were expected 
to contribute labour to complete and own the projects. Considering that only nine of the 
projects (out of over two hundred) were studied, the thesis does not evaluate or audit the 
CBRDP as a whole or draw generalised conclusions on its performance nationally. 
Rather, it seeks to provide insights into how key concepts and decentralisation theories, 
that underpin community-based programs, impacted on the CBRDPs. At the same time 
the thesis found these concepts were at variance with the demographic realities of 
Ghana and the selected localities. 
 
This research developed out of my curiosity to understand why aid, altruistic as it 
appears, sometimes fails to improve lives in Ghana and other aid–dependent countries. 
After reviewing the aid literature, I found that although there is a great deal of published 
work on aid in Ghana, it seemed to be predominantly ‘economicentric’, failing to 
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explain how it works practically on the ground. Although these econometric analyses 
were sometimes hard to understand, they urged me to read further on global efforts at 
making aid effective. Of importance was the inadequate focus on the theories and 
concepts on which aid programs are based.  
 
The popularity of Community–Driven Development (CDD) programs, as an effective 
aid delivery mechanism at the World Bank, attracted me to review its concepts and 
operations. Although CDD promised many prospects for achieving aid effectiveness, it 
was found that, like other development programs, the approach is underpinned by 
contested decentralisation theories and inherently complex concepts such as 
‘participation’, ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’. Additionally, the readings revealed 
that because these terms appear to be idealised, the World Bank in particular, and other 
international development agencies seem to use them in program designs without 
considering their appropriateness and the demographical realities of the relevant 
contexts (see Botchway 2001; Mosse & Lewis 2005; Riddell 2007, Binswanger et al. 
2010; Mavrotas 2010, World Bank 2006a, 2010a). Furthermore, little is known 
empirically on how these complex concepts influence CDD programs in culturally–
complex contexts like Ghana.  
 
As will be discussed in 1.5, three indisputable facts about Ghana make the country an 
interesting context for studying CDD programs. First, Ghana’s local government system 
is inherently partisan with weak sub–structures (Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). 
As argued in Chapter Five, this fact questions the World Bank’s categorisation of the 
country’s local government system as highly functional, and better placed to implement 
a CDD program (Binswanger et al. 2010). Second, while no part of the country is 
ethnically homogeneous, Ghana is a multi–ethnic and religious country. Given that 
‘community’ is complex and deceptive construct (Delanty 2003; Tesoriero 2010), 
Ghana’s ethnic diversity presents an interesting case for understanding the term in 
practice.  
 
Designed as a type of CDD, Ghana’s Community-Based Rural Development Projects 
(CBRDP) aimed to strengthen and empower the hitherto weak local government sub–
structures (Area Councils, Assembly Members and Unit Committees). A review of the 
‘empowerment’ literature suggests that the concept is complex and could be 
inappropriately applied (Clifford 2001; Mosse 2001; Cornish 2006; Tesoriero 2010; 
Hancock et al. 2011). Additionally, empowerment is not a neutral term, as an attempt to 
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empower one group may lead to the disempowerment of others (Mansuri & Rao 2004; 
Hancock et al. 2011). Regarded as development brokers at the local level, Traditional 
Chiefs are very influential in Ghana (Arhin 2002; Knierzinger 2011). Therefore I was 
curious to understand how the Chiefs would react to the CBRDP’s quest to ‘empower’ 
the country’s local government officials. These three intriguing observations influenced 
the motivations and the framing of the research questions. 
 
1.1 Primary Research Question 
 
How were the outcomes of the Community–Based Rural Development Projects 
in selected Districts of Ghana influenced by contested decentralisation theories 
and complex concepts such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’? 
 
 Secondary Research Questions 
 
1) How did the World Bank’s categorisation of Ghana’s decentralisation 
system as highly functional impact on the design of the CBRDPs? 
 
2) In what ways did the lack of ‘Community’ in the CBRDP beneficiary 
localities impact on the project’s outcomes?  
 
3) In what way(s) did the CBRDP’s inappropriate application of 
‘Empowerment’ impact on the relationship between Traditional Chiefs and 
Local Government Officials? 
 
 
1.2 Significance of the Thesis 
 
In the overarching sense, the thesis is a contribution to theory and practice of 
international development studies, from an anthropological and community 
development perspective. It also adds to the literature, theory and practise of the aid 
effectiveness agenda, specifically the need to understanding aid recipients’ local 
contexts. While the research is certainly not the first to examine Project Aid and the 
policies that drive it (see Botchway 2001; Mosse & Lewis 2005; Pomerantz 2004; 
Easterly 2006; Riddell 2007), the thesis seeks to make three specific contributions. The 
first relates to the setting of the research, Ghana. Over the past fifty years in excess of 
USD 5 billion worth of aid has been invested in the country1. While 60% of ODA to 
Ghana came in the form of Project Aid, very little research has been carried out on how 
the local context and its dynamics impact on such programs. The aid literature on Ghana 
seems ‘economicentric’ and tends to focus on tied–aid (Baffour 1999; Osei 2004; Clay 
                                                
1 Including the 2012 Chinese US$ 3 billion loan (Quartey et al. n.d; GoG Budget Statement 2012). 
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et al. 2009), lack of coordination among donors (Aryeetey et al. 2003; Whitfield 2005; 
2008; Woll 2008), and aid politics (Whitfield 2008). Using Ghana’s CBRDP as a case 
study, this thesis provides insights into how contested decentralisation theories and 
complex concepts impact on Project Aid outcomes in the country, a subject which is 
barely researched.  
 
This is timely because, while ‘experts’ often cite the country as an example where 
Project Aid really works, there have been concerns that this aid lacks sustainability. For 
example, the Operation Evaluation Department of the World Bank found in 2004 that 
projects completed in Ghana over a five–year period had been unsustainable and having 
less impact on the rural sector (World Bank 2004a, p. 29). Other recent studies have 
also arrived at similar conclusions on the National Health Insurance Scheme (Adusei–
Asante 2009); the Capitation Grant in public primary schools (Ampratwum & Armah-
Attoh 2010); and on Social Investment Funds (Anyidoho forthcoming). In 2012, the 
World Bank also warned the country against white elephant programs2. Thus, this 
research provides insights into the issues that impact on development and aid–funded 
programs in the country. 
 
The second contribution of the thesis relates to the methodology. This thesis is an 
example of the usefulness of employing ethno–methodology for researching the issues 
that impact on aid programs. Termed ‘aidnography’ [qualitative study of aid], the 
approach has been confirmed by others as an effective way of understanding how local 
contexts affect aid outcomes (Botchway 2001; Gould 2004; Mosse 2005). This thesis 
confirms the potency of the ‘aidnography’ research methodology and why the 
‘development fraternity’ needs to start considering it in their quest to understand how 
their aid works practically on the ground. 
 
Finally, the thesis also contributes to a better understanding of issues affecting Ghana’s 
local government and decentralisation systems, which many local scholars and the 
country’s Constitutional Review Commission (CRC)3 have observed has stagnated 
(Kyei–Baffour 2009; Owusu 2009; Ahwoi 2010; Gyimah–Boadi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 
2010; Constitutional Review Commission 2011). The thesis is therefore timely as it 
unearths the problems and challenges confronting the local government sub–structures; 
                                                
2 http://ghanaian-chronicle.com/?p=36829, retrieved June 15, 2012. 
3 They were tasked with developing recommendations for amending the current constitution.  Chapter 
Seven of the final report indicates that the country’s local government laws needs to be amended so that 
more power and resources are moved from the centre to the units. 
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and may be useful to the CRC in drafting legislative instruments to improve and 
strengthen the country’s decentralisation process. 
 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
This Chapter presents an introduction and background to the thesis. It informs readers 
about the research by outlining its scope and focus. The chapter discusses the issues that 
informed the research, the research questions, and the contribution of the research and 
the thesis outline. The chapter also defines International Development Aid as used in 
the thesis; discusses the relevance of focusing on complex concepts and how they 
influence aid effectiveness. An overview of Ghana’s social, political and economic 
settings is also presented to contextualise the country’s dynamics, which forms the basis 
of the thesis. Additionally, the chapter discusses the CBRDP, the case study project on 
which the thesis is based. Specifically, its design and implementation strategies are 
examined to outline some of the loopholes that have bedevilled the project.  
 
The history and trends of International Development Aid and how they have impacted 
on various development programs in Ghana are discussed in Chapter Two. The chapter 
seeks to justify the choice of Ghana as the setting for this research by establishing the 
extent to which the country has increasingly depended on aid and experimented various 
development assistance programs since the mid–1960s.  As of 2012, the country is 
believed to have consumed aid in excess of USD 5 billion (Government of Ghana 
Budget Statement 2012; Quartey et al. n.d.).  
 
Chapter Three reviews relevant aid literature so as to establish gaps the thesis attempts 
to fill. The chapter discusses the factors believed to have contributed to aid 
ineffectiveness as well as efforts at making it work, particularly, Program–Based 
Approaches such as Community–Driven Development (CDD). It argues that while 
CDD is celebrated at the World Bank, its pivotal theories and concepts are contested, 
and as this thesis argues, can potentially impact negatively on the project’s outcomes.  
 
Chapter Four explains the methodology: the research tools and techniques employed to 
explore how complex concepts and contested decentralisation theories influenced the 
outcomes of Ghana’s CBRDP. The chapter discusses the fieldwork experiences, the 
positionality of the researcher and ethical considerations. Additionally, the chapter 
presents the theoretical importance of the research approach, ethno–methodology; and 
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thoroughly describes how the data were collected and analysed, as well as the 
limitations of the research.  
 
One of the pivotal theories of Community-Driven Development (CDD) program is that 
countries (including Ghana) with ‘high–functioning’ local institutions are better placed 
to implement CDD programs. Chapter Five challenges this claim. Within the 
framework of the World Bank’s four indicators, the chapter uses secondary data to 
argue that Ghana’s local government institutions do not appear to be highly functional 
as the World Bank claims. Drawing on the empirical data, the chapter reveals some of 
the issues that are impacting on the functions of Assembly Members, who are key 
facilitators of local development in Ghana. The findings and the discussion that ensures 
show that the country’s local government sub–structures are weak because of seeming 
partisan political machinations and the centralising tendencies of the constitutional 
provisions, which established the system.  
 
The Sixth Chapter focuses on the term ‘community’ and how its ambiguity makes it a 
complex concept. The chapter begins by briefly exploring the literature to establish an 
analytical framework for securitising the ‘communitiness’ or otherwise of the localities 
researched. Drawing on evidence from three localities as case studies, the chapter 
concludes that, while the projects were supposedly ‘community–based’, ‘communities’ 
hardly existed in many of the beneficiary localities. Also, while the CBRDP was 
supposed to be implemented in rural localities, some were implemented in urban areas, 
a mistake that bedevilled the otherwise laudable CBRDP.  
 
The Seventh Chapter examines another CDD pivotal concept, ‘empowerment’. Through 
a brief discursive overview of the concept, the chapter draws readers’ attention to the 
conceptual difficulties the term generates. It argues that because the concept carries a 
broad meaning, it allows for many blind spots and pitfalls. Drawing on two case studies 
from the empirical data, the chapter discusses conflicts that ensued between Traditional 
Chiefs and local government officials during the implementation of the CBRDP. These 
conflicts primarily stemmed from the fact that, while the project’s designers sought to 
empower local government officials, they seem to have: 1) Taken the influence of 
Traditional Chiefs for granted; and 2) Failed to appreciate the complexity of the concept 
of ‘empowerment’ and the ‘non–neutrality’ of power: empowering one group means 
disempowering others.  
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The eighth and concluding chapter binds all the chapters into one integrative format. It 
directly answers the research questions and presents the major findings of the thesis, as 
well as their implication for development theory and practice.  
 
1.4 International Development Aid Defined? 
Various scholars have defined aid differently (see Lancaster 1999; Kanbur 2003; Moyo 
2009). However, according to Riddell (2007), the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)4 has 
led the most substantial work undertaken to develop an operational definition of aid as: 
Flows to countries and territories on the DAC list of ODA recipients and to 
multilateral development institutions which are (i) provided by official agencies, 
including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and (ii) 
each transaction of which (a) is administered with the promotion of the 
economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main 
objective; and (b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at 
least 25 percent 
 	  (OECD 2008, p. 1). 
 
Some commentators have criticised the above definition. For example, Riddell (2007, p. 
1) argues that the definition fails to mention what the Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) impact is, or the extent to which giving and receiving are voluntary acts based 
on some degree of conditionality or coercion. Other scholars seem to interpret the 
definition’s reference to ‘development’ as its main objective to mean promoting 
‘westernization’. Such scholars argue that the concept carries with it a notion of 
‘labelling’ and Western imperialism to imply ‘superiority’ and ‘differentiation’, where 
some countries are labelled as ‘Third World’, [‘Developing’] or  ‘Less Developed’ and 
others as ‘First World’ and ‘Developed’ (Brown 1974; Fergusson 1990; Mehmet 1999; 
Eyben 2007). The notion that aid promotes ‘development’, therefore, tends to generate 
perceptions that the concept (aid) is ‘always’ used as a tool for the perpetration of 
cultural imperialism; although aid may be given genuinely for humanitarian reasons 
(Crush 1995; Escobar 1997; Li 2007). 
 
There are three forms of aid: Humanitarian or Emergency Aid, Project Aid and 
Systematic Aid (Easterly 2006; Collier 2007; Moyo 2009).  Humanitarian aid is 
mobilised in response to disasters, for example, to help flood victims (Moyo 2009). 
Project Aid, according to Riddell (2007), refers to specific projects dominated by 
                                                
4 Formed in 1960 by leading donor governments to coordinate and promote aid from donor governments 
(see http://www.oecd.org/document, retrieved March 20, 2010).  
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interventions in health, education and community development. Project Aid has 
remained the dominant form of development assistance provided in Africa since 2000, 
and accounts for over 50% of the net ODA Ghana currently receives (Amoako–Tuffour 
2005; Riddell 2007; Quartey et al. n.d.). Systematic Aid refers to payments made to 
governments either through government–to–government transfer (bilateral) or 
transferred through institutions such as the World Bank Group (Moyo 2009).  
 
The definition of aid is further complicated by the recent differentiation between ODA 
and Official Aid, although both are provided under similar terms and conditions. The 
World Bank and the OECD/DAC regard ODA as the assistance given to poorer or 
developing countries outside of Europe, while the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union, and certain ‘advanced’ countries and territories 
[such as Greece, Spain and Italy who may be temporarily experiencing economic 
hardships] are the targets of Official Aid5. Owing to the controversies surrounding the 
definition above, aid is used in this thesis to simply refer to ODA for Project and 
Systematic purposes; while ‘aid effectiveness’ refers to delivering aid in a way that 
achieves value for money and maximizes impact on the relevant beneficiaries within the 
framework of donors specific program objectives (Riddell 2007; Killen 2011). 
 
1.5 Aid Effectiveness: Why Do Theories and Concepts ‘Matter’? 
After more than seven decades of its introduction, donors and their agencies, 
development organisations and academics are still searching for ways to make aid 
effective. The search is indicative of the dissatisfaction with the performance of aid, and 
the desperate pursuit of ideas to make it effectual (Easterly 2006; Riddell 2007). 
Consequently, since 2000, three different, but concurrently running mechanisms for 
delivering and achieving aid effectiveness can be identified. These include: Results–
Based Financing, Aid–Agenda Conferences and Program–Based Approaches (Riddell 
2007; Binswanger et al. 2010; World Bank 2000, 2006b, 2010b, 2011; Yogita et al. 
2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011; OECD 2011). Notably, the World Bank has been a key 
player in these efforts, which have partly contributed to the doubling of the aid quantum 
from US$ 60 billion in 2002 to almost US$ 129 billion in 20106. 
 
                                                
5 See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net–official–
development–assistance–and–official–aid–received–us–dollar–wb–data.html, all  retrieved November 11, 
2011. 
6http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3746,en_2649_37413_47515235_1_1_1_37413,00.html, retrieved 
March 15 2012. 
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Results–Based Financing (RBF), an aid delivery mechanism, was introduced in the 
World Bank in 2002. RBF ties the disbursement of aid funds to the attainment of 
specific results that directly improve access to specific sectors of the recipient country, 
such as healthcare, education communication, energy, and transportation (Yogita, 
Johannes & Kumar 2010; Birdsall, Mahgoud & Savedoff 2010). Proponents of RBF 
claim that it increases transparency, accountability and the engagement of private sector 
capital and expertise. They also maintain that RBF encourages innovation of public 
funding and enables monitoring of results (Birdsall et al. 2010; Savedoff 20117).  
 
However, the model’s focus on results rather than processes has been criticised. First, it 
seems to contradict concerns that development is not just about results and money, but 
trust (Pomerantz 2004; Eyben 2006; Kaberuka 2011); and as the thesis argues, about 
beneficiaries’ contests vis-a-vis concepts, theories and discourses that shape 
development programs. Second, the focus on results seems to reinforce 
‘conditionalities’ and aid–tying, clauses known to have bedeviled aid effectiveness in 
the past (Kanbur 2003; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Lastly, the efficiency of RBF 
mechanisms varies by sectors and countries, a limitation that weakens its potential of 
being accepted as a standard model for achieving aid effectiveness globally (Yogita et 
al. 2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011).  
 
The second mechanism, Aid–Agenda Conferences (AAC), provides donors, aid 
consumers and other relevant stakeholders with the platform to share ideas on aid 
financing, effectiveness and policy formulation.  Examples of AAC include the G8 and 
G20 Summits; the Monterrey 2002 and Doha 2008 Conferences to review Financing for 
Development; and the UK Commission for Africa. In recent times, the so–called High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLFA) has become very popular with four 
successfully held conferences in Rome (2003), Paris (2005), Accra (2008), and Busan 
(2011). While some of the above AAC have achieved some results, the latter are 
minimal. As argued in Chapter Three, despite its popularity, the HLFA appears to have 
become a bureaucratic formality, as most donors ignore the agreements they pledged to 
uphold (Mavrotas 2010). For example, the OECD (2011) painted a damning picture of 
the achievement of the 2005 Paris Declaration, as members of the OECD/DAC are not 
adhering to the benchmarks they set for themselves.  
 
                                                
7 http://www.gpoba.org/gpoba/what–is–oba, retrieved March 16, 2012. 
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The third mechanism for achieving aid effectiveness, which is the focus of this thesis, is 
termed Program–Based Approaches (PBA). PBA is a strong move away from project-
based approaches to delivering aid. PBA appear more promising as they seem to 
promote programs that espouse local ownership and participatory development; and 
normative, but inherently complex concepts such as ‘community’, and ‘empowerment’ 
(World Bank 1996; 2000a). Since 2000, Community–Driven Development (CDD) 
programs have become a popular PBA celebrated particularly at the World Bank, 
receiving funding worth over $1.3 billion (Mansuri & Rao 2003; Binswanger et al. 
2010). While its proponents appear to deify it as the panacea to aid effectiveness 
puzzles (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Binswanger et al. 2010; World Bank 2010b), this thesis 
presents an opposite picture of how CDD programs work in complex societies. 
Underlying the findings is the argument that the program is underpinned by complex 
concepts and contested theories that have little relevance for complex societies like 
Ghana.  
 
Incidentally, as some commentators have observed, these concepts and theories are 
constantly being used by ‘development experts’ because: 1) Many of them have never 
set foot in the countries in which they are applied and as a result do not understand the 
local dynamics (Lancaster 1999; Easterly 2008); 2) It offers the convenience of 
homogenisation (Cohen & Uphoff 1980; Scrimgeour 1997; Guilt & Shah 1998); and 3) 
They are terms one can hardly be against, because they seem good by definition and on 
normative grounds, even if the empirical basis is not clear (Botchway 2001; Hancock et 
al. 2011). This thesis therefore asserts that it is too early to deify CDD programs as the 
answer to aid effectiveness enigmas, given that the pivotal theories and concepts are 
questionable and at variance with the realities of the beneficiary country.  
 
The aid literature, as Chapter Three of the thesis will show, appears to blame aid 
ineffectiveness constantly on 1) The politics that influence the giving of aid (Cassen 
1994; Riddell 2007); 2) Aid itself, in that it creates dependency (Easterly 2006; Moyo 
2009); 3) The implementing country’s conditions (Burnside & Dollar 2000; Collier 
2007); and 4) The lack of aid coordination among donors (Knack & Rahman 2007; 
Woll 2008). While these factors are relevant and have led some to argue that aid must 
stop (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009), this thesis shows they are not the only reasons why 
aid has been ineffective. Theories and concepts on which aid programs are based really 
‘matter’. Concepts such as community, empowerment, participatory development and 
sustainability seem to have been incorporated in the diction of the development industry 
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and used in aid policy documents (see Mansuri & Rao 2004; Easterly 2006; Riddell 
2007; Binswanger et al. 2010, World Bank 1998, 2000, 2004b, 2005, 2006b, 2010b). 
Beyond their normative values however, ‘what they mean’ theoretically, sometimes 
seems irrelevant to the contexts in which they are practically applied. Even so, few 
academic studies have scrutinised how they influence aid effectiveness in politically-
factionalised and ethnically-diverse settings like Ghana.  
 
1.6 Why Research on Community–Driven Development in Ghana? 
As Figure 1.1 shows below, Ghana is located on the Gulf of Guinea along the West 
Coast of Africa, a few degrees north of the Equator. The country had a population of 
24,658,823 (Ghana Statistical Services 2012). A former colony of Great Britain until 
March 6, 1957, Ghana is not just an aid–recipient country, but also a major player in the 
aid effectiveness agenda, having hosted the Third High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness in 2008. Many donors are convinced that the country is the proof that 
development works and an example that the sub–regional neighbours must emulate8.   
Ghana’s social demographics, economy and political characteristics, similar to its sub–
regional neighbours, present interesting insights for aid policy discussions, particularly 
those that espouse the ideals of Community-Driven Development (CDD). It is important 
to explore briefly these characteristics and their relevance to the research. 
 
1.6.1. Social Characteristics  
Ghana is a multi–ethnic country defined by linguistic and cultural characteristics9. 
There are over two hundred and fifty languages and dialects, but English is the 
country’s official language, although most Ghanaians also speak at least one local 
language. The 2010 Government Census broke down religious divisions in the country 
as follows: Christian 71.2%, Muslim 17.6%, and African Traditional Religion 5.2%; 
some 5.3% Ghanaians are not affiliated to any religion (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). 
These diversities notwithstanding, no part of Ghana is ethnically, linguistically and 
religiously homogeneous, although a certain group may dominate. All the three regions 
researched (Greater Accra, Eastern and Volta Regions) share these characteristics, as 
described below.  
 
                                                
8 See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ghana, http://www.usaid.gov/gh/welcome/, retrieved March 24, 2011. 
9 Although the Akan make up 50% of the population. 
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While the GA10 people dominate the Greater Accra Region, almost all ethnic groups in 
the country are represented there. The nation’s capital city (Accra) is also situated there, 
and although it is the smallest region in terms of geographical size, it is the second most 
populated region11 (4, 010, 054), representing 16.3% of the country’s population 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2012). Over two million people reside in Accra (GSS 2012). 
Being multi–ethnic and busy, the city presents interesting demographical facts for 
studying how CDD programs work on the ground. The Eastern Region is the third most 
populated area in Ghana (2, 633, 154, representing 10.7% of the country’s population) 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2012). The region is also one of the most ethnically diverse in 
the country, comprising four major ethnic groupings, namely Akan (52.1%), the GA–
Dangme (18.9%), the Ewes (15.9%) and the Guans (7.2%)12. It is important to note that 
within each of the major ethnic groups, there are differences. For example, the Akan 
people in the region consist of the Akwapim in the south, the Akyem in the west and the 
Kwawu in the north. All the three religious groups are also present in the region. 
According to the 2010 census, 2, 118, 252 people, representing 8.6% of the national 
population reside in the Volta Region (Ghana Statistical Service 2012). While the Ewe 
are in the majority (68.5%), seven other major ethnic groups can be found there13. Like 
the two regions mentioned above, all the three religions are present in the Volta 
Region14 (Ghana Statistical Service 2012).  
 
The multi–religious, cultural and dialectal characteristics of the three regions presented 
many challenges for the implementation of the CBRDP. These stemmed from the 
design of the project as a ‘community–based’ initiative. While on face value, 
‘community’ is appealing and connotes collegiality and local collective ideals; it is a 
contested and deceptive term (Amin 2005; Kelly 2008; Defillippis, Fisher & Shragge 
2010). As Chapter Six will show, the designers of Ghana’s CBRDP seem to have taken 
the characteristics of the regions in question for granted, oblivious to the fact that the 
more ethnically diverse a locality is, the higher the risk of a community-based project 
failing there (Labonne & Chase 2007). The term ‘community’ appears to have been 
erroneously ‘spatialised’, homogenised, labelled and forced on many of the beneficiary 
                                                
10 Name of an ethnic group. 
11 The Asante Region has the highest population of 4,725, 046 representing 19.5% of the population.  
12 http://www.modernghana.com, retrieved December 13, 2011. 
13 They include the Guan (9.2%), the Akan (8.5%) and the Gurma (6.5%). The region also houses other 
minority ethnic groups constituting less than 2% of the population: The Ga–Adangbe, Mole-Dagbani, 
Grusi and the Mande–Busanga. 
14 http://ghanadistricts.com/region, retrieved December 15, 2011. 
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localities, even though their grounded realities and mobility patterns showed that 
‘communities’ on which the projects were ‘based’ seemed not to exist practically.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 Locating Map of Ghana on the African continent 
Source: http://thebrightestman.wikispaces.com/Sergio+Ghana+Safari, retrieved March 20, 2012. 
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1.6.2. Political Setting 
Ghana has a dual system of political governance: the Western-styled democratic system 
and the traditional system or Chieftaincy. The country’s democratic system was 
necessitated by British colonialism, which began in the early Nineteenth Century (Buah 
1998; Donkor 2005). Ghana became the first Sub–Saharan African country to gain 
independence from the British on March 6, 1957, led by its first President, Dr. Kwame 
Nkrumah of the Convention People’s Party (CPP). Right from independence, Ghana has 
adopted a presidential democratic system of government with an elected parliament and 
independent judiciary. Since 1957, six military and civilian governments have led the 
country, although the Fourth Republic (1992) has witnessed uninterrupted regimes of 
J.J. Rawlings (1992–2000), J.A. Kufour (2000–2008), J.E.A. Mills15 (2009– July 24, 
2012), and now, J. Mahama (July 25, 2012 to date).  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Emblems of the two Dominant Political Parties in Ghana 
                  
 
 
Left: National Democratic Congress (Social Democrats), Right: New Patriotic Party (Liberals 
Democrats). Source: www.ghanaweb.com. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 President Mills died and did not finish his first term. J. Mahama, who was the Vice President, has been 
sworn in as the President. 
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Ghana is a politically–sensitive country; virtually every national event or program is 
politicised. As Chapter Five will show, the CBRDP was politicised. Two political 
parties are dominant in Ghana (see emblems above): the ruling National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). Both political parties have activist 
groups they call ‘foot–soldiers’; these are supposedly the men and women who work 
hard for their respective political parties at the grassroots level to win elections. ‘Foot–
soldiers’ have become so influential that they are able to boycott and sabotage national 
programs, seize state properties or even demand the dismissal of Ministers of state and 
government officials16. As the findings will show in the fifth chapter, the ‘foot–soldiers’ 
of the NPP, under whose regime the CBRDP was implemented, tended to capture some 
of the projects, a situation which discouraged ‘non–party members’ to contribute to the 
implementation and sustainability of the projects.  
 
Ghana’s democratic setting allows for the operation of a local government system that 
consists of Regional Coordinating Councils and a four–tier and three–tier Municipal/ 
District (Figure 1.3). Within the local government system, District Assemblies (DAs)17 
are the most influential (Tettey 2006; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). While constitutionally 
mandated to be the hub of development at the local level, the operations of the DAs 
offer many loopholes for political machinations. This is because, although Article 248 
(2) of the Constitution requires that DAs be non–partisan, the opposite is the reality. 
Ahwoi (2010), Antwi–Boasiako (2010) and other local scholars have blamed this 
circumstance on the constitutional provision that allows the President to elect the 
District Chief Executive (DCE) and 30% of the DA membership. Thus, local 
government authorities in Ghana seem to be constitutionally subjected to the control of 
the central government. The situation, Crawford (2004) and Antwi–Boasiako (2010) 
have observed, has weakened the country’s local government structures and the 
realisation of true fiscal and administrative decentralisation. 
 
Despite these obvious flaws, the World Bank classifies Ghana’s local governance as 
highly functional (Binswanger et al. 2010). As a result, the CBRDP was designed and 
implemented based on an approach called the ‘Matching Strategy’ (see Chapter Three). 
This meant that the country’s established decentralisation system was not adjusted to 
accommodate the project. However, as argued in Chapter Five, the approach was a 
                                                
16 http://elections.peacefmonline.com/politics/201108/64201.php; http://www.modernghana.com/news, 
all retrieved November 25, 2011. 
17 Could be Municipal Assemblies, depending on the population. But District Assemblies will be used 
throughout the thesis. 
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policy error, and led to the implementation of the project on an effectively weak and 
politicised local government system. 
 
Figure 1.3 Structure of Ghana’s Local Government System18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ahwoi (2010). 
 
 
Chieftaincy is the other governance institution in Ghana. It is often referred to as the 
traditional institution because even before 1471, when Europeans first set foot in the 
country, the local people governed and administered their affairs through this 
institution. Chieftaincy was also the medium of British local governance during the 
early colonial days in the late nineteenth century through a system known as the Indirect 
Rule (Buah 1998; Arhin 2002). While the British colonial rule undermined the 
evolutionary processes of the traditional administrative structures, colonialism could not 
totally eradicate chieftaincy (Donkoh 2005; Knierzinger 2011). This is largely 
attributable to the fact that, while chieftaincy varies in form among different cultures 
nationwide, it is still very much respected. This is because chieftaincy provides people 
with a sense of belonging, aside from the fact that Traditional Chiefs are also regarded 
                                                
18 Several Units form an Electoral Area headed by an Assembly Member. Several Electoral Areas form a 
Town /Area Council headed by an Area Council Chairman. Several Area Councils form a District 
Assembly headed by a District Chief Executive. 
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as the embodiment of the spirit of the ancestors and a link between the latter and the 
living (Arhin 2002; Donkoh 2005; Manboah–Rockson 2007; Knierzinger 2011). 
Scholars explain that after Ghana’s independence, the role that traditional rulers played 
under the British colonial rule was terminated in the interest of democracy. Through the 
enactment of the Chieftaincy Act of 1961 (Act 81), Traditional Chiefs became subject 
to central government control during the 1960 and 1966 periods. However, when 
Nkrumah’s regime that passed the Act was overthrown, the military government that 
took over adopted a more liberal approach to the institution. For example, they passed 
the Chieftaincy Act of 1971 (Act 370), which severed the central government control of 
the institution; and also established the Regional and National House of Chiefs (Buah 
1998; Arhin 2002; Donkor 2005; Knierzinger 2011). 
 
The current (1992) Constitution has further enhanced the recognition of the chieftaincy 
institution. For example, Article 270 (1) and (2) recognizes and protects the office of 
Chiefs and debars the Parliament from making laws that interfere with the institution. 
The Constitution in Article, 272, (a–d) also assigns the institution with the 
responsibilities of: 1) Advising the government on chieftaincy issues; 2) Collecting, 
refining, codifying customary laws; and 3) Performing other functions Parliament may 
refer. Aside from these statutory functions, Traditional Chiefs also settle disputes 
through arbitration and are able to mobilize people for development purposes (Arhin 
2002; Donkor 2005). 
 
Since 2000, while the legitimacy of the institution’s source of authority has been 
questioned in the wake of succession disputes, Chieftaincy continues to be popular in 
Ghana (Abotchie 2006; Manboah–Rockson 2007; Prah & Yeboah 2011). The institution 
has since 1980 realised some form of modernisation. Unlike the pre-1980 period, 
Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs are now acquiring formal education, with some setting up 
foundations for improving education, healthcare and environmental sensitization in their 
respective traditional areas (Knierzinger 2011). These initiatives and modernisation of 
the institution have in a sense augmented their influence as brokers of social capital and 
local development. However, the designers of Ghana’s CBRDP appeared to have 
sidelined Traditional Chiefs by not assigning them clear–cut roles. Because Traditional 
Chiefs are not just custodians of culture, but also of spaces with well–delineated 
boundaries, they tended to demand the right of control over the CBRDPs that were 
implemented within their localities. As the empirical data in Chapter Seven will show, 
this led to conflicts between the Chiefs and local government officials, which eroded 
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any existing social capital in the localities. Ultimately, the conflicts impacted negatively 
on the maintenance of the projects. 
 
Social capital is noted as being indispensable attribute for developing communities 
(Putnam 2000, 2003; Bauman 2004; Tesoriero 2010). Described as the willingness of 
people to do things in concert and for one another, social capital is considered the glue 
that holds people together (Tesoriero 2010). Through social capital, networks and bonds 
can be created between people from different backgrounds or who have little in 
common (Putnam 2003, Woolcock 1998; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Bauman 2004; 
Nyirenda et al. 2010). According to Kenny (2010), social capital is an observable and a 
measurable resource that should be nurtured through trust, reciprocity, norms and 
networks; but not necessarily for achieving positive outcomes. Therefore, as Yates and 
Jochum (2003) argued, social capital can be drawn on, increased or depleted. 
 
Despite its importance for facilitating communal activities, recent research by Ling and 
Dale (2013) shows that social capital requires people and organisations to be nurtured 
and used effectively. They argue that social capital does not develop in a vacuum and 
that it requires the efforts of an influential individual or a group to cultivate it. Relative 
to Ghana, Arhin (2002), Donkor (2005), Ahwoi (2010) and Knierzinger (2011) have 
identified Traditional Chiefs as influential agents of social capital in the country. 
Respected as trustworthy individuals, Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs settle disputes, 
provide social welfare services and contribute to national debates on various topical 
issues. Aside from Ghana, Arcand and Bassole (2007) and Binswanger et al. (2010) 
outlined the roles Traditional Chiefs played in the implementation of various 
community-based programs in Senegal and Benin respectively. By implication, 
Traditional Chiefs in the West African subregion wield the influence to determine the 
fate of development projects. As the thesis shows in Chapter Seven however, 
Traditional Chiefs seemed to have been ignored in the implementation of Ghana’s 
CBRDP, an oversight that came with dire consequences for the projects.  Despite this 
positive literature and neat packaging of social capital, this concept proved elusive and 
complex in the field and like power and empowerment, was a concept not well 
implemented or understood, which in turn led to the negative impacts on the projects 
studied in this thesis (see Chapters Six and Seven). 
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1.6.3 Ghana’s Economy and Aid  
Ghana has an agro–based economy (35% of GDP), and the world’s second largest 
producer of cocoa (Bawumia 2010). Ghana is also known for its large gold and other 
mineral export industry (Bawumia 2010). The country relies on its local taxes and 
remittances from Ghanaians abroad to support the fiscal budget (Aryeetey, Harrigan & 
Nissanke 2000; Amoako–Tuffour 2005; ISSER 2010). According to Amoako–Tuffour 
(2005) and Bawumia (2010), although significant, tax revenue has not been enough to 
meet the country’s fiscal budgetary needs. In 2008, Ghana achieved Middle–Income 
Country status. The country’s economy recorded the highest ever GDP growth of 13.6% 
in 2011 (see Figure 1.4; Government of Ghana 2012 Budget Statement, World Bank 
2012). Poverty levels have also decreased significantly from nearly 40% in 2000 to 
28.5% in 2009 (African Human Development Report 2012). Since 2010, Ghana has 
been producing oil from offshore reserves discovered in June 2007 and is raising hopes 
for an economic boost to further reduce poverty levels.  
Despite the oil find and economic growth in the last decade, Ghana is aid–dependent 
(Harrigan and Younger 2000), and one of the top ten recipients of development 
assistance in Sub–Saharan Africa (see Table 1.1)19.  As of 2010, the International 
Development Association of the World Bank Group, the US, the UK and the EU 
Institutions were the country’s largest donors20. According to Harrigan and Younger 
(2000), until the mid–1960s, aid was relatively insignificant in Ghana. This meant that 
very little donor assistance was needed. Two reasons accounted for this. First, Dr. 
Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of the country 1957–1996, was distrustful of 
Britain and the USA, major donors of the time. Aid in these times, as the next chapter 
discusses, was used to ‘make friends’ because of the Cold War (1947–1991). The 
Ghanaian President refused any aid advances to the country and adopted a non–aligned 
posture. Second, Ghana’s economy had sizeable foreign exchange reserves, little debt, 
and a small public sector at the close of colonial rule (Harrigan & Younger 2000; 
Quartey 2005).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 See also Development Aid at a Glance statistics by region, Africa 2012 edition, retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/42139250.pdf, retrieved on March 24, 2012. 
20 See http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd /21/40/1881076.gif, retrieved March 25, 2012. 
 20 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 GDP– Real Growth Rate (%) in Ghana in a Decade Compared  
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Source: World Bank 2008; Ghana Statistical Service 2010; Gov’t of Ghana 2012 Budget Statement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 Aid–Dependency in Ghana and Sub–Saharan Compared 
 1968 2000 2009 
 
Indicators Ghana S–Sahara 
Africa 
Ghana S–Sahara 
Africa 
Ghana S–Sahara 
Africa 
Net Aid as % of GNI 3.85 2.25 12.37 4.02 6.12 4.49 
 
Net Aid as % of Gross 
Capital Formation 
33.62 12.52 50.2 22.96 30.9 24.85 
 
Net Aid as % of Imports 
of Good/Services 
- - 17.2 10.83 13.9 11.81 
Net Aid per Capita ($)  7.44 4.14 31.18 19.61 66.44 53.5 
 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/sub-saharan-africa/net-oda-received-per-capita-us-dollar-wb-
data.html; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net-oda-received-percent-of-gni-wb-data.html, all 
retrieved under various indicators March 24, 2012. There are no data for 1968. 
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Nevertheless, since the mid–1960s, aid–dependency has become a common feature in 
Ghana. It commenced with the National Liberation Council (NLC), the military  
government, which ousted Nkrumah’s regime21 (Harrigan & Younger 2000). The NLC 
government claimed that they needed fiscal support to balance the payments on large 
accumulated commercial debts incurred by the Nkrumah government. These 
developments laid the foundation for the phenomenon of aid–dependency in Ghana. As 
a share of Gross National Income (GNI) and other indicators (see Table 1.1), aid to 
Ghana, has for most periods, been higher than the Sub–Saharan African averages. As 
Figure 1.5 also shows, while aid ODA levels have been decreasing since 2005, aid as a 
percentage of Ghana’s central government expenditure for the decade has averaged over 
46%22.   
 
Figure 1.5 Net ODA as Percentage of Central Government Expense 
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Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net-oda-received-percent-of-central-government-
expense-wb-data.html, retrieved March 25, 2012. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
21 In a coup d’état in 1966. 
22http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ ghana/net-oda-received-percent-of-central-government-expense-
wb-data.html, retrieved March 25, 2012. 
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It is within this context that Ghana’s ‘friendship’ with the IMF, World Bank (who 
funded the CBRDP) and the donor fraternity must be understood - a relationship that 
has been mutually beneficial. Ghana regards its donors and their agencies as 
‘development partners’ (Government of Ghana 2012 Budget). On the other hand, the 
donors regard the country as a reference point for where ‘development works’ and aid 
policy succeeds (English 1999; Africa Development Outlook 200823). Significantly, 
although the implementation of the CBRDP meant that Ghana was still economically 
tied to donors (aid-dependency), there were a lot at stake for the World Bank who 
funded the project. Among other things, when successfully executed, the CBRDP would 
offer the World Bank and proponents of community-driven driven development 
programs the theoretical grounds to promote it in other developing countries.  
 
For Ghana, it would also mean more aid and reinforce the notion that aid works better 
there (English 1999; Azeem et al. 2006). Consequently, in an obvious support of aid, 
former President J.A. Kufour (2001–2008), on a local media network [Joyfm], 
recounted the role aid has played in the country’s development agenda, particularly 
during his tenure (July 1 2010, Joyfm midday news). In the face of recent flood and 
sanitation challenges facing the country, the former President urged the current 
government not to be ashamed to beg for aid24. Interestingly, the immediate past 
President, H.E. Professor J.E.A. Mills, while addressing the African Diplomatic Corps 
in Ottawa, Canada in November 2011, urged his fellow African leaders to take bold 
steps to untie themselves from aid–dependency (Ghana News Agency, November 19, 
2011).25 Two days later, his government released the 2012 budget, of which a 
significant percentage was to be aid–funded, particularly with a USD 3 billion loan 
facility from China, the highest ever aid arrangement in the country’s history 
(Government of Ghana Budget Statement 2012). While addressing the 2012 UN 
General Assembly in New York, H.E. John Mahama, the current President, also pleaded 
with the World Bank not to withdraw development assistance to Ghana, although the 
country has attained a middle-income status26. Despite Ghana’s obvious dependence on 
aid, academics do not agree on the direct relationship between aid flows and the 
                                                
23 See also http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ghana, retrieved March 24, 2011. 
24 http://edition.myjoyonline.com/pages/news/201111/76753.php, retrieved on January 10, 2012. 
25 See http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9163:president–
mills–urges–african–nations–to–be–self–reliant&catid=28:general–news&Itemid=162, retrieved 
20/01/12. 
26 Middle income countries are expected to go to the financial market to borrow at commercial rates 
instead of relying on the World Bank for concessionary loan facilities. 
(http://www.modernghana.com/news/419992/1/mahama-pleads-with-world-bank-not-to-withdraw-
fina.html, retrieved September 30, 2012). 
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country’s economic growth and poverty reduction (Aryeetey & Cox 1997; Osei, 
Morrissey & Lloyd 2005; Bawumia 2010; Clemens et al. 2011; Osei 2012).  
 
1.7 The Case Study: The Community–Based Rural Development Project 
The Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP) (2004–2011) was a joint 
pilot initiative of the Government of Ghana and the World Bank. Theoretically, Ghana’s 
CBRDP was designed as a type of the World Bank’s Community–Driven Development 
program. However, Ghana’s CBRDP was supply–driven, unlike conventional 
Community–Driven Development Programs which are demand–driven. This means that 
the beneficiary communities did not initiate the projects, but were selected, trained and 
funded to implement pre–categorised project types. Ghana’s CBRDP was funded with 
loan facilities from the World Bank’s International Development Association and the 
Agence’ Francaise Development. The Government of Ghana implemented the project 
under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD) and the 
Regional Coordinating Units (RICUs) in conjunction with an independent CBRDP 
secretariat. The project was piloted in two phases, 2004–2008 and 2009–2011 in all ten 
regions, all hundred and thirty-eight Districts, and one hundred and forty five Area 
Councils (see Figure 1.3; CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006). The thesis is based on 
the Area Councils, which are found in Metropolitan and District Assembly areas. Area 
Councils consist of Government Appointees, ordinary residents, Assembly and Unit 
Committee Members (Ahwoi 2010). 
 
The CBRDP served as one of the principal vehicles for the implementation of Ghana’s 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) to bridge the gap of uneven distribution across 
socio-economic groups and geographical locations (CBRDP Implementation Manual 
2006). The CBRDP had two objectives. First, build and strengthen the capacities of 
National, Regional, District, Area Councils and rural communities to deliver services 
and manage resources. At the Area Council and local levels, the assumption was that, 
by empowering rural populations to participate actively in local development processes, 
they would improve their productive assets and their local infrastructure (CBRDP 
Implementation Manual 2006). As a result, the second objective was to introduce a new 
fiscal transfer mechanism for the development of infrastructure and income generating 
activities in rural areas (Yaron 2008; Binswanger et al. 2010). 
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As will be argued in Chapter Five, fiscal administration in Ghana is centralised and very 
bureaucratic (Inanga & Osei–Wusu 2004; Baffour–Kyei 2009). Thus, the CBRDP’s 
strategy was to pilot the transfer of funds directly to the hitherto weak Area Councils for 
local developments. Interestingly, while the CBRDP’s objective was to avoid the fiscal 
and administrative bottlenecks at the Regional and District levels, the designers of the 
project tied it to the existing bureaucratic government planning and procurement 
systems. Also, unlike conventional CDD projects, where various localities compete for 
funding (Dongier et al. 2003; Platteau 2004; Labonne & Chase 2007; Platteau & 
Gaspart 2009), the CBRDP was different; District Assemblies selected the recipient 
localities. Because Ghana’s District Assemblies are effectively controlled by the central 
government (see Chapter Five; Antwi–Boasiako 2010; Ahwoi 2010), the selection 
processes appears to have been politicised. 
 
1.7.1 The CBRDP Implementation Strategy 
To facilitate implementation, the country was divided into four Zones (see Figure 1.6): 
Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions as Zone I; Asante and Brong Ahafo 
Regions as Zone II; Central and Western Regions Zone as III; and Eastern, Greater 
Accra and Volta Regions as Zone IV (the focus of this thesis). Each Zone had a Zonal 
Head and other staff to provide administrative and coordinating support to the project 
during the five stages of implementation; these are described briefly below.  
 
 
Table 1.2 Implementation Processes of the CBRDP in the Area Councils 
 
Stage Activity 
Stage I Training in the rudiments of the CBRDP 
Stage II Preparation of Action Plans  
Stage III Examination and Approval of the Action 
Plans 
Stage IV Implementation  
Stage V Monitoring and Evaluation 
Designed by author, based on CBRDP Implementation Manual (2006). 
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Stage I: Training of Area Councilors 
All selected Area Councils27 were taken through the rudiments of the project. In 
seminars run by consultants, Area Councillors were trained in financial, project 
tendering and procurement management processes. The Area Councillors were also 
trained in how to prepare project proposals (Action Plan). The Action Plans contained 
demographic information and the prioritised needs of the Area Council as well as a 
project implementation plan and a budget. While they were prepared as a requirement 
for receiving the CBRDP, the Action Plans were also meant to be the Area Council’s 
development blueprint (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006).  
 
Stage II: Preparation of Community Action Plans 
Once the training was over, Stage Two required that the Area Councillors return to their 
respective localities to prepare their Action Plans. The process was ‘supposed’ to be 
participatory and consultative between the local people [including women], the 
Assembly and Unit Committee Members, and local people. Once an Action Plan was 
finalised, it was forwarded to the Zonal Head of the CBRDP to be considered for 
funding.  
Stage III: Examination/Approval of Action Plans 
Stage Three rested with the CBRDP secretariat, which examined the Action Plans using 
four benchmarks. First, the Action Plan had to reflect the ‘needs’ captured in the 
respective district’s development blueprints, referred to as the District Approved 
Development Plans. Second, it had to be explicit about the project’s implementation and 
procurement plans. Third, the prioritised needs had to fall within the ‘menu’ of the 
CBRDP components, each consisting of different, but specific sub-projects (see 
Appendix A). These included: 1) Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building 
(ISCB); 2) Infrastructure for Agricultural Development (IAD); 3) Rural Enterprise 
Development (RED); 4) Infrastructure for Social and Human Development (ISHD); and 
5) Community–Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Finally, the 
implementation budget had to match the CBRDP seed money of GHC15, 00028. As will 
be discussed later, some ‘good’ projects were either rejected or downsized because they 
could not be funded by the project’s inadequate seed money or that they were 
                                                
27 The selection of the Areas Council was based on two criteria: a functioning office with staff and a 
three–party– signatory bank account. But a number of the Area Councils researched did not have offices. 
Before the CBRDP, although the Area Councils existed, with no project to implement, they were virtually 
in a state of inertia, as the District Assemblies executed most local projects. The CBRDP was the seminal 
nationwide project that tested the facilitation and implementation capacities of the Area Councils 
28 Approximately US$10, 274, based on exchange rate effective March 31, 2004, GH⊄ 9050 = US$1.  
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inconsistent with both the District Approved Development Plans and the project’s sub-
components. 
There were two types of the funding: the Normal and Rapid Response Initiative (RRI). 
Under the Normal funding arrangements, the Area Councils received the funding as 
they progressed and were not time bound. In the RRI category, Area Councils were 
required to complete their chosen project within a hundred–day limit, after which they 
received the funds (see Table 1.3). Yaron (2008), for example, observed that the RRI 
procedures had interesting empowerment impacts and proved to be very helpful in 
promoting greater accountability, transparency, ownership and effective management of 
associated sub–projects. However, in two of the nine localities where projects were 
implemented under the RRI were found the projects to be showing signs of structural 
deterioration, as they seemed to have been hastily constructed (see Table 1.3). 
 
Once the CBRDP secretariat approved the Action Plan, the beneficiary locality received 
the seed money in three equal instalments into the Area Council’s bank account. The 
expectations were that the District Assembly would contribute 10% of the project sum, 
while the beneficiary ‘community’ contribute labour or offer hired services at a reduced 
market rate. In some of the localities researched, the District Assembly funds never 
came, while others also suffered the ‘usual’ financial bureaucratic delays. In such 
circumstances, certain ‘influential’ local people pre–financed the projects, but were later 
reimbursed, when the seed money arrived (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006; 
CBRDP Annual Reports 2006 – 2010; Field notes 2010).  
 
Stage IV: Implementation 
At the project implementation stage, the Area Councils had to collaborate with the 
District Assembly for technical assistance. This depended on the sub-project chosen. 
Commonly, the District Planning Officer, Accountant, and Engineers offered relevant 
technical assistance at various stages of project implementation. Most aspects of 
procurement and technical components were supposed to be achieved on a ‘community 
contracting’ basis. This meant that businesses in the beneficiary locality had priority 
over ‘outsiders’ in the supply of the project materials, albeit through a tendering 
process. However, as the sixth chapter of the thesis will show, in some localities, the 
Area Councillors awarded contracts to themselves or their ‘cronies’, an act that 
contravened the project’s principles. 
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Figure 1.6 CBRDP Zonal Demarcations 
 
Source: http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/geography/maps.php retrieved under administrative 
maps on August 10 2010. Demarcated by author. 
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Stage V: Monitoring and Evaluation 
As each of the CBRDP beneficiary localities was expected to implement, own and 
maintain their projects, monitoring teams were established to oversee the sustenance of 
the projects. The state of most of the projects studied, as highlighted below, suggested 
that the monitoring teams were not functioning. Some of the monitoring officials 
complained of being controlled at every turn by the District Assembly bureaucrats, who 
sometimes delayed the release of funds for the maintenance of the projects. 
 
1.7.2 State of the Projects as of Fieldwork 
As of March 2011 when the data collection was completed, all the projects studied were 
completed, some for more than two years. Apart from the eight–seater school toilet 
project at Ahugakorpe in the Volta Region, which was awaiting commissioning and the 
Tease market sheds, which appeared to be ‘boycotted’, the other seven projects studied 
were in use. During the fieldwork, it was observed that most of the nine projects studied 
had not been well maintained; these aberrations were confirmed in the interviews 
conducted. Some of the anecdotes have been reproduced with pictures on the projects in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven of the thesis. Table 1.3 below depicts the state of each of 
the projects. 
 
Table 1.3: Profiles of the CBRDPs in the sampled Localities in Zone IV 
 
Region       Project               State of the projects 
 
Funding 
Type 
Eastern Pakro 
Mechanised 
bore–hole  
The project was in use, but had broken down 
several times. Some members of the committee 
taking care of it complained that the local people 
do not want to pay user fees, so they have to rely 
on the District Assembly for funds to maintain it. 
Normal 
 
Ntoaso 
sixteen-seater 
Public toilet 
A beautiful structure, but the surroundings were 
bushy and unmaintained. While the facility was 
being patronised, on all four visits to the village, 
the researcher found the inside of the facility not 
disinfected. The caretakers of the facility 
explained that it was in that state because of a 
seeming power struggle between the Assembly 
Member and the Traditional Chief over who 
should control the money meant to maintain the 
project. 
Normal 
Tease Market 
sheds 
The sheds looked abandoned and deteriorating. 
While empty, traders were seen selling in the sun 
outside. There were residues of human excreta in 
the sheds, which sheltered squatters in the nights. 
Normal 
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Greater 
Accra 
 
Agoe Culverts 
 
The culverts looked well–maintained, but anytime 
it rained, they were flooded. The local people 
complained that they wanted them a bit wide, but 
the District Engineer, who they alleged paid no 
attention to them, indicated that there were no 
funds available to execute that.  
Normal 
  
Renovation of 
Tashie Presby 
Primary 
School  
The renovation and the government school-
feeding program increased school enrolments to a 
rate that the facilities could not support. The 
school had no electricity and fans. Because the 
Tashie locality had no public toilet facilities, some 
of the local people were defecating in the 
classrooms and on the school’s compound. 
Normal 
 
Aboloo 
Community 
Library 
The library was deteriorating. Most of the louver 
blades were broken; and there were numerous 
cracks on the building, which had no electricity 
and fans. Most of the bookshelves were empty, 
there not being enough books. 
Rapid 
Respond 
Initiative 
Volta Agbetor The structure lacked many basic educational 
amenities like textbooks and educational aids. 
Also because there was no toilet facility in the 
school, staff and students were using the bush as 
places of convenience. The school had outgrown 
the three–unit structure, so Classes Three & Four 
and Five & Six were merged in makeshift 
structures. The project looked to be resting on the 
shoulders of the local Chief who pre–financed it.  
Rapid 
Respond 
Initiative 
 
Dedenu 
Mechanised 
Bore–hole  
This was one of the well–maintained projects. 
People in the locality had no problems paying 
tokens. Even so, the pipe did not always flow and 
the people had to wait sometimes for a week. The 
maintenance committee was always active, but 
complained of District Assemblies bureaucratic 
processes of releasing funds to maintain the pipes. 
They were virtually frustrated by having to always 
go through the District Assembly to access funds 
to maintain the project. 
Normal 
Lume 
Ahugakorpe 
eight–seater 
school toilets 
The project has been completed but the school had 
been waiting for the District Chief Executive to 
commission it. In the mean time, the entire Lume 
locality and the school were sharing an overused 
4-seater toilet facility built there by DANIDA. 
 
Source: Field notes (2011). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
GLOBAL AID TRENDS AND RAMIFICATIONS 
FOR GHANA  
 
“[Ghana has] been turned into a veritable laboratory for the investigation of different 
approaches to endemic African problems” 
(Antwi–Boasiako 2010, p. 166).  
   
This chapter provides an historical and global overview of International Development 
Aid (aid) and how the trends in this aid have impacted on Ghana. The researcher argues 
that Post–War II aid successfully met its aims of restoring the economies of Western 
Europe under the Marshall Plan. However, because it was originally designed for a 
specific context, aid has largely been unable to replicate the Marshall Plan’s results in 
other settings. Therefore, over the last two decades in particular, desperate for evidence 
that ‘aid works’, international development agencies have been experimenting with 
various programs, many of which have achieved mixed outcomes and also turned the 
recipients into ‘aid–addicts’ (Moyo 2009; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). Within the context of 
aid to Ghana, one of the top ten aid–dependent countries in Sub–Saharan Africa, the 
impacts and limitations are considered for major aid programs such as Structural 
Adjustment, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, Multi–Donor Budgetary 
Support and the Millennium Development Goals. Based on the literature, this thesis 
argues that, when aid programs concentrate on economic theories and indicators 
(‘economicentric’), while ignoring the social, political and other relevant contexts 
within which they are implemented, mixed results or failure seem inevitable. 
 
2.1 A Brief Overview of Aid in the Pre–World War II Period 
Long before the institutionalisation of aid in the 1950/60s colonial governments and 
voluntary Christian missionaries provided and managed large–scale humanitarian aid 
(Hjertholm & Howard 1998). Thus, as early as 1811 and 1896, the US Government was 
providing relief aid to the citizens of Venezuela and food aid to other parts of the world. 
The US Department of Agriculture also funded agriculture research centres in parts of 
Latin America. Hjertholm and Howard (1998) argued further that, while the French 
funded universities in their colonies, Great Britain’s colonial administration provided 
non–administrative aid to their colonies through the 1929 Colonial Act and the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act of 1940 and 1945 (see also Lumsdaine 1993; Riddell 
2007). During much of the Pre–War II era, church–based organisations also provided 
key services to poor people. For example, in Eastern Africa, Riddell (2007) argues that 
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church–based organisations provided between 40% to 60% of health, education, water 
and food–security services. Relative to Ghana, Buah (1998) asserts that Christian 
missionaries championed formal education in the country during much of the Pre–
World War II period.  
 
Apart from the colonial governments and church–based organisations, Riddell (2007) 
explains that during the 1940s, there were discussions in the International Labour 
Organisation for the provision of funds to raise living standards in poor countries.  
Also, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), after its 
establishment in 1943, received funds from over forty countries to help provide food, 
medicine, and agricultural and industrial goods to recipients in more than fifty 
countries. These early international commitments for alleviating poverty in poor 
countries were not only championed by Western countries, as Asian and Latin 
American countries were among those who called for the establishment of substantial 
programmes of development assistance29 (Lancaster 2007). Even so, the genesis of the 
current aid regime is traceable to the aftermath of World War II. 
 
2.2 The Post–World War II Period: The Birth of the Bretton Wood Institutions, 
the Marshall Plan and the Cold War 
 
The immediate Post World War II period (1945−1955) significantly influenced the 
institutionalisation of International Development Aid and several contemporary aid 
institutions developed from organisations originally created to cater for post–war needs 
(Riddell 2007). These include, but not are limited to, Oxfam (1942), which originally 
catered only for refugees from Greece; CARE (1945), which was originally the Centre 
for American Relief in Europe; the UN (1945) which began as the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA); and the so–called Bretton Wood 
Institutions30 (Hjertholm & Howard 1998; Riddell 2007). 
The birth of the Bretton Wood Institutions (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development [now the World Bank], the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the 
International Trade Organisation [now the WTO]) to establish a framework for a global 
                                                
29 It was in the 1940s that the Indian Chair of the UN’s Sub–Commission on Economic Development 
formally called for the UN to provide concessional loans to poor countries to help them obtain loans from 
commercial sources.  
30 Named after the Bretton Woods suburb in New Hampshire USA, where over seven hundred delegates 
from some forty-four countries met in Mount Washington Hotel in 1944. The meeting was held against 
the backdrop of World War II and was meant to restructure international finance, establish a multilateral 
trading system and construct cooperation that would avoid a repetition of the Great Depression of the 
1930s. 
 32 
system of financial and monetary management, is considered by many scholars as the 
genesis of the dominant framework for aid–infused development (Crush 1995; 
Lancaster 2007). In broad terms, the World Bank was designed to facilitate capital 
investment for reconstruction, while the IMF was designed to manage the global 
financial system31 and stabilise the world economy. Subtly underlying the operations of 
the two institutions was the idea that if war–devastated Europe was to return to its 
previous level of development, massive capital [aid] injection was required. This 
principle, later referred to as the ‘Gap–Theory’, was based on the ideas of Britain’s J.M. 
Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) and America’s H.D. Dexter White (1892–1948) (Erixon 
2005). At the end of the 1940s therefore, the notion of using aid to drive economies had 
been established, starting with the US Marshall Plan32 of 1948 for Western Europeans. 
Although an economic program, the Marshall Plan also propelled the US into leadership 
of foreign policy (Cassen 1994; Lancaster 2007). 
Driven by the Keynesian33 Economic Theory [given huge capital investments, weak 
economies would be revived], the Marshall Plan was tailored for the reconstruction of 
war–torn Western Europe in the face of the threats of communism in Eastern Europe  
(Mehmet 1999; Lancaster 2007; Riddell 2007). Under the program, the US through its 
Secretary of State, George C. Marshall (1947–1949), embarked on an aid program 
worth USD 13 billion34 to fourteen Western European countries in a five–year 
development plan (1948–1952). The Marshall Plan was successful in bringing Western 
Europe back onto a strong economic footing, restoring infrastructure and reinstating 
political stability (Hjertholm & Howard 1998; Riddell 2007).  
 
Although designed for Western Europe, the Marshall Plan significantly influenced the 
establishment and globalisation of aid in two ways. First, in the wake of its relative 
success, the Marshall Plan tended to lend credence to the Keynesian Economic Theory. 
As a result, some argued for its replication in developing countries, based on a 
simplistic assumption that if it worked for Western Europeans, why could it not produce 
the same results in other contexts (Mehmet 1999; Crush 2005; Erixon 2005; Reinert 
2007)? However, as some scholars have observed (see Escobar 1995; Botchway 2001; 
                                                
31 France (1946), Netherlands, Denmark and Luxembourg (1947) were the earliest beneficiaries of loans 
from the World Bank and these were for reconstruction. 
32 Also known as the European Recovery Program (Riddell 2007). 
33 Referring to the ideas of Maynard Keynes. 
34USD 86 billion in today’s terms and only surpassed in 2005. Great Britain had the largest share of 24% 
according to Riddell (2007). 
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Li 2007), and this thesis will argue, ‘development’ is not just about capital investment, 
as the contextual differences and concepts on which aid programs are based also matter.  
 
Second, as the US provided large sums to Europe, monies that the Bretton Wood 
Institutions had earmarked for the reconstruction of Europe were freed up and were 
ready to be directed towards developing countries (Cassen 1994; Lancaster 2007). This 
coincided with: 1) Britain and France’s resolve to maintain their geopolitical hold on 
their former colonies in Africa and Asia; and the 2) US and Russia’s quest for allies in 
Africa during the Cold War. Despite this, by the end of the 1960s, over thirty-one 
African countries had become independent, beginning with Ghana in 1957. However, 
their independence seemed nominal; they remained financially dependent on their 
colonial masters (Mehmet 1971; Kanbur 2003). Thus, aid became the tool for countries, 
Britain and France in particular, to maintain their geopolitical influence, a situation 
some commentators argue laid the foundation for aid–dependency on the African 
continent (Ashimolowo 2009; Moyo 2009). 
 
Aid was also the instrument of Cold War diplomacy (1945–1991), as the US and the 
Soviet Union used it to gain allies in African countries (Mehmet 1971; Riddell 2007). It 
is within this context that the famous inaugural speech of US President Harry Truman 
(1945–1953) must be understood35. While the speech tended to portray the US 
commitment as being the altruistic use of aid, the reality was that the US employed it to 
gain more allies in its challenge to Soviet communism (Lancaster 2007).  Thus, Zaire’s 
Mobutu Sese Seko (1965 – 1997), Liberia’s Samuel Doe (1986 – 1990) and Uganda’s 
Idi Amin (1971–1979) became beneficiaries of US aid at the time. The Soviet Union 
also funded the regimes of Patrice Lumumba (Congo: 24 June 1960 – 14 September 
1960), Mengistu Mariam (Ethiopia: 1977 – 1987), Jean Bokassa (Central African 
Republic: 1966 –1979) and Muamar Gaddafi (Libya: 1977 – 2011) (Meredith 2005; 
Lancaster 2007). Interestingly, while most of these leaders were dictators with 
despicable human rights records, both the US and the Soviet Union overlooked their 
infamous records to further their respective strategic advantages. Ghana remained non–
aligned during the Cold War, a position some aver accounted for the American CIA’s 
complicity in the overthrow of its first President, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 (Shivj 
2003; Meredith 2005; Botwe–Asamoah 2005). During the Cold War period, aid also 
funded Poverty Reduction and Structural Adjustment Programs.  
                                                
35See http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres53.html, retrieved April 28, 2012. 
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2.3 The 1970s: Poverty Reduction Focus, the Herald of Structural Adjustments 
 
This decade saw two major oil crises in 1973 /436 and 197937.  According to Riddell 
(2007), for the most part of the decade, oil prices soared, sending most African 
economies into chaos. The greatest beneficiaries of the price hike were oil–exporting 
countries, which deposited their huge profits into international banks. Within Sub–
Saharan Africa, incidences of food price hikes and economic recession occurred, 
situations that compelled many governments to borrow more from international banks. 
Owing to these crises, donors shifted their aid programs from the 1960s model of 
funding infrastructure to addressing poverty directly with projects in agriculture, rural 
development, social services, mass inoculation programs, adult literacy campaigns and 
the provision of food for the malnourished (Lancaster 2007).   
 
Championed by the World Bank38 and the UNDP39, the ‘poverty focus’ was driven by 
the notion that economic growth was insufficient to reduce poverty, and that it was 
important for donors to tackle poverty directly (Ghai et al. 1980; Erixon 2005). The new 
approach compelled donors to abandon the Keynesian Economic Theory and also 
amend their international aid policies to focus on satisfying ‘basic human needs’. 
Accordingly, the US passed the International Development 1973 Act, which stipulated 
that 75% of its Food for Peace Program should go to countries whose per capita income 
was USD 300 per annum or less (Lancaster 2007). According to Riddell (2007), in 
1975, the UK also released a paper titled Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies: 
More Aid for the Poor, to reflect the ‘poverty focus’ paradigm. Riddell further asserts 
that the notion of addressing poverty directly laid the foundation for the 
professionalisation of the aid industry, more technocrats being needed to create, 
implement and monitor projects.40 More importantly, the shift gave rise to poverty–
oriented lending to Africa, rising sharply from 5% in the late 1970s to 50% in the early 
1980s (Moyo 2009). By the end of the decade, the African continent had consumed 
USD 36 billion worth of aid, while many nations remained hugely indebted to 
international banks (Moyo 2009; Lancaster 2007). The situation led the World Bank 
Group to introduce and experiment with yet another aid program on the continent, 
Structural Adjustments. 
                                                
36 Arab States placed an embargo on oil in retaliation for US support for Israel in the Yom Kippur War.  
37 Precipitated by the Iran–Iraqi War. 
38 Redistribution–with–growth policy. 
39 Basic Needs policy–adopted from the ILO.  
40 Riddell (2007) estimates that over 40,000 people are employed in the aid industry. 
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2.4 Precursors to the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment in Ghana 
 
Aid was irrelevant in Ghana in the first decade of its independence (1957–1966). As 
Harrigan and Young (2000) observed, President Nkrumah’s policy of non–alignment 
during the Cold War meant that he refused any aid advances to the country. At the time, 
Ghana also had a relatively good economy. According to Konadu–Agyemang (2000), 
although the British plundered the country, they left it in a better shape than any other 
country in Sub–Saharan Africa at the time, Ghana’s primary material export–based 
economy being well established. At independence in 1957, the author insists that Ghana 
was the world’s leading producer and exporter of cocoa, and exported 10% of the 
world’s gold. The country also had foreign reserves of £200 million and an external 
debt of just £20 million (see also Buah 199809). Furthermore, Ghana had one of the 
best infrastructure systems in Africa, arguably with the most educated, skilled, and 
experienced workforce in Sub–Saharan Africa, and well–formulated development plans 
(Huq 1989; Roe & Schneider 1992; Werlin 1994). By all criteria, Ghana was probably 
much better endowed than most countries labelled ‘Third World’, and had better 
potential to develop its economy. At independence, Ghana was a middle–income 
country with a per capita income of £50, equivalent to that of South Korea. In 1960, 
Ghana’s per capita income of £70 was still higher than that of Nigeria (£29), India 
(£25), and Egypt (£56), with a growth rate of 6% per annum (Huq 1989; Leite et al. 
2000). 
 
Under Nkrumah’s Convention People’s Party (CPP) government (1957–1966), 
manufacturing industries boomed in Ghana. The CPP government inherited a colonial 
economy that promoted only primary industries, mainly for the extraction of the 
country’s natural resources, agricultural and forest products as raw material for 
metropolitan and Western industries (Buah 1998; Okyere 2000). However, Nkrumah 
took steps to reverse the trend to ensure that the raw materials were reserved for local 
production or that the government controlled their marketing locally and overseas.  In 
pursuit of its policy of self–reliance and independence, Nkrumah’s government set up 
the Capital Investment Board and the Industrial Development Bank to source funding 
for the country’s industrialisation drive. Aside from entering into partnerships in some 
manufacturing sectors, the government itself established several enterprises that 
produced goods ranging from safety matches, canned foods, pharmaceutical products 
and fishing vessels to electronics. The Ghana Standards Board was also established to 
control the quality of production (Buah 1998; Okyere 2000).  
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Because industries thrive on a reliable power supply, the CPP government built the 
Akosombo Hydro–Electric Power Station, which still supplies much of the domestic 
and industrial needs of the country. The government also built rail lines, feeder roads 
and motorways to ease general transportation in the country and facilitate the haulage of 
export products and raw materials from the hinterlands (Buah 1998; Okyere 2000). 
Under Nkrumah, Ghana experienced a golden decade of self–initiated development. As 
Apter noted: 
Richer than most (African) countries, carefully groomed for independence, with 
trained cadres exceeding those of far larger countries ... having inherited a good 
and expanding educational system, Ghana [had] ... the resources, manpower ... 
moral and spiritual qualities to set the pace and tone of political development in 
all Africa 
                                                                                                      (Apter 1972, p. 337). 
 
However, as Whitfield (2008, p. 185) observed, ‘Ghana became the epitome of Africa’s 
decline.’ By the middle of the 1960s, Ghana was bankrupt, the country having a huge 
debt burden of USD 1 billion. The country’s GDP growth rate in 1966 fell to –5.1%, 
while its foreign reserves became minimal. From this period onwards, aid dependency 
became a common feature in Ghana commencing with the National Liberation Council 
(NLC) government, which ousted Nkrumah’s CPP in a military coup d’état in 1966. 
The NLC government claimed it needed fiscal support to balance payments on the large 
accumulated commercial debts incurred by Nkrumah’s government (Harrigan & Young 
2000). According to Bawumia (2010), in per capita terms, aid increased from USD 
20.88 in 1966 to USD 24.28 in 1969.  
 
Ghana returned to democratic rule in 1969, under K. A. Busia’s Progress Party, raising 
hopes that the economy will be restored. However, this did not happen as the economy 
was hit by the effects of the oil crises of the 1970s and decrease in aid levels from USD 
24.28 in 1969 to USD 16.79 in 197241 (Bawumia 2010). This led to harsh economic 
conditions and the overvaluing of the exchange rate to almost 1000% (Bawumia 2010).  
Citing the poor economic conditions of the time, Colonel I. K. Acheampong overthrew 
the K. A Busia’s government in a coup d’état in 1972 and ruled the country until 1978. 
This government, the National Redemption Council (NRC) and later the Supreme 
Military Council I42; decided to repudiate some of the country’s commercial debts for 
supposed irregularities. This led to a considerable decline in aid flows to Ghana in the 
                                                
41 In per capita terms. 
42 Acheampong changed the name of his government in 1978. 
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first half of the 1970s (Bawumia 2010).43 Under the NRC, Ghana experienced import 
substitution, restrictions on foreign exchange imports and price controls (Okyere 2000; 
Bawumia 2010).  
 
According to Bawumia (2010), from 1975 the NRC successfully approached 
multilateral lenders44 leading to increases in aid levels, which reached USD 20.93 per 
capita by 1979. However, Ghana’s inability to repay these loans on time increased the 
country’s external debt stock. Thus by 1980, Ghana’s total external debt had reached 
USD1407 billion, causing international financial institutions to refuse credit to the 
country. Meanwhile, cocoa production, the main source of foreign exchange at the time, 
dropped and industries stalled for lack of machine parts and intermediate inputs 
(Aryeetey, Harrigan & Nissanke 2000; Fosu n.d). The huge debt situation and the 
general harsh economic conditions that ensued were complicated by three years of 
political unrest (1978–1981), during which several governments, mainly the military, 
ruled the country.  
 
In 1981, Flt Lt. JJ Rawlings (1981–2000) seized power in a coup d’état.45 In his bid to 
restore the economy, Rawlings engaged in what Bawumia (2010, p. 43) calls “popular 
nonsense.” The policy ensured that traders reported by the regime’s vigilantes for 
hoarding and overpricing goods were arrested and their wares sold to the public at 
reduced prices. However, Rawlings abandoned that policy because it was an inadequate 
vehicle for growing and sustaining the economy. Compelled by an already bad 
economic situation including a severe drought and famine that hit the country in 1983, 
and the repatriation of many Ghanaians from Nigeria in the same year, Rawlings sought 
foreign assistance (Okyere 2000). After being disappointed by the Soviet Union, 
Rawlings approached the World Bank Group in 1983, which prescribed Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAP), and a tight fiscal, neo–liberal and market–oriented 
program (World Bank 1984; Aryeetey et al. 2000; Bawumia 2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
43 For example, in per capita terms, aid decreased from USD 16.79 in 1972 to USD 7.43 in 1974. 
44 IMF, World Bank and the African Development Bank 
45 His first coup was in 1979, but handed over to Dr. Hilla Limann’s People’s National Party.  
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2.5 1980/1990: Structural Adjustment Programs in Ghana 
  
Following the effects of the 1979 spike in oil prices, many African countries were 
hugely indebted, as they had borrowed and were servicing their debts at high cost. As 
Moyo (2009) argues, Africa’s debt servicing had escalated to USD 8 billion by 1982 
from USD 2 billion in 1975. As a result, the IMF formed the Structural Adjustment 
Facility, intended to lend monies to defaulting countries so helping them to repay their 
debts in a program referred to as Structural Adjustment. In simple terms, Structural 
Adjustment meant that beneficiary governments reduced the excessive involvement in 
economic activities by their countries, liberalised these activities, and then adopted 
privatisation, import substitution and export–oriented economic policies (World Bank 
1984; 1991; 1995).  The policy also postulated that African economies, in particular, 
carried ‘excess baggage’ that served as barriers to development. Examples of the 
barriers were, the World Bank indicated, unwarranted state interference in the workings 
of the price mechanism, a bloated public service, exchange control, state ownership of 
manufacturing enterprises, and investment in social welfare. Once removed, poverty 
reduction and strong economies were guaranteed (World Bank 1984; 1991; 1995).  
 
Although Ghana adopted Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) from 1983–1995, by 
1991, most of the structural reforms were concluded. Undoubtedly, the country 
experienced some positive improvements between 1984 and 1991. Interestingly, these 
transient improvements have earned the country the label as ‘the most successful SAP 
case in Africa’ (English 1999; Aryeetey et al. 2000; Aryeetey & Tarp 2000). Initially, 
SAPs helped to rehabilitate the country’s physical infrastructure. According to 
Bawumia (2010), before Ghana adopted the program, its roads, highways and railways 
were in such an appalling state that important export products like cocoa and timber 
were locked up in the hinterland. The successful rehabilitation of roads linking export-
producing regions opened up many rural areas and allowed export products to reach the 
ports. With increases in exports, Ghana’s GDP, which was negative in 1981, rose to an 
annual average of 5% between 1984 and 1991. Micro–economic stability was also 
restored during this period, while poverty levels dropped from 51% in 1991/92 to 43% 
in 1998/99 (English 1999; Aryeetey & Tarp 2000; Aryeetey & Fosu 2003; Ghana 
Statistical Service 2000; Bawumia 2010).   
 
However, these successes were momentary as the country began to experience the 
economic and social effects of SAPs. Thus, SAPs have been condemned generally as 
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laying the foundation for Ghana’s current economic woes and continued aid-
dependency (Osei & Quartey 2001; Tetteh 2003; Aryeetey & Fosu 2003). Three 
negative impacts are considered for discussion. First, under SAPs, many Ghanaians 
became unemployed. Nkrumah had made the state the driver of the Ghanaian economy 
meaning that the: 1) State completely dominated production; and 2) Government 
employed a large workforce, approximately 75% of formal employees. Thus, the SAPs 
stipulation that the Ghanaian government downsize its public service through 
retrenchment, while it divested its shares in many state–owned companies, should have 
been carried out cautiously. The directive, which led to the dismissal of over fifty 
thousand civil servants by 1990, brought much pain to families and the economy. The 
divestiture of several state–owned companies, some very strategic, also led to abrupt 
layoffs, and exacerbated the unemployment situation in the country. While it made 
some ‘economic sense’ to divest many of the state–owned companies at the time, as 
some were considered a drain on the economy, considering that a large percentage of 
the country’s workforce would lose their jobs, the social context should have been 
considered to mediate the economic context.  
 
Second, given that Ghanaians had been used to ‘the government doing virtually for 
them’, many were not used to paying realistic fees for public health and education. 
Although over 55% of the population was defined as poor in 1985 (Aryeetey n.d.; Sarris 
& Shams 1991) the Ghanaian government was compelled by the program to recover 
costs in critical sectors such as health and education in order to be eligible for loan 
facilities (Bawumia 2010). Thus, during much of the mid–1980s, fees for hospital beds 
and consultation were raised, a situation that led to what became known in Ghana as the 
‘Cash and Carry system’, meaning that people could access the healthcare system only 
if they had the money to pay. The practice, Senah (1997) and Arhinful (2003) argued, 
led many people to resort to ‘unorthodox’ means of seeking health support, as they 
could not afford the cost of allopathic cure in health centres. Thus, while SAP is 
believed to have reduced poverty levels in the country, Aryeetey & Cox (1997) and 
Tetteh (2003) argue that it [poverty reduction] was confined to the capital city and the 
forest localities only, worsening the existing regional, spatial and the rural/urban 
disparities throughout the country. 
 
Finally, SAPs made Ghana economically vulnerable to external shocks such as trade 
shocks and crude oil price hikes. Because SAPs promoted exports, Ghana relied heavily 
on cocoa and gold exports. However, when prices for these two commodities fell in 
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1992 and 1999/2000 due to the trade shocks that came with further rise in crude oil 
prices46, Ghana’s economy atrophied (Bawumia 2010). With a weak tax administration, 
the country experienced shortfalls in revenues, while the government continued to 
spend47. This led to huge budget deficits of almost 9.4% and 9.5% in 1992 and 1996, 
respectively. Bawumia (2010) argues that, although the government embarked on 
concessional borrowing in response to these slippages and thus mitigating these external 
shocks, the economic situation remained essentially unaffected. By 2000, Ghana’s 
currency, the Cedi had lost 50% of its value. As discussed below, the country’s external 
debt also rose to unsustainable levels, so much so that by 2000 Ghana qualified as a 
Highly Indebted Poor Country. 
 
The analysis of the factors that bedevilled the implementation of Structural Adjustment 
in Ghana points to the fact that aid programs have a less chance of being effective if 
they fail to address local circumstances. Clearly, the World Bank and the IMF seemed 
to have ignored Ghana’s social context at the time, focusing on economic indicators as 
providing the framework for the implementation of the program. Specifically, they 
overlooked the facts that 1) Ghana’s economy was state-driven, and approximately 75% 
of the work force were government employees; 2) Ghana’s economy was not 
diversified, and was driven by cocoa and gold; and 3) Ghanaians in the period were not 
used to paying realistic fees for public health and education, over 55% being poor.  
 
Although SAPs may have been good policy in principle as its relative achievements in 
other regions show (Glassman & Carmody 2001; McColls & Young 2005; Ostry et al. 
2009), its implementation in Ghana offered a key theoretical and development policy 
lesson – giving consideration to aid beneficiaries’ local contexts in development policy 
program designs. However, as the analysis of the progress towards achieving the 
Millennium Development Goals and the findings of this thesis will show (see Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven), international development agencies appear to have paid less 
attention to this lesson by continuing to promote and design aid programs that are at 
variance with the settings of development beneficiaries.  
 
 
 
                                                
46 In 1999/2000.  
47 Some of the expenditure was political as they financed election–motivated projects in 1992, 1996 & 
2000. 
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2.6. 2000–2010s:  The Decade of Global ‘Aid Boom’  
 
Following the mixed results of Structural Adjustment Programs and the end of the Cold 
War, international aid flows in the 1990s were considerably reduced. Aid as percentage 
of donors’ Gross National Income (GNI) decreased consistently from 0.33% in 1992 to 
0.22% in 1997 (see figure 2.1). Aid to Africa in the mid 1990s also remained below 
USD 20 billion. Hence, some anti–aid crusaders, who attributed the trend to aid 
ineffectiveness and ‘donor fatigue’, argued that aid was over (Collier 1999; Easterly 
2006; Moyo 2009; Mavrotas 2010).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: DAC48 Members net ODA49 1990–2008 and DAC  
Secretariat Simulation of Net ODA to 2009 and 2010 
Source: OECD Development Cooperation Report (2010). 
 
 
 
 
                                                
48 Development Assistance Committee. 
49 Official Development Assistance. 
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However, aid reinvented itself (Riddell 2007). As Figure 2.1 illustrates, and confirmed 
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the last 
decade has recorded an unprecedented increase in global aid levels (‘aid boom’), so that 
by 2010, aid to Ghana had hit a record high of almost USD129 billion50. Consequently, 
over the period in question, aid has promoted and financed several programs and 
initiatives. These include the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative; Multi Donor 
Budgetary Support Programs; and the Millennium Development Goals, which are 
discussed below. The others, discussed in the next chapter include: Output–Based Aid; 
High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness; and Community–Driven Development 
programs. While most of these initiatives were direct derivatives of and contributors to 
the ‘aid boom’, other factors have also influenced the trend, some of which predated the 
2000s. These include: 1) The publication of influential scholarly works; 2) International 
aid campaigns; and 3) The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the US. It is important 
to analyse these factors briefly before discussing how some of them impacted on Ghana. 
 
2.6.1 The Publication of Influential Scholarly Works 
In a period when aid was condemned as being ineffective and a waste of tax payers’ 
monies, Robert Cassen’s seminal work, Does Aid Work? (1986, 1994) criticised the 
prejudices characterising the public perception of the concept of aid. Arguing that most 
aid did succeed in terms of its own objectives and obtained a reasonable rate of return, 
Cassen’s work revived public hope in aid. In 1996, the OECD of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) followed with the famous Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Cooperation. Remembered for advocating the reduction 
of world poverty by 2015 which has been captured in the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the report reiterated the 1970 UN General Assembly Resolution for 
economically advanced countries to set aside 0.7% of their GNI annually for 
international aid (UN General Assembly Resolution 2626, October 1970; CIDA 2010). 
Although most donors have not met this target, it still remains the benchmark for 
measuring aid levels (see OECD 2011).   
 
The World Bank’s 1998 study, Assessing Aid and Burnside and Dollar’s (2000) Aid, 
Policies and Growth were other landmark publications during the period. They 
augmented Cassen (1994) and OECD publications by drawing together the relationship 
between aid, the recipient–country’s environment and economic growth. Burnside and 
                                                
50 See http://www.oecd.org/ document/35/0,3746,en_2649_ 37413 _47515235 _1_1_1_37413,00 html,  
retrieved March 15, 2012. 
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Dollar were particularly influential, theorising that aid worked in ‘good policy 
environments’ and among sound fiscal, economic and trade policies (see also Crook & 
Manor 1998). The theory emanated from the poor economic performance of most 
African economies in the 1990s51, which seemed to place blame on the continent’s 
weak political leadership and institutions. Burnside and Dollar’s report also influenced 
the establishment of the US Millennium Challenge Account to reward ‘well–governed’ 
African countries, including Ghana (Easterly 2006). British Prime Minister, Tony 
Blair’s Commission on Africa was also established, based upon the ideas presented by 
Burnside and Dollar (Easterly 2006).  
 
Significantly, the report ushered in the era of aid conditionalities. Thus, unlike the Cold 
War era, when aid was a ‘gift’, it was now a ‘contract’ (Leon & Eyben 2005; Amoako–
Tuffour 2005). Aid as a ‘contract’ seemed to have been given impetus by the terrorist 
attack on the US. As argued below, after the incident, the adoption of good governance, 
civil service reform and Western–styled democracy have become the ‘conditions’ for 
giving aid (Gastel & Nuijten 2005; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Although the claims of 
the Burnside and Dollar (2000) report are now challenged together with the earlier 
publications, their work can be credited with stimulating academic interest in the subject 
of aid. These earlier works have led to further research and other publications, some 
very provocative. These include, but not limited to, the works of Hirvonen (2005), 
Mosse & Lewis (2005), Sachs (2005), Easterly (2006), Collier (2007), Lahiri (2007), Li 
(2007), Riddell (2007), Moyo (2009), Walz & Ramachandran (2010) and Mavrotas 
(2011). 
 
2.6.2 International Aid Campaigns 
The current ‘aid boom’ is also a result of two streams of international aid campaigns. 
The first was organised by NGOs within specific European Countries who decried the 
cuts in aid of the early 1990s. These NGOs called on their governments to stop further 
cuts in ODA, and instead to support increases in development support. These included, 
but were not limited to, the ‘Just 1%’ campaign in the US and the German ‘Pro 0.7%’ 
campaign (Lancaster 2007). Also, development oriented NGOs began to collaborate 
across borders in pursuance of aid. For example, in Japan, international NGOs launched 
the Reality of Aid publication to review and assess aid programs worldwide 
                                                
51 This was a backlash of the SAP as high cost of their servicing debts which equalled the total amount of 
aid they received leading to a net reverse flow, from poor countries to rich countries, of USD 15 billion 
from 1987–1989 (Lancaster 2007; Moyo 2009).  
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independently52. The period also witnessed the restructuring of Japanese and French 
fragmented aid agencies to engage better the NGOs in advising and implementing their 
aid programs and aligning them to conform to the OECD/DAC (Lancaster 2007; 
Riddell 2007). 
 
The other campaign stream was much more global, being manifested in the ‘Jubilee 
2000’ and Drop the Debt’ campaigns. According to Sachs (2005) and Moyo (2009), 
towards the end of the 1990s, there were concerns from some quarters that huge debts 
were holding Africa back, a situation largely the result of Western lending institutions’ 
operations. Consequently, in the early 2000, there arose an army of aid campaigners, 
pop and movie stars, philanthropists and the clergy, who not only fought for 
cancellation of African debts, but also pressed for a swathe of new aid. For example, in 
2005 the Irish singer, Bono met the US President George W. Bush, while Bob Geldof 
was also a guest at the G8 meeting in Gleneagles, Scotland, all in the pursuit of debt 
forgiveness for poorer economies (Easterly 2006; Lancaster 2007; Moyo 2009).  Both 
streams of campaigns were significant as they influenced the World Bank’s debt 
forgiveness initiative, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), which led to the 
reduction of the debts of some African countries for the first time. For example, 
Lancaster (2007) notes that member states of the OECD/DAC forgave debts amounting 
to USD 3.7 billion in 2004, a substantial rise above the 1990 forgiveness figure of USD 
650 million. Ghana benefited from the initiative, as later discussed.  
 
2.6.3 September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack on the USA 
Global aid has not remained the same after the terrorist attack on the US on September 
11, 2001. The incident, popularly referred to as 9/11, claimed thousands of lives, 
destroyed infrastructure and inclined American and European political elites to support 
higher levels of aid for the prevention of ‘failed states’, believed to be a derivative of 
poverty, conflicts and weak institutions and a haven for terrorists (Coll 2004; Collier 
2007). As a security measure, rich countries around the world, led by the US and its 
allies, started employing aid as a tool to prevent state failures in the Arab world, 
particularly countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Somalia, each labelled as 
‘havens for terrorists’ (see Figure 2.2 below; Jones, Riddell & Kotoglou 2005; Collier 
2007). Legitimised by the unfortunate incident, ‘security aid’ regained currency in aid 
                                                
52 (See http://www.realityofaid.org/content/about–roa/parent/17/name/RoA–Profile/id/7, retrieved March 
25, 2012). 
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discourses, the philosophy having first influenced aid giving during the Cold War. As 
Brenda Killen of the OECD Development Co–operation Directorate submits in the 
OECD 2012 Yearbook53, “in our highly interdependent world, what happens with the 
economy, security, climate and health of any country affects us all”. 
 
Firmly underpinning the concept of ‘security aid’ was the notion that poverty and 
inequality around the world generate hostility and resentment towards the West (Lozada 
2002; Hirvonen 2005; Woods 2005). As a result, most Western countries and their 
media argued for increasing aid to poor countries for poverty reduction and conflict 
prevention in ‘failed states’ (Hirvonen 2005; Collier 2007; Lancaster 2007). James D. 
Wolfensohn, the former World Bank President (1995–2005) supported the idea 
observing that:  
Poverty in itself does not … lead to conflict, let alone to terrorism ... and yet we 
know that exclusion can breed violent conflict. … Civil wars have often resulted 
not so much from ethnic diversity… poverty is a central ingredient and conflict–
ridden countries in turn become safe havens for terrorist ... Our common goal 
must be to eradicate poverty, to promote inclusion and social justice to bring the 
marginalised into the main stream of the global economy and society … What 
should be our agenda? First scale up foreign aid. 
(cited in Lancaster 2007, p. 59). 
 
The 9/11 incident has influenced the aid landscape significantly. Among other things, 
countries that had hitherto not been receiving aid have been included in the aid recipient 
list. For example, after the 9/11 incident, countries considered to be havens for terrorists 
– Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan – appeared on the UK’s top eleven aid beneficiary 
countries, although they had not been among the top fifteen in previous years (Jones et 
al. 2005). Meanwhile, these ‘terrorist–haven’ countries also appeared on the aid list of 
donor countries, sometimes as new aid providers, such as Sweden and Norway, whose 
ODA, until the 9/11 incident, was value–free. Figures from the OECD indicates that 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, ‘supposed’ terrorist haven countries, have for the last 
decade remained in the top ten of aid beneficiary countries of the US and its wealthy 
allies in the fight against terrorism54. Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 below, aid to 
Afghanistan has since 2000 risen significantly, while at the peak of the US war on 
terrorism, aid to Iraq soared. Although aid to Pakistan is relatively smaller, the rise in 
US assistance to the country since the 9/11 incident is significant. 
                                                
53 http://oecdinsights.org/2012/04/04/development-aid-drops-for-the-first-time-in-15-years/.Retrieved 
August 22, 2012. 
54 http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats, retrieved May 04, 2012. For the 2009/2010 period see the top ten gross 
ODA recipients of the US, the UK, Australia, Sweden and Canada. 
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Figure 2.2 Net ODA received (% of GNI) of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan 
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Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html, 
retrieved March 12, 2012. Figures from 1982–2000 are unavailable. 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iraq/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html, retrieved March 
12, 2012. Figures from 1982–2000 on Afghanistan and Iraq 1991–2003 are unavailable; 
http://www.globalissues.org/ article /35/foreign–aid–development–assistance, retrieved January 2012. 
 
 
 
It is within this context that the 2002 UN Conference on Financing Development in 
Monterrey, Mexico; and the convening of the 2005 G–8 Summit in Gleneagles, 
Scotland must be understood.  The Monterrey conference, which coincided with the 
international aid campaigns and the terrorist attack on the US, significantly impacted the 
first decade of 2000, as many donor countries promised to increase their aid to the 
developing world. For example, the US promised to increase its aid by USD 5 billion or 
by half by 2006, and to make that increase permanent (UN Monterrey Consensus 2003). 
According to Lancaster (2007), by 2003, worldwide aid rose by USD10 billion as 
governments began to implement their commitments. The G–8 Summit in Gleneagles in 
2005 also renewed calls for donors to increase their aid to Africa in particular, where it 
was projected that a total aid volume of USD 25 billion was needed by 2010 to reduce 
poverty and conflicts55.  
 
 
                                                
55 http://www.unmillenniumproject. org/press/ g8overview.htm, retrieved January 18, 2012. 
 47 
2.7 Ghana in the Decade of Aid Boom: 2000–2010 
The discussion above addressed the factors that accounted for the ‘aid boom’ in the first 
decade of 2000. As earlier indicated, the trend has led to the promotion of many aid 
programs and initiatives in developing countries. Below, three such initiatives are 
discussed, within the context of Ghana to demonstrate the country’s continued aid 
dependence, and the challenges facing some of the programs. However, a brief 
overview of the country’s economic situation in the decade is crucial.  
 
Figure 2.3: Net ODA to Ghana 1970–2010 Compared in USD Millions 
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Source: OECD (2011); World Bank Database; Quartey et al. (n.d.). 
 
 
 
Ghana’s economy at the start of the millennium was poor. While the poverty level had 
been reduced from 51% in 1992, it was still high at approximately 40% in 2000, with 
almost 79% of the population living on less than USD 2 a day (Human Development 
Report 2002). The country also had huge debts burdens (see Figure 2.4). Thus, the 
newly elected New Patriotic Party (NPP) government was ‘desperate’ for programs that 
would improve the lives of the people and the country’s debt situation (NPP 2000 
Campaign Manifesto). The NPP was fortunate as their regime coincided with the ‘aid 
boom’. As a preferred destination in Sub–Saharan Africa for the experimentation with 
aid programs, Ghana benefited significantly from the ‘aid boom’ with an unprecedented 
increase in ODA volumes, most of them as Project Aid (see Figures 2.3 & 2.5).  
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2.7.1. Ghana and the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) 
The Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) was a World Bank and IMF debt 
forgiveness program. Under the initiative, huge monies that poor countries were 
expected to use to service their debts to international creditors were channelled into 
poverty reduction programs, named HIPC Savings or HIPC Funds (IMF & IDA 2001). 
Apart from the worldwide campaigns for debt relief, the HIPC initiative was 
theoretically premised on several commentators’ assertion that debt servicing was 
compromising the ability of developing economies to provide basic social amenities for 
their poor, and that the situation would hinder their achievement of the MDGs56 (Osei & 
Quartey 2001; Eaton 2002; Tarp 2000; Birdsall et al. 2002; Easterly 2002; Kanbur 
2003). With debt relief, the commentators were convinced that more resources would be 
freed and made available for investment in both human and physical capital, while 
achieving pro–poor growth targets and sustainable debt levels. 
 
Beneficiary countries of HIPC had to go through three stages: a 1) Satisfactory three–
year reputation, mainly the reduction of non–ODA debt by 65% in net present value 
terms; 2) Decision point; and 3) Completion point.  The last two stages were tied to the 
HIPC country’s ability to produce and implement its Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(Whitfield 2005; Woll 2008), after which donors would commit to the provision of 90% 
or more flow reduction in debt (Bawumia 2010). The Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSP) was a country–driven, results focused, long–term, comprehensive and 
partnership–oriented document that spelt out the economic priorities of countries that 
wished to access World Bank and IMF concessional lending and debt relief. The PRSP 
sought to introduce the principles of greater ownership of economic reforms by 
countries, and of wider participation by citizens in determining the content of their 
country's development strategy (IMF 2003; World Bank Country Assistance Strategy 
2005; Killick 2001; Woll 2008).  
 
Ghana commenced the year 2000 with huge debts (see Figure 2.4 below). The country’s 
external debt as percentage of GDP was over 150%. According to the 2002 Africa 
Economic Outlook Report, Ghana’s debt servicing in 2000 was over 20% of all exports 
in the country. The total external debt due for repayment in 2001 was USD 560 million 
(Bawumia 2010). Faced with such an huge debt–burden, the NPP government explained 
to donors that achieving the MDGs was a challenge, and upon the advice of the World 
                                                
56 In the case of Ghana an economic growth rate of 8% was projected as the condition for the country to 
attain the MDGs (Osei & Quartey 2001; Bawumia 2010). 
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Bank57, declared the country HIPC in March 2001(GOG 2001; 2003a).58Apart from the 
usual harsh political criticisms of the opposition, Japan, Ghana’s leading bilateral donor 
at the time, also threatened not to extend new loans to Ghana if the country signed up 
for HIPC (Osei & Quartey 2001). However, the government remained resilient and 
braced itself to present its PRSP to be considered for debt relief. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Ghana’s Public Debt as Percentage of GDP 
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Source: MOFEP (2008), cited in: 2010 Ghana 2010 MDG Report.  
 
According to Whitfield (2005), the National Development Planning Commission 
(NDPC) of the outgoing Rawlings’ government in 2000 formulated the first draft of 
Ghana’s PRSP. The New Patriotic Party under President J.A. Kufour (2001–2008) 
adjusted the draft and modified it to reflect the priorities of their election campaign 
promises while taking into account comments by the IMF and the World Bank. Named 
the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper I (GPRP I) the paper defined the 
government’s medium–term development strategy. In 2003, the donors endorsed the 
document, although Whitfield (2005) argues that the formulation process was not 
consultative enough, Parliament being marginalised, and the paper lacking a ‘pro-poor’ 
face (see also IMF 2006).   
 
                                                
57 After the IMF conducted a Debt Sustainability Analysis  
58 Although the country had been technically HIPC since 1999. 
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The launch of the GPRS I coincided with several other development initiatives. Apart 
from the MDGs, the country had signed in 2002 the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD) of the Organisation of African Union as well as the United 
Nation’s Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Most of the medium–
term development priorities of these commitments were similar to the GPRS I. Thus the 
NPP government reviewed and revised the GPRS I for the period 2006–2009, 
producing a single document, the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper II 
(GPRS II), that combined all the government’s development and policy commitments 
(Whitfield 2005; IMF 2006; Woll 2008).  
Ghana reached the HIPC decision point in February 2002, after which an amount of 
USD 96 million of the total external repayable debts of USD 375 million was written 
off as debt relief (GoG Budget Statements 2002; 2003; 2004). In 2005, Ghana was also 
among eighteen African countries that benefited from another debt relief package 
totalling USD 40 billion under the Multi–Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) of the world’s 
richest countries (G–8). Under the MDRI, Ghana’s debts of USD 4.2 billion were 
written off in January 200659. Thus, the country’s external debt was dramatically 
reduced further from 156% of GDP in 2000 to 27% in 2008 (Bawumia 2010). Tellingly, 
owing to the problematic nature of aid–dependency, the country’s debt stock seems to 
be rising again. Data from the World Bank indicate that in 2009, Ghana’s external debt 
to GDP was 34.3%, 39.2% in 2010 and 41.2% in 201160.  
 
2.7.2 Multi–Donor Budgetary Support  
Another noteworthy milestone in Ghana’s aid profile was the Multi Donor Budgetary 
Support Program (MDBS). Theoretically, the idea of the MDBS was borne out of the 
donors’ strong commitment to making their aid effective. Because aid flows were 
unpredictable, governments of developing economies did not know how much to expect 
so enabling them to formulate their respective country budgets (Woll 2008; Amoako–
Tuffour 2005). The idea of a multi–donor-funding mechanism was that all donors paid a 
fixed, so–called base tranche at the beginning of each year into a single fund so 
ensuring predictability of cash flow (World Bank 2006a; Amoako–Tuffour 2005; Woll 
2008). The MDBS mechanism allowed a recipient government the freedom to 
determine which priority areas to which it wanted to allocate the funds, within the limits 
of its own budgetary processes (Walters 2005; World Bank 2006a).  The initiative was 
                                                
59 IDA (USD 3,482.9 million), IMF (USD 274.6 million), AfDB (USD 445.5 million). 
60 See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/ government–debt–to–gdp, retrieved April 13, 2012. 
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also a way of reducing aid transaction costs, while enhancing better coordination among 
donors and promoting recipient–government’s ownership of its development agenda 
(Amoako–Tuffour 2005; Walters 2005; World Bank 2000a; 2006a).  
 
Figure 2.5: ODA Forms Ghana Received in a Decade compared in Millions USD 
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Source: Quartey et al. (n.d.). 
 
 
Ghana’s MDBS was established in 2003 to support the implementation of the GPRS I, 
while harmonising development cooperation reporting mechanisms (Woll 2008). When 
Ghana’s GPRS I was replaced with GRPS II, donors signed a new Framework 
Memorandum with the government of Ghana in 2008 to finance fiscal actions broadly 
aimed at reducing poverty, reaching the MDGs and promoting growth. The MDBS has 
contributed a substantial amount of aid monies to Ghana (see Figure 2.5). Currently 
there are eleven donors61 participating in the MDBS. While the MDBS has led to aid 
predictability in Ghana, four challenges still remain. First, although there are many 
donor agencies in the country, not all of them have joined the MDGS. For example, 
while Australia has been providing aid to Ghana in recent times, the Australian aid 
agency (AusAid) prefers to implement projects in areas of its choice (Australian High 
Commission Accra 2010). Furthermore, none of the eleven donors, currently involved 
in the initiative, channel all their aid through the MDBS, the UK excepted (Geddes et al. 
2009; Clay et al. 2009). Clearly, the situation has tended to fragment and lead to aid 
                                                
61 The World Bank, European Commission, UK, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
the Africa Development Bank and Japan. 
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duplication in the country, as well as allowing speculation into the motives of donors 
(Easterly & Pfutze 2008). 
 
Additionally, Woll (2008) observes that the operational structure of the MDBS reflects 
continuing divergence in different donors’ institutional structure, as well as in their 
priorities. Consequently, accounting structures have not been harmonised as donors 
continue to employ different accountability, planning and disbursement mechanisms, 
particularly whenever harmonisation requirements are at variance with their respective 
organisational requirements. Thus, while in principle the MDBS is supposed to make it 
easier for donor agencies to harmonise their aid policies with the Ghanaian government, 
the former continue to employ their respective reporting and monitoring mechanisms 
(CIDA 2010). Finally, donors usually fall short of the amounts they pledge (Table 2.2). 
Clearly these shortfalls have significant impact on the Ghanaian Government’s fiscal 
budget and planning. 
 
 
Table 2.2 MDBS Disbursements for the Period 2003 – 2010 (in millions) 
 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Pledges 
in USD 
281.40        302.16        285.33       372.43       319.57       347.90              
Actual 
(USD) 
278     311         282         299     316.57      368.13     525.2      451.2 
MDBS% 
of ODA 
30.1            26.74         29.34         33.34          26.48      25.72                
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (2010); Quartey et al. (n.d.). There are no figures for 
Pledges and MDBS % of ODA for 2009 and 2010. 
 
 
 
  2.7.3 The Millennium Development Goals 
The launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in September 2000, added 
further momentum to the ‘aid boom’. The MDGs were intended to be a vehicle for 
renewed global determination to achieve peace and decent standards of living for every 
man, woman and child62 (Sachs 2005). The eight goals that were to be reached by 2015 
included: 
1) Eradicating extreme poverty and hunger;  
2) Achieve universal primary education;  
3) Promote gender equality and empower women;  
                                                
62 See also http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm, retrieved January 14, 2010. 
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4) Reduce child mortality;  
5) Improve maternal health;  
6) Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases;  
7) Ensure environmental sustainability; and  
8) Develop global partnership for development (MDG Reports 2006; 2008).  
 
Three years to the target, developing countries are reported to be on track or close to 
achieving MDGs 1, 2, 3 and 7 (Figure 2.6). However, unless efforts are stepped up, 
MDGs 4 and 5 may not be achieved. Details of the distance to MDG 6 are lacking 
because the World Bank has conceded their hypothesis about HIV/AIDS must be re-
evaluated as some impact evaluations have shown the original assumptions to be 
wrong63. However, according to the MDG 2011 Report, while some efforts have been 
made, MDG 6 is unlikely to be achieved globally. ‘Develop Global Partnership for 
Development’, MDG 8, is also facing evaluation challenges. While ODA has increased, 
an OECD (2011) report indicates that donors are not adhering to the tenets of the 2005 
Paris Declaration and the UN 0.7% of GNI aid target. Also, although there have been 
efforts to broker global development partnerships, the World Bank admits that poor 
economies have not been fully integrated into the global trading system and banking 
regulations, which impose excessive capital requirements on trade and finance 
transactions that still remain64 (Global Monitoring Report [GMR] 2011). From this 
analysis, the Africa Human Development Report (2012) was right to project that 
globally, only four of the MDGs may be achieved by 2015.  
 
In terms of regional analysis, Sub–Saharan Africa lags behind the other regions (see 
Figure 2.7). As a group, the region is unlikely to reach a single MDG target by 2015, a 
fact acknowledged by the African Region MDG Report (2011). Of the forty–seven 
countries engaged, the GMR (2011) indicates that only nine countries have shown 
progress on extreme poverty, eight on hunger, twenty seven on gender parity in primary 
education, and fifteen on access to safe drinking water. Goals related to child and 
maternal mortality, access to sanitation, and primary education completion require 
stepped–up efforts, as they seem to have lost their direction (Africa Human 
Development Report 2012). 
 
                                                
63 http://www.worldbank.org/mdgs/diseases.html, retrieved October 09, 2012. 
64 See also http://go.worldbank.org/ JGENXDULT0, retrieved April 15, 2012. 
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Relative to Ghana, progress is mixed (see Table 2.3). According to the GMR (2011) and 
the MDG Report (2011), none of the MDGs has been fully achieved in Ghana. While 
the country is heading in the right direction to achieve MDGs 1, 2, and 3, the remaining 
MDGs will not be fulfilled. Incidentally, according to the Ghana MDG Report (2010), 
there is a dearth of data to track the progress of the under-performing MDGs. Thus, 
Baidoo (2011) asserts that Ghana would need nearly forty years to achieve the MDGs. 
 
The reality that the MDGs will not be fully achieved globally by 2015 has led its 
realities to blame the situation on the: 1) Global financial, food and fuel crises; and 2) 
Notion that the Sub–Saharan Africa region is far behind (GMR Report 2011; MDG 
Report 2011; African Region MDG Report 2011). Consequently, the UN Secretary 
General, Mr Ban Ki Moon, the Special Advisor on the MDGs, Professor Jeffery Sachs, 
and Robert B. Zoellick, President of the World Bank Group have called for renewed 
international efforts and commitments for achieving the MDGs (see reports above).   
 
Meanwhile, even before it became obvious that the MDGs would not be achieved, many 
scholars warned the UN and the World Bank to review the MDGs as they seemed 
arbitrary and had ‘context problems’.  For example, Easterly (2009) argued that the 
MDG are unfair to Sub–Saharan African countries as they do not take into account the 
historical and the contextual diversity of the region. In other words, because the 
indicators are universalised, relative successes of the Sub–Saharan African countries in 
some of the MDGs tend to be portrayed as worse or even failures. Therefore, as 
Clemens & Moss (2005) and Clemens et al. (2011) observed, in most discussions on the 
MDGs, the ‘failure’ of the region seems to be emphasised compared to other regions, 
although some progress has been made in specific countries.  
 
Others have also argued that the MDGs would exacerbate aid dependency in many 
economically poor countries. Because the initiative emphasises foreign financing of 
domestic social and redistribution policies, recipient countries are being flooded with 
resource transfers, leaving them permanently aid–dependent or ‘welfarised’ (Reinert 
2007; Easterly 2009; Haque 2011). Finally, Hancock et al. (2011) have criticised MDG 
3, “Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women” on the ground that it isolates 
rather than mainstreams women. They argue that seeing women in isolation is not a 
sustainable way of empowering them as they do not live in isolation, but are a part of 
society. Thus, if ‘uncontextualised’, MDG 3 could lead to the inadvertent 
disempowering of men and result in conflicts. The phenomenon of the simultaneity of 
 55 
empowerment and disempowerment is empirically supported by the findings of this 
thesis (see Chapter Seven). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Current Global Distance to the MDGs 
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  Source: GMR (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Countries on Target to Achieve the MDGs, by Region 
 
 
Source: Global Monitoring Report (2011). 
 
 
 56 
Table 2.3 Ghana’s Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals 
 
MDG TARGETS ACHIEVEMENTS  
 
MGD 1: 
Eradicate 
Extreme Poverty 
& Hunger 
The percentage of those living below the national poverty line has 
fallen from 52% in 1992 to 29% in 2005–06. The 2010 report is 
confident that this target will be achieved by 2015. 
MDG 2: Achieve 
Universal 
Primary 
Education 
The percentage of children of official school age (net enrolment) 
who are enrolled in primary schools rose from 81% in 2006/07 to 
89% in 2008/09. The total number of children enrolled at the 
primary level irrespective of age (gross enrolment) increased from 
91% in 2006/07 to 95% in 2008/09. 
MDG 3: Promote 
Gender Equality 
& Empower 
Women 
Currently, for every 100 boys in primary education, there are 96 
girls. It is likely that this target will be met. 
MDG 4: Reduce 
Child Mortality 
 
There has been significant progress on under–five mortality, 
although for every 13 children in Ghana, one child still dies before 
his/her fifth birthday. Previously 1 in 10 children died before 
his/her fifth birthday. This target can only be achieved if the 
country scales–up and sustains the recent child survival 
interventions. 
MDG 5: Improve 
Maternal Health 
 
Ghana is off–track in improving maternal health. Although 
Ghana’s maternal mortality ratio has improved slightly in recent 
years, for every 100,000 women giving birth, 451 die (down from 
560 deaths per 100,000 live births, WHO, 2005).  
MDG 6: Combat 
HIV/AIDS, 
Malaria & Other 
Diseases 
 
HIV/AIDS prevalence rate was 2.2% in 2008 but increased to 
2.9% in 2009. With this trend, it is unlikely that the country will 
achieve the 2015 target of halting and reversing the spread of the 
epidemic. The incidence of malaria still remains the leading cause 
of mortality and morbidity, particularly among pregnant women 
and children under–five years.  
MDG 7: Ensure 
Environmental 
Sustainability 
 
Ghana is not on course to achieve this goal in full. Only 12% of 
households have access to improved sanitation. While the nation is 
on track in reducing by half the proportion of people without 
access to improved water, critical challenges exist in the area of 
proportion of land area covered by forest, and reducing the 
proportion of urban population living in slum areas.  
MDG 8: Develop 
Global 
Partnership for 
Development 
 
Donors are partnering for development, most significantly through 
the Ghana Joint Assistance Strategy (GJAS). While ODA inflows 
to Ghana appear to have increased in nominal terms between 2001 
and 2010; the challenge has been quality of the aid the country 
receives. This target remains a challenge as global issues continue 
to negatively impact on the economy and debt situation.  
Source: Ghana Ministry of Education 2008/2009 Annual Report; Ghana Health Service Annual Report 
(2009); African Development Outlook (2008); Ghana MDG Report (2010); MDG Report (2011); GMR 
(2011); African Human Development Report 2012. 
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2.8 Conclusion 
This chapter traced global aid trends and explained how they have impacted on the 
Ghanaian aid landscape. Three conclusions were apparent. First, Post–War II aid did not 
start as a package for poorer economies nor was it geared to ethnically diverse contexts, 
as it was designed to save only the West. Second, Ghana is aid–dependent, being best 
described as both a beneficiary and victim of an experimental global aid system as the 
country has experienced most forms of aid introduced on the continent: SAPs, HIPC, 
MDBS, and the MDGs– a matter which justifies the choice of the country for this 
research. Lastly, the chapter showed that a country’s political and social context play 
crucial roles in the fate of aid programs implemented there. Accordingly, a well–
intended program could fail or achieve mixed results, if the beneficiaries’ grounded 
realities are taken for granted or judged within the framework of demographically 
different settings. The next chapter discusses the factors believed to have contributed to 
aid ineffectiveness as well as efforts to making them ‘work’.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
MAKING AID EFFECTIVE: EFFORTS, ISSUES AND GAPS  
 
“Effective aid matters to developing countries, as it can enable them to move beyond 
aid dependence and reach development effectiveness” 
Dr. Kwabena Duffuor (2010)65. 
 
 
Over the last two decades discussions on the effectiveness of international development 
aid (aid) have gained prominence in international development discourse and policy 
analysis. The interests in the subject stem from the argument that, although Sub–
Saharan Africa, for example, has received much aid in the past fifty years, lives have 
not improved, as 70% of the one billion poorest people on earth live in the region 
(Collier 2007; Moyo 2009).  The prevalence of poverty in the region is considered so 
serious that not a single Millennium Development Goal (MDG) will be achieved by the 
target date of 2015, although some progress has been made (MDG Report 2011; Global 
Monitoring Report 2011; Africa Human Development Report 2012). While the 
incidence of poverty in Sub–Saharan Africa is caused by the interplay between so many 
factors including: leadership crises, ethnic hatred, corruption, politics, social structures 
and aid–dependency, the last factor is most often cited (Mehmet 1971; Cassen 1994; 
Meredith 2005; Calderisi 2006; Ashimolowo 2007). This has led some to argue that aid 
must stop entirely, as it does more harm than good (Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009).  Others 
disagree and argue that aid can work, but only under very specific conditions (Cassen 
1994; Sachs 2005; Collier 2007).  
 
This chapter argues that global efforts for achieving aid effectiveness appear to focus on 
condition–driven and bureaucratic mechanisms, while the need to understanding local 
contexts of aid recipients is ignored. To put this argument in perspective, the first part 
of the chapter discusses two prevalent arguments believed to account for aid 
ineffectiveness that: 1) Aid drives donors’ motives and; 2) Aid creates dependency in 
the recipient–country. While relevant, the section argues that the problem of aid 
ineffectiveness goes beyond these two widespread arguments; understanding aid 
recipients’ contexts vis-à-vis the theories and concepts on which aid programs are 
based, is crucial.   
                                                
65 Ghana's Minister of Finance and Economic Planning (2009–2012) shared his perspective on how the 
DAC can help in providing aid more effectively to ensure that the country reaches its development goals 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/22/45298985.htm, retrieved April 27, 2012). 
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The second section of the chapter examines Results–Based Financing, Aid–Agenda 
Conferences and Program–Based Approaches, three currently popular mechanisms for 
addressing aid ineffectiveness globally.  As will become obvious, while these 
approaches are celebrated, none seems to address the ‘context argument’, a gap this 
thesis seeks to fill.   
 
3.1 Why Has Aid Been Ineffective?66 
Although there are several arguments for why aid is considered by many to be 
ineffective, the two most prevalent in the literature are explicated below. These are the 
notions that: 1) Donors use aid to achieve their strategic interests; and 2) Aid creates a 
culture of dependency in the recipient–country (Mehmet 1999; Riddell 2007; Moyo 
2009; Mavrotas 2010).  
 
3.1.1. Aid and Donors’ Strategic Interests  
Although inherently altruistic, aid is believed never to have been ‘an honest gift’ 
(Mehmet 1971; Amoako–Tuffour 2005). In their Who Gives Aid to Whom and Why? 
Alesina and Dollar (1998), exposed non–developmental motives that inform aid 
allocation. They found that the direction of aid is dictated by political and strategic 
considerations much more so than the economic needs and policy performance of the 
recipient country.  Jones et al. (2005, p. 26) also observed that: 
Aid from the largest bilateral donors ... [is] provided for motives that are not 
purely based on poverty reduction objectives, although the latter have been 
made more explicit in recent years and are formally the sole or major 
justification for development assistance for some donors. Security and regional 
relations are the most significant drivers of aid allocations for donors. 
 
As previously discussed, the phenomenon of using aid to achieve donors’ strategic 
interests dates back to the Marshall Plan, which was meant not just to revive Western 
European economies, but also to challenge the spread of Soviet communism in Europe 
(Lancaster 2007; Mavrotas 2010). The same principle also underlined British and 
French colonial aid after World War II as well as the US and Soviet aid during the Cold 
War (Riddell 2007).  
 
Contemporary bilateral donors continue to use aid to advance their respective national 
interests. For example, a Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked, “it must not be 
forgotten that in the end Official Development Assistance is implemented for Japan’s 
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own sake” (Riddell 2007, p. 97). Australia is also forthright, “the objective of the 
Australian aid program is to assist developing countries reduce poverty and achieve 
sustainable development in line with Australia's national interest”67. Canada is also no 
exception (Pomerantz 2004). It is within this context that Riddell condemns the MDGs 
as being deceptive and tending to portray ‘development’ and the welfare of the poor as 
the only reasons why aid is given; however without doubt, security and commercial 
interests are influential (Jones et al. 2005; Riddell 2007).   
 
The use of aid to advance donors’ commercial interests dates back to 1896 when the US 
used food aid as a ploy to find markets for their food surpluses (Hjertholm & Howard 
1998). The British Colonial 1929 Act, which allowed for loans and grants to their 
colonies for infrastructure, was also meant to absorb the outputs of British 
manufacturers (Riddell 2007). As a result, during the 1940s the British viewed their 
colonies as the producers of materials for their industries (Hjertholm & Howard 1998). 
The British Minister of Food in the World–War II Labor government is quoted, saying 
that, “by one means or another, by hook or by crook, the development of primary 
production of all sorts in the colonial area ... is ... a life and death matter for [Britain’s] 
economy” (Gupta 1975, p. 320).  
 
Modern bilateral donors have maintained the commercial–interest philosophy through      
strategies such as tied–aid. Tied–aid is defined as Project Aid determined and contracted 
by the source country to private firms in the donor country (Mehmet 1971; Svensson 
2000). In simpler terms, if Australia gave aid to Sri Lanka to build schools, for example, 
Australian firms would be awarded the contracts. In the mid 1980’s, Jempa (1991) 
found that 52% of donors tied their aid. In 2006, the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development of the Development Assistance Committee 
(OECD/DAC) also revealed that more than 50% of total Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) remained tied68.  
 
Some have argued that in principle, tied–aid is common sense, and that it could 
strategically promote the recipient country’s business or exports (Aryeetey 1995; Sowa 
& White 1997). However, others disagree and argue that tied–aid promotes corruption 
and does not promote local ownership of aid programs (Bhagwati et al. 1983; Jempa 
                                                
67 http://ausaid.gov.au/ about/default.cfm, retrieved May10, 2011. 
68 http://www.oecd.org/document/50/0,3746,en_2649_33721_46345330_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved 
April 26, 2012. 
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1991; Baffour 1999; Osei 2004; Quartey 2005). Riddell (2007) estimates that tied–aid 
costs recipient–countries about USD 7.3 billion extra; for example, Osei (2004) found 
that between 1990 and 1997, tied–aid raised the price of imported goods in Ghana from 
USD 40 million to USD 80 million a year (see also Mehmet 1971; Cassen 1994).  
 
As a result of the negative impact of tied–aid on recipient–countries, the OECD/DAC 
has intensified its efforts since 2000 to get its member states to “untie” their aid (Clay, 
Geddes & Natali 2009). The efforts stem from empirical studies which suggest that 
untied aid promotes the development of the recipient country’s local businesses and 
employment, while aligning projects to local priorities (Jempa 1991; Lahiri & 
Raimondos 1997; OECD 2009). These efforts culminated in a Recommendation to 
Untie Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries, which came 
into force in January 2002 (DAC High Level Meeting, April 2001; Riddell 2007). The 
recommendations aimed to: 1) Untie ODA to the least developed countries to the 
greatest extent possible; 2) Promote and ensure adequate ODA flows, in particular to 
the least developed countries; and 3) Achieve balanced efforts among DAC Members in 
untying aid. This effort was augmented by the 2005 Paris Declaration, which as 
discussed below, emphasised local ownership, aid coordination and donor/ recipient 
partnership as a means to achieving greater aid effectiveness69. The recommendations 
were amended in 2006 and 2008 to expand the coverage to heavily indebted poor 
countries70.  
 
A recent report of Clay et al. (2009), Untying Aid, Is It Working? based on case studies 
from Burkina Faso, Ghana, Laos, South Africa, Vietnam and Zambia, indicates that the 
proportion of untied bilateral aid has risen progressively from 46% in the period 1999 –
2001 to 82% in 2008. The report also claims that since January 2002, ODA to the least 
developed countries has been untied in the following areas: balance of payments and 
structural adjustment support, debt forgiveness, sector and multi–sector programmes 
assistance, investment project aid, import and commodity support, commercial services 
contracts and ODA to NGOs for procurement related activities.  
 
Despite OECD’s efforts, tied–aid still exists. In Ghana, with the exception of the UK, 
most bilateral donors do not channel all their aid to the country’s budgetary support 
                                                
69 See http://www.oecd.org/document  /18/0,3343,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html, 
retrieved April 2005, 2012.   
70 http://www.oecd.org/document/ 50/0 , 3746,en_2649_33721 _46345330_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved 
April 20, 2012. 
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mechanism that uses untied aid modalities (Woll 2008; Clay et al. 2009; Geddes et al. 
2009). Technical assistance to most developing countries remains tied under the de 
facto tying principles which are applied in contexts where the aid recipient’s local or 
regional contractors ‘supposedly’: 1) Are unable to compete internationally; 2) Have 
unequal access to information; and/or 3) Lack the capacity to implement the projects 
that may require speedy execution. Some donors also apply the principle because they 
want to avert potential risks or follow their ODA regulations (Clay et al. 2009; OECD 
2011). While de facto tying may be a consequence and not necessarily intended, the 
practice offers loopholes for donors to manipulate their aid. As most donors are thought 
to focus their technical assistance in areas of their comparative advantage (Amoako–
Tuffour 2005), the principle seems to provide donors with the convenience of 
promoting their country’s businesses, while local capacities, which may need such 
opportunities to grow, are bypassed (Geddes et al. 2009). 
 
While tied–aid does have some impact on the quality of aid; it does not offer enough 
grounds to argue in general that donors’ interests contribute to aid ineffectiveness. The 
reason is that the commercialisation aspect of tied–aid is just one ruse of donors’ 
strategic agendas. Interestingly, some donors have “successfully” employed the 
instrumentality of aid to accomplish security, climate, and immigration policy agendas. 
An example is the US Marshall Plan for Western Europe, which was an overt economic 
program, but in reality was ‘security–driven’71 (Lancaster 2007). Others include the 
2009 UN Conference on Climate convened in Copenhagen, Denmark, where aid was 
used as a “bait” to gain support for the deal72; and the use of aid to curb illegal 
migration to many developed countries (AIDWATCH 2011; Arthur & Quartey 2008; 
DFID 2012). 
 
The fact that some donors have been able to use aid to accomplish their national 
agendas presents two points for discussion. First, it gives rise to problems as to what 
defines “aid effectiveness”. If defined and assessed as just “outcomes”, aid programs 
that accomplish donors’ objectives, but lead to increased local corruption and keep 
despots in power may also be considered as “effective” or “successful” (Alesina & 
Weder 1999; Annist 2005; Eyben & Leon 2005; Labonne & Chase 2007). The question 
then becomes: from whose perspective should “aid effectiveness” be measured: donors 
or recipients? Relative to this thesis, “aid effectiveness” is measured through the lenses 
                                                
71 To challenge the spread of Soviet communism in Europe. 
72 (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8422133.stm, retrieved April 25, 2012). 
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of donors’ specific program objectives and how these impact on beneficiaries at the 
local level. However, understanding the impact of aid on recipients, this thesis shows, 
requires a considerable appreciation of their local dynamics.  
 
Second, it suggests that untying aid would not necessarily lead to “aid effectiveness”, as 
it is a broad concept (Li 2007; Mavrotas 2010).  For example, although the UK has, as 
of 2008, untied all its ODA to Ghana (Geddes et al. 2009), this laudable action has not 
necessarily improved the successes of its programs in the country. This is because other 
problems with aid, such as lack of coordination among donors, still exist there, a 
challenge that has no correlation to tied or untied aid (DFID 2012; see also Woll 2008).  
Further, although multilateral aid programs are untied, appear to be less politically–
driven, and are more likely to be channelled to recipients’ needs, some of them fail or 
do not meet all goals for other reasons, including the notion that aid creates dependency 
(Riddell 2007).  
 
3.1.2 Aid and the Dependency Theory  
Dependency Theory has its roots in the Leninist theories of imperialism (Chase–Dunn 
1975; Kaufman et al. 1975; Bornschier et al. 1978; Barrett & White 1982). It refers to 
“a situation in which the economy of a certain group of [developing] countries is 
conditioned by ... another [mostly rich] country or external forces [multilateral 
corporations, international commodity market, aid]” (Santos 1971, p. 321). Aid became 
the medium for dependency after World War II (Hjertholm & Howard 1998). Hitherto, 
minerals (gold or silver), agricultural products and raw materials were the instruments 
(Santos 1971; Bauer 1982; Mehmet 1999).  
 
Arguing within the framework of Dependency Theory, most anti–aid authors contend 
that aid is a disincentive for development, as it leaves the recipient country dependent 
on donors and lenders (Pankaj 2005; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). Because of its 
“addictive” nature, they argue further that if a country relies on aid as a channel for 
mobilising fiscal resources, it would be difficult to “wean” them off it. Other grounds 
for criticisms against the concept include the notions that aid: is unpredictable and 
cannot be relied upon as a permanent source of income; is used to drive donors’ 
agenda(s); reduces the incentive to adopt good policies; creates ‘welfarism’; stifles 
economic growth; and leads to consumption rather than investment (Barrett & White 
1982; Bauer 1982; Collier 1999). 
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However, aid proponents would disagree with the above claims. For example, Barrett 
and White (1982) argued that the proposition of aid dependence leading to slower 
economic growth should not be considered as a generality. Drawing on evidence from 
Taiwan, they claimed that the country received massive foreign aid and investment, but 
also had one of the highest sustained rates of economic growth in the 1980s. Cassen 
(1994) also averred that aid has specifically contributed to raising food production in the 
South Asian sub–continent and to experimental rural education programs in Africa. 
Maintaining that majority of aid is successful in terms of its objectives, Cassen 
condemns “public demonisation” of aid, which, he argues; tends to be swayed by only 
one or two horrible stories of failed projects. Collier (1999 & 2007) and Sachs (2005) 
also argue that, subject to a satisfactory policy environment, aid improves economic 
growth, and that aid welfare and disincentive effects are negligible.  
 
Despite these disagreements, there is no doubt that most Sub–Saharan African 
countries, including Ghana, are aid–dependent.  As the consumer of two–thirds of 
global aid and often cited as the target of aid, the region is also showing little signs of 
“weaning” itself off donor largesse (Easterly 2006; Reinert 2007; Riddell 2007; 
Mavrotas 2010). For example, at the 2005 G–8 Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, it was 
projected that the African continent would need a total aid volume of USD 25 billion by 
201073. Figures from the OECD indicate that in 2010, bilateral aid to the continent rose 
to USD 29.3 billion. Of this, 90% (US$ 26.5 billion) went to Sub–Saharan region 
alone74. Despite this, the region has little to show for these huge aid investments, as 
poverty is still widespread (African Region MDG Report 2011). In fact numerous 
reports have stated that the region stands in the way of the achievement of the MDGs 
globally (Collier 2007; MDG Report 2011; GMR 2011).  
 
The culture of aid dependency in Sub–Saharan Africa has spurred some Africans to join 
the campaign against aid even though Ghana’s former President J.A. Kufour [2001–
2008] argued that the African continent cannot do without it for now75.  Among the 
campaigners are Africa’s richest man, Dangote Aliko76; Nigerian Pastor Mathew 
                                                
73 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/press/g8overview.htm, retrieved January 18, 2012. 
74 http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3746,en_2649_ 34447_ 47515235 _1_1_1_1,00. html,                  
retrieved January 14, 2012. 
75 http://www.modernghana.com/news/241587/1/africa–cant–do–without–aid–for–now–kufuor.html, 
retrieved October 10, 2009. 
76 http://africanbrains.net/2011/02/04/dangote–africa–needs–investment–not–aid/, retrieved October 10, 
2011. 
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Ashimolowo (2009); Ghana’s Archbishop Palmer Buckle77; and Paul Kigame, the 
Rwandan president, who said that “the only type of aid that is worth[while] to Africans 
is the type of aid that will … not exist in future’78.  The most assertive of the African 
anti–aid crusaders is a former World Bank employee, Dambisa Moyo. In her 
provocative book, DEAD AID: Why Aid is Not Working and How There Is another Way 
for Africa?, Moyo (2009) argues strongly that African governments must “wean” 
themselves off aid as it is ruining their economies. Aid, she argues, makes African 
leaders underperform and too comfortable, while avoiding innovative ways of 
improving their economies. 
 
Moyo’s (2009) arguments and those of many anti–aid authors seem to suggest a subtle 
demonisation of ‘aid as a concept’. However, ‘aid as a concept’ and ‘aid dependency’ 
are not the same. Amidst the controversies it tends to generate, scholars, including 
critics like Moyo and Easterly, concede that aid is a way of mobilising investment and 
capital resources, and that when employed within in a short, finite and time–bound 
period, aid can produce positive results (Cassen 1994; Reinert 2007; Collier 2007). For 
example, the US Marshall Plan, which succeeded in reviving Western European 
Economies after World War II, lasted for a short time (1948–1952). Also, many 
countries, referred to as the International Development Association [IDA] Graduates, 
have lowered poverty, increased income levels and achieved, relative economic 
successes because of their short–term reliance on aid (Reed 2005; Collier 2007; Riddell 
2009).  These include: Chile, Columbia, China, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and 
Turkey. Within sub–Saharan Africa, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, and Swaziland are 
examples of the transformative power of aid (Cassen 1994; Collier 2007).   
 
Although the figure below provides evidence to the contrary, Moyo (2009) contends 
that Botswana did not succeed economically because of aid. She argues that Botswana 
has been pursuing numerous market options; and that by 2000, aid as percentage of the 
country’s Gross National Income (GNI) was less than 2%. However, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.3, Botswana relied significantly on aid in the decade of 1980, when it 
accounted for nearly 7.7% of its GNI, while aid to Ghana stood at 6%. Although factual 
that Botswana reduced its reliance on aid in the 1990s, aid as percentage of the 
country’s GNI in 2008 rose to 5.6%, clearly higher than that of Ghana. Even though the 
                                                
77 http://news.peacefmonline.com/social/201111/77515.php, retrieved November 4, 2011. 
78 See http://youtu.be/n4a–FZjPreg,  accessed June 27, 2011. 
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correlation between aid and Botswana’s growth lies beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
clear that the country has not entirely been “aid–free” as Moyo (2009) and others claim. 
 
3.1 Aid as Percentage of Ghana and Botswana GNI 1980–2008  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
%
	  o
f	  G
N
I
Botsawna Ghana
 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/botswana/net–oda–received–percent–of–gni–wb–data.html, retrieved 
may 13, 2012, all retrieved May 12, 2012. 
 
 
The above analysis has revealed that the question of why aid seems to be ineffective is 
far more complicated. While the notions that aid drives donors interests and creates 
dependency are still relevant, the discussion has 1) Problematised what is defined as 
‘aid effectiveness’; and 2) Shown that aid dependency and ‘aid as a concept’ are not the 
same. The effectiveness of an aid program, it was argued, should be measured through 
the perspectives of donors’ specific program objectives and how they impact on 
beneficiaries at the local level. Furthermore, while aid-dependency may have long-term 
negative effects for recipients, it does not justify any attempt to demonise ‘aid as a 
concept’. What has emerged from the discussion so far is the fact that “aid” is not a 
negative concept and that it produces results, or otherwise, depending on the 
‘externalities’ (programs, motives, theories and concepts) that drive it. However, as the 
next section will show, most of the current mechanisms for achieving aid effectiveness 
seem to ignore these ‘externalities’; particularly contested theories and complex 
concepts (such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’), which are the focus of this thesis. 
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3.2 Efforts at Making Aid Effective 
Owing to the recent global financial crises, global aid levels dropped in 2011 by 3% to 
USD 133.5 billion compared to 201079. Coupled with the perception that aid does not 
work, the debate on aid effectiveness has been very active in the last decade. Among 
other issues, including the idea that donors must use their aid monies to solve domestic 
problems, or achieve tangible outcomes for beneficiaries, the aid effectiveness debate 
has led to the launch of many initiatives in pursuit of making aid ‘really work’ (Cassen 
1994; Riddell 2007). Accordingly, the World Bank listed seven key principles for 
achieving aid effectiveness. These include the need to: 1) Improve [recipient] country 
ownership; 2) Build capacity and use country systems; 3) Increase the use of Program–
Based Approaches; 4) Engage with fragile/post–conflict country situations; 5) Promote 
the use of non–DAC donors and funds and South–South cooperation; 6) Refine 
management for development results; and 7) Bolster transparency, governance and 
accountability (World Bank 2010a). Many of these principles are part of three broad 
categories of global efforts towards achieving aid effectiveness: 1) Results–Based 
Financing (Birdsall et al. 2010; Yogita et al. 2010; World Bank 2011); 2) Aid–Agenda 
Conferences (Walz & Ramachandran 2010; OECD 2011; Zimmermann & Kimberly 
2011); and 3) Program–Based Approaches (World Bank 2010a; Binswanger et al. 
2010).  
 
3.2.1 Results–Based Financing (Tied–Aid Repackaged)  
Introduced by the World Bank in 2002, Results–Based Financing (RBF), is considered a 
modernised approach to delivering aid. Results–Based Financing links disbursements to 
outputs, after the achievement of agreed measurable outcomes (Yogita et al. 2010; 
Birdsall 2010; Birdsall & Savedoff 2010). Advocates of the mechanism argue that RBF 
increases recipient–country ownership, transparency, accountability, the quality of 
governance and the engagement of private sector capital and expertise (Yogita et al. 
2010; Birdsall et al. 2010). RBF is also believed to encourage innovation of public 
funding and enables monitoring of results, while reducing corruption (Birdsall et al. 
2010; World Bank 2011; Bollyky & Glassman 2012). 
 
Presently, two models of RBF exist: 1) Output–Based Aid; and 2) Cash on Delivery 
Aid. According to Yogita et al. (2010) Output–Based Aid (OBA), unlike traditional aid 
                                                
79 The first drop since 1997, disregarding years of debt relief (see http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
49/0,3746,en_2649_34447_46582641_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved April 27, 2012). 
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delivery approaches, fund projects in specific sectors of the recipient country, including: 
Information Communication Technology (ICT), Roads, Energy, Water and Sanitation, 
Health, and Education. Under OBA, service delivery is contracted to a third party, 
which receives a subsidy to complement or replace user fees, and is paid after the work 
is done (Yogita et al. 2010). As of 2010, OBA projects totalling USD 3.5 billion80, 
which had supposedly benefitted 17.4 million people worldwide, were identified at the 
World Bank (GPOBA 2011). The Global Partnership for Output Based–Aid (GPOBA) 
created by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and the World 
Bank has, since 2003, provided technical assistance to donors wishing to use the 
mechanism (OBA Fact Sheet 2011). While currently being piloted in some developing 
countries, Australia, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), and the World Bank have adopted RBF81. 
 
The Centre for Global Development (CGD) is piloting another RBF model, ‘Cash on 
Delivery Aid (COD)’. COD builds on the OBA approach, but links payments more 
directly to a single specific outcome. Unlike the OBA, which hires the service to a third 
party, COD allows the recipient–government the leverage to achieve progress (Yogita et 
al. 2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011). However, the donor pays for an outcome, not an 
input, agreed to by both the recipient and funder (Birdsall et al. 2010). The outcome 
must be measurable and should be continuous, such as number of children enrolled in 
school or surviving to age five, making it possible to pay in proportion to progress 
(Birdsall et al. 2010; Eyben 2010; Savedoff & Martel 2011).  
 
In January 2012, the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved the latest 
COD model, Program–for–Results (PforR). The mechanism is an innovative financing 
instrument for the World Bank's client countries that links the disbursement of funds 
directly to the delivery of defined results82. According to Birdsall (2011)83, when fully 
operational, PforR will be the third lending mechanism84 at the World Bank, and the 
first to be added to the investment and adjustment instruments since 1980. PforR is 
expected to enable the World Bank’s partner countries to improve the design and 
                                                
80 Excluding USD 2.8 billion subsidy funded by the recipient government. 
81 See http://www.gpoba.org/gpoba/donors, retrieved January 26, 2012.  
82 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTRESLENDING/0,, 
menuPK:7321732~pagePK:7321723~piPK:7321730~theSitePK:7514726,00.html, retrieved 15/05/12. 
83 http://blogs.cgdev.org/globaldevelopment/2011/11/world–bank–results–initiative–the–u–s–should–
support–it–%E2%80%93–but–with–independent–verification–please.php, Retrieved April 28, 20120. 
84 The two that exist now are investment loans under which inputs, not results, are financed; and policy 
based loans, under which policy changes are financed. 
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implementation of their development programs thereby providing lasting results by 
strengthening institutions and building capacity (World Bank 2011). The mechanism 
will also enhance partnerships with government, development partners and other 
stakeholders by providing a platform for collaboration in larger country programs 
(World Bank 2011)85. PforR is currently in the pipeline to fund projects worth almost 
USD 1.3 billion in Ethiopia, Mozambique Tanzania, Uganda, Morocco, Nepal, 
Uruguay, Vietnam, and Indonesia.86 
 
While RBF seems to provide evidence of achieved results to donors, the mechanism has 
been criticised on many grounds.  First, the literature on RBF is dominated by its ardent 
supporters: World Bank, GPOBA and the CGD, for example. As RBF does not specify 
the use of, and there seems to be no independent, third–party performance audit of its 
programs, the claims about its effectiveness remain subjective (Birdsall et al. 2010). 
Second, there are concerns that donors who use RBF tend be interested in results and, 
for example, ignore social and environmental safeguards. This criticism has been raised 
by the US, which has withheld its support for the RBF, despite being incessantly 
lobbied (Birdsall 2011). Third, Savedoff and Martel (2011) argue that outcomes of RBF 
vary by contexts, sectors and countries. For example, while RBF has been achieving 
successes in the ICT in Latin America, the mechanism has not produced equivalent 
results in Sub–Saharan Africa, for example (Yogita et al. 2010).  
 
Finally, RBF seems to reinforce conditions and ‘neo tied–aid’, an approach identified as 
hampering aid effectiveness (Kanbur 2003; Easterly 2006; Moyo 2009). The seeming 
repackaging of tied–aid to results also appears to contradict the claims of RBF 
proponents that the mechanism enhances country ownership as most RBF projects are 
executed by a third party. The operational strategies of RBF also seem to suggest that 
donors: adopt ‘a hands–off attitude’ to aid program processes, mistrust recipient 
governments, and ignore the principle that development is more than increased funding 
and results (Pomerantz 2004; Eyben 2006; 2010; Kaberuka 2011).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
85 See also http://web.worldbank. org/ProgramforResults, retrieved April 27, 2012. 
86 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PROJECTS/Resources/40940-1244163232994/6180403-
1340125811295/PforR_Pipeline_6.20.2012.pdf, retrieved July 15, 2012. 
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3.2.2 Aid–Agenda Conferences  
In their efforts to ensure that aid is effective, many donors have also resorted to using 
international conferences as platforms for the discussion of issues on global aid 
financing and effectiveness. Examples include: those held in Monterrey (Mexico) 2002 
and Doha (Qatar) 2008 to review Financing for Development; the UK Commission for 
Africa; the G8 and G20 Summits; and the now popular High–Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (HLFA). The HLFA is specifically organised for discussing issues on aid 
effectiveness with four being already held in Rome (2003); Paris (2005); Accra, Ghana 
(2008) and Busan, South Korea (2011). In Rome, representatives of donor and 
developing countries committed themselves to work with developing countries to 
coordinate and streamline aid activities better at the country level (HLFA Rome 2003).  
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD 2005) has enhanced the importance of 
HLFA as an Aid–Agenda Conference (AAC)87. The document committed participants 
of the HLFA–2 (Paris) to fostering partnerships to ensure that developing countries 
were in–charge of their own development processes. Furthermore, the Paris Declaration 
stipulated that donors and aid recipients hold each other accountable for attaining 
development results through a set of indicators having thirteen targets to be achieved by 
2010 (OECD 2011). The targets, which have become the only international framework 
on the quality of aid with overarching influence on the MDGs and the UN/G8–led 
commitments on development finance, cover five broad themes: 1) Ownership: 
developing countries set their own priorities for development, strengthen their 
institutions and lead in coordinating aid; 2) Alignment: donors arrange aid through 
developing countries’ priorities and make better use of each country’s plans, policies 
and systems; 3) Harmonisation: donors coordinate to avoid duplication, simplify 
procedures and agree to a better division of labour with partner countries; 4) Managing 
for results: developing countries and donors focus on effecting and measuring results; 
and 5) Mutual accountability: donors and developing countries become accountable to 
their parliaments and citizens for the results they achieve (OECD 2011; Killen 2011).  
In September 2008, development partners met in Accra (Ghana) to accelerate the 
achievement of the Paris Declaration. Named the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), the 
forum promoted the idea that donors and partner country governments recognise the 
necessity for national ownership of programs and for a wider dialogue on development 
                                                
87 See http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html#Paris, 
retrieved March 28, 2011. 
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processes. At the AAA, participants also assessed the progress of the PD 2005 and 
concluded that, while some progress had been made, it was minimal and very slow. 
Three major challenges identified were: country–ownership; building more effective 
and inclusive partnerships; and achieving development results, and openly accounting 
for them. Agreement therefore was reached on: 1) Aid predictability; 2) Use of 
recipient–country systems; 3) Avoidance of conditionalities; and 4) Untying aid88. 
 
Before discussing the HLFA-4 at Busan, it is important to show the extent to which the 
commitments to the PD 2005 have been realised. A report released by the OECD in 
2011 reveals sobering outcomes. While some progress has been made, only one out of 
the thirteen targets established for 2010 (coordinated technical cooperation)89 has been 
met, albeit by a narrow margin. The report also portrays stark variations in the direction 
and pace of progress across donors and partner countries since 2005 (OECD 2011). 
Other studies have made similar conclusions. For example, a study released in 2011 by 
a campaign group, “Publish What You Fund” indicates that aid harmonisation still 
remains wishful thinking because some donors continue to conceal a large proportion of 
their ODA (AIDWATCH 2011; Faust 2011; www.aidtransparency.net).   
 
Following the report, aid proponents blamed aid ineffectiveness on a lack of 
coordination between traditional and new donors such as Brazil, China, India, Kuwait, 
Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, the United Arabs Emirates, and recently, 
South Africa. Walz and Ramachandran (2010) estimated the aid flows of these donors 
in the last decade to be between USD 11 billion and 41.7 billion representing 8% and 
31% of the global gross ODA respectively. Interestingly, while many of them have high 
rates of poverty, their ODA reach the UN aid target of 0.7% of GNI, a benchmark, 
which only 10% of the traditional donors attain (Walz & Ramachandran 2010; 
Zimmermann & Kimberly 2011).   
 
The OECD/DAC argues that the new donors have no standard system for reporting their 
ODA nor follow the ‘official’ OECD/DAC definition of aid (Zimmermann & Kimberly 
2011). Further, the OECD/DAC notes that this practice is impacting on global aid 
coordination and transparency, and has given rise to three distinct models of aid giving: 
                                                
88http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ACCRAEXT/Resources/4700790–1217425866038/AAA–4–
SEPTEMBER–FINAL–16h00.pdf, retrieved April 28, 2012. 
89 The extent to which donors co–ordinate their efforts to support countries’ capacity development 
objectives. 
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the OECD/DAC; Arab; and Southern models90. These models are distinguished by the 
level of transparency and accountability to areas such as military aid, peacekeeping 
contributions, debt relief and direct foreign investment (Walz & Ramachandran 2010).  
 
Although collaboration with the new donors started in 200391, it has intensified in recent 
years through the OECD/DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP–EFF).  Its 
main task is to get the new donors to adopt OECD/DAC guidelines for giving aid while 
working towards recommendations on ways by which the ‘traditional donors’ can 
engage the former by achieving the MDGs. This was discussed at the HLFA–4 held in 
Busan, and attended by many traditional and new donors (Walz & Ramachandran 2010; 
Zimmermann & Kimberly 201192).  
 
The Busan discussion did not focus on coercing the new donors to adopt the 
OEDC/DAC model, but on fostering partnerships between the traditional and new 
donors to increase and reinforce development results. Within the framework of 
diversity, that will underpin this partnership, the OECD/DAC urged the new donors to 
commit to the PD 2005 to pursue the achievement of the MDGs. A significant 
development at the Busan Forum was the commitment to scrap the role of the 
OECD/DAC’s WP–EFF as the convener of all development cooperation meetings. The 
WP–EFF will be replaced by a new, inclusive and representative Global Partnership for 
Effective Development Co–operation to support and ensure accountability for the 
implementation of commitments at the political level (Busan Partnership for Effective 
Development Co–operation 2011). This development was crucial because, as Walz and 
Ramachandran (2010) argued, the WP–EFF is an arm of the OECD/DAC and is not an 
independent body for facilitating discussion of international aid cooperation and 
understanding. In their view, the Southern and Arab donors were unlikely to subscribe 
fully to a donor dialogue led by the OECD/DAC; the international aid fraternity needed 
a more independent body to lead such discussions. 
 
 
 
                                                
90 http://www.oecd.org/document/35/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_43382307_1_1_1_1,00.html, retrieved 
May 14, 2012. 
91 The China–DAC Study Group and the Task Team on South–South Co–operation were examples of 
such initiatives aimed at fostering dialogue on development assistance cooperation. 
92 See also http://www.aideffectiveness.org/ busanhlf4/en/about/aid–effectiveness.html, retrieved April 
28, 2012. 
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Some have argued that because many of the new donors are trying to break down the 
traditional Western hegemonies,93 and build their profile and influence in the 
international arena, it is highly unlikely they will cooperate with the traditional donors 
(Zimmermann & Kimberly 2011; Walz & Ramachandran 2010). Tellingly, some of the 
new donors have formed an alliance organisation called the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, 
India, China and South Africa), where economic and other strategic areas of 
cooperation are discussed94. Whether the new donors will adhere to the Busan principles 
and the traditional donors will take the HLFA agreements seriously cannot be predicted. 
3.2.3 Program–Based Approaches (Community–Driven Development) 
The Program–Based Approach (PBA) is premised on the notion that donors contribute 
to a coherent set of development activities at the national sectoral, sub–sectoral or 
thematic level95. Within the World Bank, PBA is considered one of the seven guiding 
principles for achieving aid effectiveness (World Bank 2010a). The OECD defines it as 
sharing the following features: 
Leadership by the host country or organisation; (ii) a single comprehensive 
programme and budget framework; (iii) a formalised process for donor co–
ordination and harmonisation of donor procedures for reporting, budgeting, 
financial management and procurement; (iv) efforts to increase the use of local 
systems for programme design and implementation, financial management, 
monitoring and evaluation96.  
 
The Paris Declaration (2005) enjoined donors to commit 66% of their aid in the form of 
PBAs. Listed as a way of achieving both harmonisation of aid and the MDGs, donors 
support and implement PBAs in different ways and across a range of aid modalities 
including: budget support, sector budget support, project support, pooled arrangements 
and trust funds31. Although most donors have not achieved the 66% benchmark, there is 
evidence that many are investing in the approach (See CIDA 2010).  
 
The World Bank’s Community–Driven Development (CDD) has, since 2000, become a 
popular PBA and aid delivery mechanism. CDD is noted for espousing local 
community involvement, participation and empowerment (World Bank 2000b; Dongier 
                                                
93 Many of the new donors have not had fair representation in the Bretton Woods and other global 
institutions. For example, while Belgium has 103 votes per billion dollars of GDP at the IMF, China has 
about 25. The BRICs also feel sidelined in the multilateral institutions (Zimmermann & Kimberly 2011). 
94 See http://www.millasa.co.za/BRICS_2012, retrieved April 28, 2012. 
95 http://www.aideffectiveness.org/Themes–Programme–based–Approaches.html, retrieved May 18, 
2012. 
96 http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_21571361_39494699_39503763_1_1_1_1_,00.html. 
Retrieved May 18, 2012. 
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et al. 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010). Before discussing the World Bank’s commitment 
to CDD, it is important to point out that the concept is not new. Historically, CDD or 
community–based development approaches date back to the days of Mahatma Gandhi 
and Paul Freire, and the activities of S.K. Dev and Akhter Hameed Khan of the 
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) in the 1960s (White 1999; 
Mansuri & Rao 2004).97 Similarly, the World Bank in the 1970s used the approach in 
their Integrated Rural Development Programs which implemented many combined 
projects including: irrigation, agricultural credit, rural infrastructure, education, health, 
water supply, and small–scale industries (Binswanger et al. 2010)98. 
 
However, the CDD approach became unpopular, many commentators of the period 
criticising it as a Marxist paradigm and lacking external stimuli (Hardin 1968; Olson 
1973; Mansuri & Rao 2004). These criticisms reinforced existing beliefs in the top–
down, centralised and state–led machinery for the provision of public goods, state 
regulation of common–pool resources, and an emphasis on the development of private 
property rights (Mansuri & Rao 2004). In relation to developing countries, Binswanger 
et al. (2010) argues that the criticisms offered their leaders grounds for building strong 
centralised governments to allow them to stay in power under the guise of avoiding 
neo–colonialism. 
 
Community-Driven Development approaches regained popularity from the mid–1980s 
(Binswanger et al. 2010), four factors accounting for this. First, allegations of 
corruption against leaders of centralised regimes, particularly in developing countries, 
led many to lose confidence in top–down paradigms (Collier 1999; Binswanger et al. 
2010). Second, during the period in question, CDD approaches achieved better 
development results than government–initiated or ‘top–down’ projects in many 
developing countries such as: the self–employed women’s association in India; the 
Orangi slum improvement project in Pakistan; the Iringa Nutrition project in Tanzania; 
and the Mexican Zacatecas projects99 (Krishna et al. 1997; Mansuri & Rao 2004; 
Binswanger et al. 2010). These successes were in contrast to the failure of large-scale 
                                                
97 S.K. Dev was a former Indian Community Development Minister who piloted community development 
projects in 1948. He used community participation approaches that were scaled up to a nationwide 
community development program. The BARD designed a community–based rural project (the Comilla 
Model) to encourage farmers to generate capital through thrift deposits, access to credits and 
technological innovations.  
98 During the same period, UN agencies also used the community–based approaches (Mansuri & Rao 
2004). 
99 The Mexican project employed Rapid Rural Appraisals, what is now referred to as Participatory Rural 
Appraisal. 
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‘macro–initiated’ projects in many sectors around the world (Scott 1998; World Bank 
2000a; Mansuri & Rao 2004; Binswanger et al. 2010).	  	  
 
The popularity of CDD approaches is also attributable to its promotion by Western 
governments during the period in question. Rooted in the so–called ‘neo–liberal’ 
philosophy, community–based approaches became a strategy of most governments in 
the West for encouraging their citizens to do things for themselves and not rely on 
public funding. As discussed below, this has led some to mistrust community-based 
development paradigms (Pandey 2010; Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010).  
 
Finally, academics played a vital role in promoting CDD approaches as opposed to top–
down paradigms. Chambers’ Rural Development: Putting the Last First was an example 
of such influential scholarly works. Rooted in Foucaudian and Marxist ideologies, 
Chambers (1983) contended that wastage of billions of dollars occurred due to 
centralisation of power at the top. Many scholars have followed suit, arguing that local 
voices are crucial in determining the fate of project outcomes as they can enhance or 
dampen participation and sustainability tendencies (Cernea 1985; Ostrom 1990; Escobar 
1995; Fergusson 1997; Scott 1998; White 1999; Narayan 2002; Cleaver 2001; Mosse 
2001). According to Mansuri and Rao (2004), these writings have been instrumental in 
the World Bank’s renewed interest in CDD programs.  
 
3.3 The World Bank’s Commitment to Community–Driven Development 
Community–Driven Development (CDD) programs have been embraced as an effective 
Program–Based Approach (PBA) to delivering aid. The World Bank defines CDD as ‘a 
development approach that gives control over planning decisions and investment 
resources to community groups and local governments’100. CDD is not considered a 
project, but rather the strengthening of political and administrative structures to 
empower communities and local governments with the resources and authority to 
control fully all project stages as shown in Figure 3.2 below (Chase & Woolcock 2005; 
Labonne & Chase 2007; 2008; Binswanger et al. 2010). While their operations vary by 
[country] context and objective, CDD is largely a joint–venture between ‘communities’, 
local governments and the central government, with support from the private sector and 
civil society (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Binswanger et al. 2010). However, in some 
contexts, different localities or “communities” wishing to use CDD approaches write 
project proposals to compete for funds (Annist 2005; Conning & Kevane 2005).  
                                                
100 http://go.worldbank.org/ 24K8IHVVS0, accessed August 04, 2011. 
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Because CDD provides ‘communities’ with a voice and control over all project stages, 
it is believed to; 1) Enhance sustainability; 2) Improve [aid] efficiency and 
effectiveness; 3) Allow poverty reduction efforts to be taken to scale; 4) Make 
development more inclusive; 5) Empower poor people, build social capital, and 
strengthen governance; and 6) Complement market and public sector activities (Dongier 
et al. 2003; Baird et al. 2009; van Domelen 2007; 2008; Binswanger et al. 2010; World 
Bank 2010b). Thus, the World Bank Group claims that CDD programs have 
empowered ‘communities’, delivered cost–effective infrastructure, enhanced 
livelihoods, and improved ‘community’ dynamics in Sub–Saharan Africa and Asia 
regions, while solving critical problems in Haiti and Somalia (World Bank 2010b )101.  
 
Figure 3.2 Characteristics of CDD Projects  
 
Source: Asian Development Bank (2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
101 http://www.worldbank.org/ida, retrieved in January 2012; see also Van Domelen (2008). 
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Figure 3.3 World Bank Lending in Support of CDD Programs in USD (Billions) 
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Sources: Wong & Guggenheim (2005); Binswanger et al. (2010). 
 
 
Figure 3.4 CDD as Percentage of IDA Lending 
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Figure 3.5 Number of Active IDA–Funded CDD Operations by Fiscal Year from 
2000 
 
Source: World Bank (2010b). 
 
The World Bank’s investment in CDD programs since 2000 has averaged almost USD 
2 billion a year (see Figure 3.3). A recent Independent Evaluation Group review of 
sixty–two country assistance strategies found that CDD operations are an important part 
of the World Bank’s strategy in more than 74% of relevant countries (Binswanger et al. 
2010). In 2008, the International Development Association’s (IDA) lending for CDD-
related programs averaged 17% of its total lending (World Bank 2010b; see also Figure 
3.4) while the number of CDD programs active at the IDA for the 2007 – 2009 period 
averaged over seventy–two (see Figure 3.5). Although there are no recent published data 
on the regional distribution of the World Bank’s CDD lending, there is evidence that 
between 2000 and 2003, a greater proportion went to Sub–Saharan Africa (Asian 
Development Bank 2006). The focus on the region reflects the World Bank’s vision in 
2000 to reducing poverty on the continent through program and community–based 
approaches (Narayan 2002; World Bank 2000a; 2004b; 2010b). 
 
The above notwithstanding, some scholars have criticised CDD programs. First, 
Tesoriero (2010) and Warwick and Overton (2011) argue that the World Bank’s 
promotion of the concept cannot be trusted, as they have a hidden agenda.  In their 
view, like Structural Adjustments of the 1990s, the World Bank is now using CDD to 
promote neo–liberal and neo–structural ideals, which shielded governments’ 
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commitment to welfarism, while encouraging privatisation and reliance on families and 
women (see also Amin 2005; Defillippis et al. 2010; Pandey 2010).  
 
Second, some scholars contend that because, in some contexts, different localities have 
to compete for funding, CDD inadvertently promotes ‘survival of the fittest’, the rich, 
the educated and the politically–connected (Platteau 2004; 2009; Labonne & Chase 
2007). Because the approach usually funds those with the best project proposal, it has 
been argued that the approach posits ‘style’ over ‘real needs’, and that the ‘genuinely 
needy’ (the poor, illiterate or marginalised), may not always be those who obtain ‘the 
help’, due to the possibilities of corruption and conflict of interests (Annist 2005; 
Conning & Kevane 2005; Araujo et al. 2008; Baird et al. 2009). 
 
Furthermore, there are concerns that CDD programs lack generalisable and uniform 
indicators for assessing aid effectiveness, as its successes are context–specific (Mansuri 
& Rao 2004; Chase & Woolcock 2005; Labonne & Chase 2008). Finally, some argue 
that CDD programs tend to create new allocation rules, while altering existing structures 
of engagement and neglecting traditional institutions (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Miguel & 
Gugert 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007). In other words, while CDD attempts to 
empower marginalised people, it is criticised for failing to appease the ‘traditionally 
powerful’. Because ‘power’ is not neutral, and ‘empowering’ one group may mean 
‘disempowering’ the other; CDD programs can potentially threaten ‘community’ 
cohesion (see Chapter Seven; Chase & Woolcock 2005; Mansuri & Rao 2004; Vail 
2004; Hancock et al. 2011). 
 
As pointed out in Chapter One, ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ are pivotal concepts 
in its operations. Without a certain entity called ‘community’, CDD programs cannot 
function. Further, although its operations may vary, CDD has one agenda: 
‘empowering’ people. While appealing, both concepts are complex (Guijt & Shah 1998; 
Cleaver 2001; Amin 2005; Tesoriero 2010; Hancock et al. 2011). Interestingly, there 
seems to be no empirical study on how these concepts impact on CDD program 
outcomes in multi–cultural and ethnic settings. This will be the focus of Chapters Six 
and Seven of this thesis. Apart from these complex concepts, the World Bank also avers 
that countries with ‘high functioning’ inter-government systems are better placed to 
implement CDD programs (Dongier et al 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010; World Bank 
2010b). While Chapter Five challenges this theory within the framework of Ghana’s 
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decentralisation system, it is important to first examine the theory to contextualise the 
arguments advanced against it.  
 
3.4 The World Bank’s Framework for Engaging Local Government Structures  
The World Bank and other proponents of CDD programs opine that better outcomes are 
guaranteed if the implementing country’s existing inter–government institutions are 
effective, or have genuine commitment to decentralisation (Crook & Manor 1998; 
World Bank 2002; 2004b; 2006b; Whitford & Kavita 2006; Binswanger et al. 2010). In 
the words of Dongier et al. (2003, p. 23):  
Local governments can be critical to the success and sustainability of [CDD]. 
When local government interacts with communities and informal groups in a 
participatory way, it is possible to achieve economies of scale in producing and 
providing goods and services ... Furthermore … local governments are needed to 
support operation and maintenance of services, and for continuing funding of 
community groups.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6 CDD Institutional Alternatives 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Dongier et al. (2003).   
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As Figure 3.6 illustrates, Dongier et al. (2003) identified three institutional alternatives 
for CDD programs. While each varies operationally, their contextual appropriateness 
depends on the state of the country’s decentralisation. While the World Bank’s scholars 
provide guidelines for each option, they favour the first: partnership between 
Community–Based Organisations (CBOs) and local governments. They argue that 
because it engages existing elected and functioning local government structures, it has 
better prospects for galvanising local support for CDD programs. By so doing, the 
argument continues, it strengthens the national system of inter-governmental transfer of 
resources and allows resource allocation decisions to be accountable to local priorities 
(Dongier et al. 2003; World Bank 2006b; Binswanger et al. 2010). Ghana’s CBRDP 
was fashioned on this format, but with some variations 
 
 
Table 3.1 Classification of African Countries Context 
 Low–functioning Inter-
governmental System 
High–functioning  
Inter-governmental System 
Description Dysfunctional 
Government 
De-concentrated 
System 
Incipient 
Decentralisation 
Consolidating 
Decentralisation 
Characteristics CPIA cluster 
D is less than 
2.5 
Local state 
bodies are 
upwardly 
accountable,  
but not elected 
Decentralisation 
law creates local 
governments with 
some autonomy 
in resource 
management &  
local elections 
are held 
Conditions for 
incipient 
decentralisation 
are met, 
combined 
with fiscal 
decentralisation  
& devolution of 
service delivery 
Countries  Angola, Chad, 
Dem. Rep. of 
Congo, Rep. 
of Congo, 
Liberia, 
Sudan 
Mauritania, 
Mozambique, 
Niger, São 
Tomé and 
Principe 
Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, 
Gambia, Guinea, 
Kenya, 
Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Zambia 
Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Tanzania, Uganda 
Source: Binswanger et al. (2010).  
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The World Bank distinguishes between low and high–functioning inter–government 
systems (decentralization) and categorises some African countries by the approach. The 
World Bank’s indicators of a high–functioning inter–government systems include 
contexts where there exist: 1) Decentralisation laws create local government structures 
with autonomy in resource management; 2) Local elections; 3) Fiscal decentralisation 
and; 4) Devolution of service delivery (see Table 3.1 above). Accordingly, the World 
Bank has put forward operational strategies appropriate for both the low and high–
functioning contexts: the Leading, the Conservative or Lagging and the Matching 
strategies (Dongier et al. 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010).  
 
The ‘Leading strategy’ is used in low–functioning inter-governmental system countries 
that have dysfunctional government structures. Under this strategy, a community–based 
or driven project becomes an initiative that pushes the boundaries of the institutional 
environment and accelerates change in the political, fiscal, administrative or social 
aspects of local governance (Binswanger et al. 2010). The ‘Conservative or Lagging 
strategy’ is largely employed in a low–functioning inter-governmental system with a de-
concentrated system or a high–functioning inter–governmental system and incipient 
decentralised system. The strategy is cautious in allowing the country’s local 
government institutions the full power to set priorities, manage resources and 
implement subprojects. It does not take full advantage of the opportunities to promote 
the role local of government in program implementation (Binswanger et al. 2010). 
 
The ‘Matching strategy’ is employed in a country such as Ghana, categorised as having 
high–functioning inter–governmental system, with a consolidating decentralised 
system. The World Bank considers such countries as being better placed to execute 
CDD programs successfully, a notion which influenced the design and implementation 
of Ghana’s Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP ) (Serrano–Berthet 
et al. 2010; Binswanger et al. 2010). However, as argued in Chapter Five, Ghana’s 
inter–government system does not appear to be highly functioning as claimed by the 
World Bank, a finding that questions the validity of some of the pivotal concepts and 
theories of CDD programs. Given this revelation, this thesis also cautions the use of 
CDD programs as PBAs to achieve aid effectiveness. 
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3.5 Conclusion  
Based on the discussion so far, it can be argued that ‘aid as a concept’ should not be 
blamed for its ineffectiveness, but the motives, concepts and programs that drive it, and 
the tendency to depend on it perpetually. Two prevalent reasons for the relative failure 
of aid have been explored: 1) Donors use aid to advance their respective strategic 
interests; and 2) Aid is ‘addictive’ and creates dependency. Given the evidence that 
donors’ interests go beyond aid commercialisation (tied–aid); and that aid has 
‘successfully’ facilitated the achievements of security, climate and immigration 
agendas, it remains debatable whether a causal link between donors’ strategic interests 
and aid ineffectiveness can be found. The chapter also revealed that ‘aid-dependency’, 
which obviously has adverse effects on recipients, is different from ‘aid as a concept’. 
Evidence was given to show that aid has promoted growth and has had positive impacts 
in many countries, including Botswana, whose reliance on aid is denied by some anti–
aid crusaders. Therefore, it emerged that aid effectiveness must be measured from the 
perspectives of recipients and not as just ‘outcomes’ or within the framework of donors’ 
objectives.  In this way, it becomes easier to identify such ‘externalities’ as motives, 
recipient structures and dependency level, and how they impact on aid program 
outcomes. 
The second part of this chapter examined three existing mechanisms for achieving aid 
effectiveness, including: 1) Result–Based Financing; 2) Aid–Agenda Conferences; and 
3) Program–Based Approaches. The purpose was to establish the extent to which these 
mechanisms pay attention to the impact of theories and complex concepts on which aid 
programs are based (‘the concepts factor’). It became clear that none of them pays 
significant attention to the ‘concepts factor’. Result–Based Financing mechanisms were 
found to be essentially ‘results–oriented’, and in the process, concentrate on 
conditionalities. The chapter also showed that, while Aid–Agenda Conferences provide 
donors, aid consumers and other relevant stakeholders, and the platform to share ideas 
on aid financing and effectiveness, these donors do not adhere to the principles 
established at those conferences. Thus, although some of the conferences have achieved 
very good results, it seems evident that the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
(HLFA) appears to have become a mere ‘bureaucratic formality’ as donors have 
reneged on their commitments to, for example, the 2005 Paris Declaration. As Mavrotas 
(2010, p. 3) observed “... it is apparent that some donors intend to slack off, and do not 
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take the [HLFA] process seriously enough”. Incidentally, the agreements of all four 
HLFA do not, at least explicitly, address the ‘concepts factor’ 
 
The last section of the chapter focused on Community–Driven Development programs, 
one of the celebrated Program–Based Approaches at the World Bank. Despite its many 
advantages, highly contested theories such as, “CDD programs succeed in high–
functioning local and inter–government contexts”; and complex concepts like 
‘community’ and ‘empowerment’, were identified as pivotal in CDD programs. Even 
so, little appears to be known as to how these ‘externalities’ influence CDD programs. 
The remainder of the thesis examines how these contested theories and concepts 
impacted on Ghana’s Community–Based Rural Development Program (CBRDP). In 
particular, the next chapter will explore in detail the methodology used to examine the 
CBRDP programs in Ghana. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
METHODOLOGY 
It remains an open empirical question, however, whether and how such 
[positive] outcomes are achieved by a given Community–Driven Development 
[Program]; if they are, then it is likely that only a more diverse package of 
methodological tools than is typically deployed in (‘rigorous’) program 
evaluation is likely to detect them 
(Chase & Woolcock 2005, p. 6). 
 
 
This chapter discusses the methods and tools that were employed to explore how 
contested theories and complex concepts influenced the outcomes of Ghana’s 
Community–Based Rural Development Programs (CBRDP). The chapter discusses the 
methodological basis of the study, the fieldwork experiences, the limitation of the 
research, ethical considerations as well as the data collection and analysis processes. 
 
 
4.1 Why Ethno–Methodology?  
The option of using quantitative data collection techniques was discarded in favour of 
an ethno–methodology research practice being identified as the most appropriate 
technique for data collection (Patton 2002; Darkwa & Tsikata 2009; Liamputtong 2009; 
Travers 2010; Willis 2010). Using this approach, qualitative research tools such as 
participant–observation, interviews, focus group discussions, review of 
literature/documents and open–ended questionnaires were deployed. Because the 
research questions draw on people’s understanding of how CDD programs work on the 
ground, it was crucial to employ qualitative techniques in order to view the world 
through the eyes of the participants (Padgett 2008; Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010; 
Willis 2010) as quantitative methods use structured (survey) instruments designed on 
pre–conceived biases (de Vaus 1995; Patton 2002; Walter 2010). Other factors as 
follows influenced the decision. 
 
First, ethno–methodology is directly human–related and facilitates the collection of data 
in natural settings (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009). As this research sought to 
investigate the impact of intangible, but human–related concepts (such as ‘community’ 
and ‘empowerment’) on Ghana’s CBRDP, an ethno–methodological approach was 
more suitable (Mansuri & Rao 2004; Chase &Woolcock 2005; Darkwa & Tsikata 2009; 
Liamputtong 2009). Since humans are generally complex and their  “actions are 
significantly influenced by the setting in which they occur” (Marshall and Rossman 
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2006, p.53) ethno–methodological techniques such as participant–observation, 
interviews and focus group discussions offered the possibilities of interacting and 
empathising with the beneficiaries of the project. These techniques enabled the 
researcher to gain insight into how the attitudes, behaviours, value systems, concerns, 
motivations, aspirations and culture or lifestyles of the beneficiaries impacted on the 
CBRDP processes102 (Patton 2002; Padgett 2008; Liamputtong 2009; Walter 2010).   
 
Second, the choice of ethno–methodology was also necessitated by the dearth of     
qualitatively–generated research of aid programs (aidnography) in Ghana; although 
several independent scholars have effectively used it in other contexts to research and 
produce influential works on aid (Escobar 1995; Fergusson 1995; Grillo & Stirrat 1997; 
Gould 2004; Mosse 2004, 2005; Li 2007; Eyben 2007, 2010).  While Ghana is one of 
the top ten aid–dependent countries in Sub–Saharan Africa103, there are not many 
published independent, academic and ethnographic studies concerning aid to the 
country. As earlier indicated, the related aid literature appears to be dominated by the 
writing of economists, who ignore ‘human–centred’ and conceptual issues, and reports 
of aid agencies. Whilst some of the publications of the latter are scientific, many of 
them tend to be less critical and as Riddell (2007, p. 193) observed, “present a [more] 
flattering picture than it probably deserves”. Furthermore, owing to the concern that 
internally–initiated research and evaluations of donors and their agencies tend to suffer 
conflict of interests, their publications do not provide scientific and objective grounds 
for understanding the issues affecting aid programs at the grassroots level in Ghana 
(Azeem et al. 2006; Riddell 2007; Easterly 2008; Cullen 2009). Thus, although the 
ethno–methodological approach to this research may not be a theoretical novelty, it fills 
a significant gap of ‘aidnographies’ on Ghana. 
 
One advantage of ethno–methodology is its compatibility with case studies (Patton 
2002; David 2006; Willis 2010). The fundamental principle underlying case study is the 
purposive focus on [one, specific] individualised outcomes within a larger social group, 
or what Gerring (2007, p. 1) calls the “micro–macro link ... and cross level inference” 
(Gillharm 2000). By focussing on a key element [called a case], Gerring argues further 
that researchers gain insight into the whole, and that an in–depth knowledge of a case is 
more helpful than fleeting knowledge about a larger number of examples. Riddle (2007, 
p. 169) argues that “an effective way of addressing the methodological problems in 
                                                
102 Project identification, implementation and maintenance. 
103 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/27/42139250.pdf , retrieved March 24, 2012. 
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understanding how aid works on the ground is to undertake sampling studies of where 
projects have been implemented”. Additionally, both Patton (2002) and Liamputtong 
(2009) aver that through case studies, researchers are able to compare, draw generalised 
inferences and stimulate further research (David 2006; Yin 2008; Padgett 2008).  
 
Relative to this research, as indicated in Chapter One, Ghana’s CBRDP was 
implemented in one hundred and thirty eight districts. However, as it was not possible 
to study all, the research focuses on nine districts [cases] to gain insights into the 
CBRBPs nationally.  Even so, experts in research methodologies insists that researchers 
clearly define the boundaries of their ‘cases’ and justify what/who is included and why 
(David 2006; Luck, Jackson & Usher 2006; Liamputtong 2009; Willis 2010).  
 
4.2 Case Study Boundaries 
This research focused on Ghana’s CBRDP Zone IV: Eastern, Greater Accra and Volta 
Regions104. Several reasons influenced the choice of this zone.  First, it was a practical 
impossibility to research the entire country; second, the zone is arguably the most 
developed and populated area of the country; third, it has better communication 
infrastructure, road networks, and was more stable, in terms of ethnic conflicts, 
compared to Zone 1 (the northern parts of the country), for example. Furthermore, the 
convenience that both the National and Zonal Headquarters of the project were situated 
there made the zone the best location for the fieldwork, as the researcher had to be in 
constant communication with both offices for documents and informal interviews on the 
project.  Finally, although Zone IV differs topographically from the other zones, as 
pointed out in Chapter One, they share relatively analogous social characteristics, such 
as ethnic and dialectical diversities, Traditional Chieftaincies, political sensitivity, 
rural/urban dichotomy, relatively high levels of poverty and so on. The similarities of 
the zones legitimised the case study approach as well as the confident generalisation of 
the findings (Patton 2002; Padgett 2008). 
 
Within Zone IV, nine municipalities/districts, three from each region, were selected. In 
each district, one Area Council (locality) was selected. While the districts were selected 
randomly, the localities were sampled purposively (Willis 2010, Travers 2010). 
Although all the districts in the country benefitted from the CBRDP, not all Area 
Councils or localities did; some could not meet the criteria of having offices and a 
                                                
104 See Figure 1.6 in Chapter One. 
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three–person signatory bank account. Thus, the localities that received and completed 
their projects, and where relevant contacts had been established were selected. 
 
4.3 The Fieldwork Experience 
 
The fieldwork was carried out over a period of seven months (2010/2011) in three 
phases: familiarisation, data collection and follow–ups. The familiarisation phase 
involved collecting the project’s documents and securing contact of all relevant persons 
in all nine Districts researched. The second phase involved visiting or living in the 
CBRDP beneficiary localities while collecting data. The final phase included the 
follow–up of some unresolved issues arising from the second phase, these ranging from 
obtaining relevant documents and information to ascertaining the results of the 2010 
local government elections, which coincided with the fieldwork. As Chapters Five and 
Seven will show, the election outcomes were crucial for this research. 
  
Although Ghanaian, the researcher had to adjust to the insider and outsider realities of 
fieldwork (Altorki 1994; Boudewinjse 1994; Chiseri–Strater & Sustein 2007; Al–
Makhamreh & Lewando–Hundt 2008). Researching in Ghana allowed the researcher 
much flexibility and independence, as no permit was required. Although I am dark–
skinned, and possess some intimate knowledge of the Ghanaian culture, for strategic 
reasons however, introductory letters from the CBRDP National and Zonal 
Headquarters were secured for identification purposes (see Appendix D & E). Being a 
Ghanaian also facilitated the identification of key informants and settling into the host 
localities. Further, except in some parts of the Volta Region, the use of interpreters in 
the data collection process was not necessary as many of the respondents could either 
communicate in Akan or English. Aware that being Ghanaian could breed familiarity, 
the researcher had to be reflexive and observe familiar socio–cultural patterns carefully 
(Altorki 1994; Boudewinjse 1994; Al–Makhamreh & Lewando–Hundt 2008). 
 
Throughout the fieldwork however, the researcher was an ‘outsider’ in many respects. 
Three reasons explain this. First, most of the localities researched were relatively less 
populated, and meant that the residents easily identified ‘strangers’ in their midst, even 
if they spoke the local dialect or ‘looked like them’. Second, except for Tease in the 
Afram Plains District105, the researcher had no consanguineous ties with the other eight 
localities researched. Third, because ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ research tends to 
                                                
105The researcher had conducted a research there in 2009. 
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relate to females (Tesoriero 2010, pp.12 & 13; see also Hancock et al. 2011), the data 
tended to be drawn more from females than males106. In most Ghanaian rural localities, 
there seems to be a social distance between women and men (Apusigah 2004a; 2004b). 
Thus, my frequent interaction with women as a stranger, particularly in smaller 
localities, exposed my ‘outsiderness’, as both men and women found it strange.  
 
 Photo 4.1: The researcher on a familiarisation tour in Pakro, the Eastern Region 
 
As an outsider, some of the research subjects tended to have doubts about the 
researcher’s status. Thus, letters of introduction obtained from the Edith Cowan 
University and the CBRDP Headquarters were always carried to all formal interview 
sessions as proof of identity (see Appendices D & E).  
 
Also, the researcher consciously tried to reduce all asymmetrical variables between 
myself and the research subjects (Boudewinjse 1994). This meant, for example, 
downplaying the social status of coming from abroad, wearing casual clothes most of 
the time, speaking the local dialects, and briefing the respondents and interviewees 
thoroughly before the sessions started. These proved very effective, as it enhanced the 
                                                
106Women form 55% of Ghana’s population (Ghana Statistical Service 2012) 
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trust of the respondents in me and allowed them to relate to me “as one of their own”, 
thereby facilitating the data collection procedures and the tenets of ethnographic 
research (aidnography).  
 
During the fieldwork, the local customs of the host localities were observed. Indeed, 
some were so crucial that by defying them, the fieldwork or relationship with the 
research subjects would have been jeopardised. Examples included going through a 
Linguist during interview session with Traditional Chiefs. In Ghana, Traditional Chiefs 
are not addressed directly but through Linguists; culturally inappropriate language or 
expressions to Traditional Chiefs could lead to punishment for the offender. Linguists 
are the mouthpiece of Traditional Chiefs as well as the communication link (not 
interpreters or translators per se), between the former and visitors to the palace. Their 
main job is to edit information in a culturally appropriate way before they are spoken to 
Traditional Chiefs. Working with Linguists in some of the research localities proved 
very frustrating and time consuming, particularly during transcription. In most 
instances, as local traditions demanded, I had to pay money ‘to open the door’ into the 
palaces. In one village, the Traditional Chief was unwilling to welcome me, until the 
‘palace knocking fees’ was paid.  
 
4.4 Limitations  
Like many social research activities, this research also had some limitations. Being 
Ghanaian came with some drawbacks. I concede that many aspects of the ‘Ghanaian 
culture’, which were familiar to me, must have been taken for granted, irrespective of 
my conscious reflexiveness (Boudewinjse 1994; Chiseri–Strater & Sustein 2007). 
During the fieldwork, the researcher also experienced what Altorki (1994, p. 60) 
referred to as ‘threat of exposure and judgement’. As most of the interviews and focus 
group discussions were recorded, the participants must have been cautious of their 
responses and withheld some vital information. However, because multiple data 
collection tools were employed for triangulation, the empirical rigorousness of the data 
is still credible (Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010). Relative to the questionnaires, some 
of the respondents who could either not express themselves on paper or in the English 
language were assisted by the research assistants. While the respondents were debriefed 
about their answers, some of them may have been misquoted. 
 
The final limitation relates to the transcription. Most of the interviews were conducted 
in Akan and transcribed into English. Owing to the variation in translations, despite 
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earnest endeavour, some interviews were difficult to transcribe verbatim with all its 
heuristic effects; thus some nuances that may have been better expressed in the original 
languages may have been lost (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009). 
 
4.5 Ethical Considerations 
All aspects of this research required adherence to many ethical considerations. These 
were important so that the confidentiality of the respondents’ identity would not be 
jeopardised, while enhancing the credibility of the process. Several ethics formalities 
were completed and approved before and after the data collection process by the Ethics 
Committee of Edith Cowan University. Accordingly, all respondents were briefed about 
the research purposes and gave their consent before the implementation procedures with 
the protocols of the interviews and questionnaires. Respondents were also assured of 
confidentiality and informed about their rights to withdraw, if they felt uncomfortable. 
The data were protected in lockable filing cabinets or protected with passwords on hard 
disks. At the end of the research, much of the confidential data were shredded and 
deleted from the hard drives. 
 
During the fieldwork, the magnitude of the work necessitated the use of research 
assistants. Thus, one permanent and two casual research assistants were employed. 
They were all trained in the rubrics of data collection and transcription and the ethical 
considerations of fieldwork. They signed contracts in which they assured me of 
confidentiality and to respect the social structures and cultures of the research subjects.  
Although permission of the CBRDP offices in Ghana to carry out the fieldwork was not 
necessary, letters of introduction were obtained from them for proof of identity and 
mission purposes whenever questioned. Substantial volumes of documents were 
obtained from them with the assurance in writing of their sole use for the purposes of 
this research (Appendices C & D).  
 
For ethical reasons the names of the respondents and some of the towns and districts, 
where the fieldwork was carried out have been deidentified with pseudonyms.  
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4.6 Data Collection 
 
In tandem with the Chase and Woolcock (2005) assertion that only a more diverse 
package of methodological tools were likely to detect how CDD programs work on the 
ground, five key research tools were employed in this research (see Figure 4.1). This 
was crucial to obtaining data for triangulation purposes, while enhancing the credibility 
of the findings (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009). Each of the instruments employed and 
the type of data they generated is described next. 
 
Figure 4.1 Data Collection Tools 
 
 
 
 
4.6.1. Review of Literature/Documents 
Because the research focused on theories and concepts, a review of literature and policy 
documents was crucial. The purpose of the review was to: 1) Establish the absence of 
empirical studies on how contested theories and concepts influence aid outcomes, a gap 
this research seeks to fill; and 2) To understand aid policy discourses and analysis to 
establish the conceptual and an analytical frameworks for scrutinising the themes 
emerging from the data (see Figure 4.2). Four categories of literature were reviewed. 
The first category was academic literature which included the works of both local and 
‘foreign’ scholars in scholarly peer–reviewed journal articles, books, conference papers 
and policy briefs that related to aid, CDD, community, empowerment, Ghana and 
decentralisation or local government. 
 
CBRDP documents constituted the second category of literature consulted. Some 
aspects of the project that were directly unobservable were captured in the CBDRP 
documents. For example, the National Reports, which spanned the years 2005–2010, 
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established the trends and aims of the project. The Zone IV CBRDP Reports also 
provided some demographic information on the research localities and many aspects of 
the project that preceded the fieldwork. Both reports, most of which were obtained 
before entering the field, facilitated the framing of the interview questions, assembling 
the focus group discussions, sharpening the questionnaires and clarifying the nature of 
field observations. Copies of the CBRDP Action Plans, which described the planning 
and implementation processes of the projects in the respective beneficiary localities, 
were also obtained.107  
 
Official documents from the Government of Ghana were also reviewed. While some 
were directly downloadable online, others were obtained through formal applications to 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP) (see Appendix F) and the 
Electoral Commission, for example. The documents from MOFEP, which ranged from 
annual budget statements to policy briefs, provided insights into various aid initiatives 
in the country since the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs. The 
‘ghanadistricts.com’ website also provided useful information on the social–cultural and 
demographical characteristics of the districts and localities researched. 
 
The last category of documents consulted were literature from the World Bank, the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). The databases of these institutions provided 
statistical information on global and Ghana–specific trends regarding aid. They also 
provided useful insights into the Millennium Development Goals as well as global 
efforts at making aid effective. The recently launched UNDP African Human 
Development Report (2012) provided statistical information and indicators for 
understanding poverty levels and general development trends in Ghana. 
 
4.6.2. Participant–Observation 
Often seen as the main pillar of ethnography (see Senah 1997), participant–observation 
(P–O) allowed time for observing and interacting with the CBRDP beneficiary 
localities, as the pictures below show (Herbert 2000). This technique was used within 
the spirit of what Bryman (2008, p. 376) outlined as ‘prolonged participation in the 
social life of a [community] over a period of time allows the researcher to ensure a high 
level of congruence between concepts and observation’. Meyer and Singh (1997) have 
also endorsed P–O as an effective way of researching development program outcomes.  
                                                
107 See 1.4.1, Stages I & II. 
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Drawing on an observation by Tesoriero (2010) that any community–based 
development processes [or research] must begin with a long–term membership of the 
‘community’; the researcher became immersed in the field for several months. While 
general trends were observed, particular attention was paid to the social systems, 
routines, spaces, events and cultural–norms and practices that underpinned the 
behavioural pattern and perceptions of research subjects (Boudewinjse 1994; Patton 
2002). The CBRDP stipulated that beneficiary localities consultatively choose and 
implement projects that addressed their most important needs (CBRDP Implementation 
Manual 2006). Accordingly, in all localities researched, such infrastructure elements as 
the state of roads, school buildings; and basic necessities such as water, electricity, 
public toilet facilities and so on were observed. The aim was to gain first–hand and 
experiential knowledge of the ‘potential needs’ of the localities and to what degree they 
matched the projects implemented. 
 
Photo 4.2: The researcher interacting with pupils from the Agbetor Primary School (Volta Region). 
 
Community–based programs, Tesoriero (2010) and Kenny (2010) argue, thrive on 
social capital, an observable attribute of ‘communities’, and the glue that holds people 
together (Woolcock 1998; Woolcock & Narayan 2000). As a result, during the 
fieldwork, the observation of and participation in several social–cultural activities in the 
research localities took place thereby gaining insight into the strength of their respective 
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social capital or what Bhattacharyya (2004, p. 5, cited in Tesoriero 2010), referred to as 
‘... [their] pursuit of solidarity and urgency’. Thus, religious services in both the church 
and mosque were attended and observed, and local and Parents/Teachers Association 
(PTA) meetings monitored, or some of the key informants accompanied to their farms. 
In the meetings, who spoke, who did not and the general atmosphere were observed. 
Apart from facilitating a better understanding of the localities and the projects, these 
interactions also assisted in establishing further contacts with prospective interviewees 
and key informants (Scheyvens & Storey 2003; Stone & Bonnie 2007).    
 
Photo 4.3: The researcher on a farm in the Afram Plains, Eastern Region. 
 
The entire P–O process enhanced the researcher’s understanding of the grounded 
meanings and realities of the theories and concepts such as ‘community’ and 
‘empowerment’, which were pivotal in the implementation of the CBRDP. It also 
offered first–hand information, other than any prior conceptualisation of the projects 
and the localities gathered through reading (Patton 2002). The technique also allowed 
an appreciation of the forms of local knowledge and repetitive routines in the localities 
that must have escaped the project implementers or been taken for granted (Mosse 
2001; Tesoriero 2010).  Through the P–O process, issues such as people’s political 
affiliations, which many respondents were unwilling to reveal in formal interviews, 
were discovered. To keep track of everything observed in the localities researched, field 
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notes were written for review and analysis. Some of the insights gained through the P–
O technique influenced the framing of the questions for the formal interviews and focus 
group discussions. 
 
4.6.3. Interviews/ Focus Group Discussions 
People’s thoughts, feelings, perceptions and intentions are not directly observable 
(Patton 1992). It is only when they open up to talk that their worldview, experiences and 
thoughts can be appreciated (Patton 1992; Liamputtong 2009). This explains why 
interviews and focus group discussions formed a substantial part of the methodology. 
As Tesoriero (2010, p. 129) points out, the “community worker [researcher] has to learn 
to step back, watch, listen and ask questions rather than provide answers.”  
 
In order to obtain comparative data and address a range of experiences (Travers 2010), a 
total of fifty formal and in–depth individual interviews were conducted. Those included 
in the individual interviews were key informants, local government officials (Assembly 
Members, Area Council Executive or Unit Committee Members), Traditional Chiefs 
and CBRDPs’ maintenance committee members.  The questions, many of which were 
based on what was observed in the localities or taken from the project documents, were 
semi–structured and open–ended to allow the respondents the flexibility of expressing 
themselves (Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010). The interviews elicited information on 
the processes leading to the selection and implementation and the state of the CBRDPs. 
Key Informants were asked to identify issues that affect local organising tendencies in 
their respective localities as well as the sustainability of the projects, most of them 
being observed to lack maintenance.  
 
Local government officials were asked to explain the motivation for doing the unpaid 
job and issues affecting their work. Three sets of questions were posed to Traditional 
Chiefs; the first sought information on the histories of the localities, while the second 
touched on their roles in the selection and implementation of the CBRDPs. The final set 
of questions related to their relationship with local government officials. Some of them 
were aggrieved that by virtue of its design, the CBRDP sidelined them, and they bore 
grudges with their local government representatives (see Chapter Seven).  
 
All the interviews were held in venues that were convenient for the respondents. 
Although, the questions tended to probe, the sessions were patterned on what 
Liamputtong (2009, p. 44) described as the ‘Parisan Cafe Model’: [a relaxed 
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atmosphere] that encourages shared experiences between the researcher and 
respondents. Most of the interviews lasted approximately forty minutes and were 
recorded with the consent of the interviewees.  
 
To obtain a larger sample of respondents without having to interview them individually 
(Liamputtong 2009; Tranter 2010), ten focus group discussions were held, one in each 
locality, except Aboloo in the Greater Accra Region, whose circumstances warranted 
two (see Table 4.1). As a research technique, many scholars have theoretically endorsed 
focus group discussion (Krueger 1994; Punch 1998; Frith 2000; Sarantakos 2008; 
Liamputtong 2009; Travers 2010). While the dynamics of each focus group differed, 
they were all sampled purposively, participants having to be residents of the relevant 
localities and to possess some knowledge of the projects. Depending on the project 
type, each focus group was based on a core characteristic, such as profession, 
parenthood or ethnicity. Other attributes such as gender, age, religion, and educational 
levels were used to stratify focus group members (see Table 4.1) so as to establish 
variations and representation of the relevant people in the localities (Liamputtong 2009; 
Travers 2010). For example, as photo 4.4 below shows, the focus group in Agoe 
(Greater Accra Region) centred on parents, the participants having been stratified by 
gender, religion and profession. Key informants in conjunction with research assistants 
facilitated the selection process, sometimes using both opportunistic and snowball108 
sampling techniques (Patton 2002; Liamputtong 2009).  
 
All the focus group sessions commenced with an introduction of the research team, 
participants109, the purpose of the research and what they had to expect. The discussions 
were designed from an interpretive perspective to obtain a wide range of opinions and 
detailed insights from the sampled groups on the CBRDPs (Liamputtong 2009; Travers 
2010). Thus, the questions, which were mainly open–ended to stimulate discussions, 
related to the functions of the local government sub–structures and the commitment of 
the participants to the development of the locality. Others questions probed the 
participants’ understanding of ‘community’, and their sense of belonging and 
obligations to their respective localities; and what they considered as the most important 
needs of their respective localities vis–a–vis the projects implemented. The researcher 
                                                
108 Participants were asked to suggest others they knew who met the research criteria and might be willing 
to participate.  
109First time some were interacting with each other. 
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moderated all the focus group sessions, which were also recorded with the consent of 
the participants. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Focus Groups’ Sampling Structure per Project Type and Beneficiary 
Group 
 
Town/ Village  Project Type Focus Group 
 
Agbetor Three–unit classroom block Fulani People 
Agoe Culverts Parents 
Dedenu  Mechanised bore whole Women 
Lume Eight–seater toilet facility for the 
local primary school 
Farmers 
Tashie Renovation of Tashie primary 
School 
 Parents 
Ntoaso Sixteen–seater toilet facility Traders 
Pakro Mechanised bore whole Dagomba People 
Tease Market sheds Traders 
Aboloo Community library block Students/ Parents 
Source: CBRDP Implementation Manual (2006); Field notes (2011). 
 
 
 
Photo 4.4:  The researcher in a focus group discussion with parents in Agoe, Greater Accra Region. 
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4.6.4. Open–Ended Questionnaires 
Conventionally, questionnaires are considered as a quantitative or survey technique 
(Patton 1992; Robson 2002). In recent times however, that narrow stance is giving way 
to a contextualised usage of the technique, which allows for qualitative analysis. 
Responses to open–ended questions, some methodologists aver, can provide details 
about perceptions, opinions, personal experiences, and deeply held beliefs (Carpenter & 
Suto 2008; Padgett 2008). As Liamputtong (2009, p.282) puts it, “qualitative 
researchers need to know that we sometimes count too”. This implies that 
questionnaires could be used quantitatively or qualitatively, depending on their design.  
In this research questionnaires were used qualitatively for two reasons: 1) To reach out 
to the residents of the CBRDP beneficiary localities who were not included in the 
individual interviews and focus group discussions; and 2) To obtain some sense of 
quantity of the emergent themes for contextualisation and triangulation (Carpenter & 
Suto 2008; Padgett 2008; Liamputtong 2009).  
 
Accordingly, twenty-five questionnaires were distributed in each of the nine CBRDP 
beneficiary localities researched110. They were administered randomly to residents who 
had intimate knowledge of the CBRDP implementation in the locality, but were not 
included in the individual interviews and focus group discussions and willing to 
participate in the research. All the questions were open–ended and required respondents 
to explain their: 1) Commitments to the locality; 2) Participation in the identification 
and implementation processes of the CBRDPs; and 3) Opinions on the functions of their 
local government officials (see Appendix B). While some responded to the 
questionnaires instantly, others retained them for up to seven days111. Some of the 
respondents who were literate completed the questionnaires unassisted, while the 
research assistants helped those who could either not express themselves on paper or in 
the English language. In such instances, the respondents were debriefed about their 
answers, after which they could deny the claims written on their behalf or accept them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
110 225 in total. 
111 Almost 95% of them were retrieved. 
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4.7 Data Analysis 
Different analytical procedures were applied to make sense of and identify patterns and 
emerging themes from the huge volumes of the secondary and primary data collected. 
The secondary data, which were drawn mainly from academic literature, CBRDP 
documents and reports from the Government of Ghana, World Bank, OECD, and 
UNDP, were examined for their arguments, how they have evolved overtime and the 
contexts within which made them relevant to the research topic. In some cases, the 
literature was cited contrarily to identify gaps on the research topic (Liamputtong 2009; 
Walter 2010). The literature also provided the tool for both data analysis and the 
theoretical basis of the arguments advanced in the thesis (see Figure 4.2). 
 
The analysis of the primary data – field notes, interviews, focus group and open–ended 
questionnaires – commenced with immersing in and organisation of the data (Willis 
2010). This involved manually reviewing the field notes, verbatim transcriptions of all 
audio interviews and the interpretation of the questionnaires on a district basis. Another 
round of organisational procedure involved coding the data. In order to simplify the 
process, the data were broadly coded in accordance with the three Secondary Research 
Questions drawn from the Primary Research Question as SRQ1, SRQ2 & SRQ3. The 
third round involved organising for critical analysis each of the three categories to 
identify recurring responses both thematically and inductively (Walter 2010; Willis 
2010). For example, in the SRQ2 category, themes recurring most included: 1) 
Residents’ dissociation with the Tease locality; 2) Allegations of corruption against 
local government officials; 3) Lack of interest in local meetings; 4) The failure of 
previous locally–initiated projects; and 5) Partisan politics.  
 
When several themes had been identified for each category, their convergence (how 
they hold together) and divergence (how they differ) was established (Patton 2002, 
Willis 2010). This involved interpretation of the themes through writing them up into 
complete stories guided by the conceptual and analytical framework (see Figure 4.2 
below). Specifically, the emergent themes in SRQ1, SRQ2 and SRQ3 are discussed in 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven respectively.  
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Figure 4.2 Conceptual/Analytical Frameworks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ahwoi 2010; Arhin 2002; Binswanger et al. 2010; Birdsall et al. 2010; Hancock et al. 2011; 
Tesoriero 2010; Travers 2010. 
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The concluding chapter of the thesis binds the findings into one integrative format and 
answers the Primary Research Question. However, because qualitative research 
techniques are often vilified as lacking validity and reliability, as the interpretation of 
the data tends to be biased by the researcher’s personal worldview (Angen 2000; Patton 
2002; Padgett 2008); the drafts were subjected to several test mechanisms. Apart from 
being reviewed by senior academics in the subject area (‘expert–checking’), the drafts 
were also exposed to ‘member–checking’ for accuracy112 (Lincoln & Guba 1989; 
Carpenter & Suto 2008), and an audit trail113 (Creswell 2007; Padgett 2008). These 
processes elicited feedback and comments, some of which have been incorporated into 
this thesis. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter described the methods and tools employed in this study. It outlined the 
research design and the questions the thesis sought to answer. The three reasons that 
informed the use of ethno–methodology as the overarching design were also presented. 
These included the: 1) Fact that the research is directly human–related; 2) Dearth of 
ethnographic studies concerning aid in Ghana; and 3) Compatibility of case studies with 
ethno–methodology. The chapter also outlined the fieldwork experiences, explaining the 
negotiation of the researcher as an ‘outsider’. The limitations of the research and ethical 
considerations were also outlined.  
 
The genre of documents and literature reviewed to understand the CBRDP; the theories 
of aid and CDD approaches were also discussed.  The literature provided background 
information that framed the theoretical and analytical frameworks of the research. 
Explanation was given of how the Participant–Observation technique facilitated the 
process of gaining useful insights into the real world experiences of the research 
subjects. The interview and focus group discussion processes and the kind of 
information elicited from them have also been outlined. The questionnaire protocols 
sought information by reaching out to residents of the CBRDP beneficiary localities 
who had not been included in the interviews and focus group discussions, and to obtain 
some sense of quantities for data triangulation purposes.  
 
                                                
112 For example, a draft of the section of Chapter One which described the research case study project was 
sent to the CBRDP Headquarters in Accra (Ghana) for comments. 
113 Some of the drafts were reviewed by my network of academics internationally. 
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Finally, the chapter explained the data analysis processes and mechanisms engaged to 
mitigate against the biases and inaccuracies of qualitative research methods. All the data 
were manually organised on a district basis and coded to the Secondary Research 
Questions, which were drawn from the Primary Research Question. Subsequently, each 
category was analysed for recurring responses and themes.  When several themes had 
been identified for each category, guided by the conceptual framework, drafts were 
written of the findings that answered the respective secondary questions. ‘Member–
checking’ and audit trail mechanisms were employed to review and enhance the 
credibility of the findings.   
 
The next chapter examines, within the framework of Ghana’s CBRDP, one of the 
pivotal decentralisation theories in Community–Driven Development operations. While 
the theory appears to suggest that CDD programs do well in ‘highly’ decentralised 
countries such as Ghana, the findings point to the contrary. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GHANA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT:  
A DECEPTIVE ‘HIGH–FUNCTIONING’ SYSTEM?  
 
“Ghana’s decentralisation process could be best described as stagnated. Several 
countries who understudied Ghana’s system have made significant strides” 
                    (Kyei–Baffour 2009, p. 32). 
 
Chapter Three established that the Community–Driven Development (CDD) program is 
a popular aid delivery mechanism at the World Bank. Among other things, the 
popularity of CDD stems from the assertion that the implementing country or locality 
has control over the program, an essential recipe for achieving aid effectiveness 
(Mansuri & Rao 2004; World Bank 2010). The chapter also showed that CDD programs 
do not work in a vacuum, as their operations invariably depend on the level of the 
implementing country’s inter–government, or decentralisation systems (Dongier et al. 
2003; Binswanger et al. 2010). Accordingly, the World Bank distinguishes between 
African countries with low and high–functioning decentralisation systems relative to the 
existence of four indicators: 1) Decentralisation laws [that] create autonomous local 
government structures in resource management; 2) Fiscal decentralisation; 3) Local 
[government] elections114; and 4) Devolution of service delivery. Therefore, a CDD 
operationalisation strategy (Leading, Conservative and Matching) is determined by the 
implementing country’s relative attainment of the four indicators. The Matching 
Strategy applies to countries with high–functioning decentralisation systems (Dongier et 
al. 2003; Binswanger et al. 2010).  
 
Interestingly, in lieu of Kyei–Baffour’s (2009) assertion, and others (Asante 2009; 
Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010; Ghana Constitutional Review Commission Report 
2011), that Ghana’s decentralisation process has stagnated and needs an overhaul; the 
World Bank considers it as high–functioning and better placed to implement CDD 
programs successfully (Binswanger et al. 2010). This projection, which has given 
Ghana ‘an aid celebrity status’ as one of the preferred destinations for donor support in 
Sub–Saharan Africa, does not paint the true picture or reflect the grounded realities, in 
this case, the country’s inter–government systems (decentralisation). This chapter 
challenges the World Bank’s classification of Ghana’s decentralisation system as being 
highly functional.  Three sections are presented to contextualise the arguments 
                                                
114 Although the World Bank does not state explicitly about the type of election it refers to, from the 
context it points to local government election (Binswanger et al. 2010 p. 123).  
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advanced in the text: the first section provides a brief overview of Ghana’s local 
government and decentralisation system. Drawing on secondary sources and within the 
framework of the four indicators above, the second section examines and points out 
many weaknesses in Ghana’s local government system, proving why it does not appear 
to merit the label ‘high–functioning’. The final section of the chapter draws on 
empirical data collected from the Eastern, Greater Accra and Volta Regions of Ghana in 
2010/2011. The section discusses some of the weaknesses inherent in Ghana’s local 
government system by unravelling the issues affecting the operations of Assembly 
Members, who are key facilitators of developments at the local level. Among the issues 
contributing to their dysfunction are partisan politics, the fact that the officials are not 
paid any salaries, working with weak Unit Committees, and conflicts with Traditional 
Chiefs. Through an analysis of how these challenges influenced the outcomes of 
Ghana’s Community–Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP), the section 
provides empirical basis for appreciating the impact of contested theories on 
development program outcomes.  
 
5.1 Ghana’s Local Government System: A Brief Overview 
Local government in Ghana dates as far back to the pre–independence era through what 
was known as Indirect Rule, which centred on native authorities made up of Traditional 
Chiefs or local royalty (Ayee 1999; Institute of Local Government Studies & Ministry 
of Local Government & Rural Development and Environment 2006). Although both the 
pre and post–independence (1957) periods have witnessed several local government 
legal and constitutional amendments, the most significant was the 1988 Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC) Local Government Law 207, Legislative Instrument 
1589115. This was the landmark legislation that provided the legal framework for the 
beginning of Ghana’s decentralised local government system of today. In the current 
Constitution (1992), the PNDC Law 207 has been strengthened as an entrenched 
provision in Chapter Twenty, while Article 240 specifically provides the broad 
framework for the Ghana’s decentralisation. In the last decade, the passages of other 
relevant laws have also augmented Article 240116.  
                                                
115 The law was a reflection of the wind of public sector reforms that was blowing in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s for public accountability, transparency, efficiency, responsiveness to citizens’ input and 
reducing state apparatus (Tettey 2006). 
116 These include but are not limited to: the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462); the Local 
Government Service Act 2003 (Act 656); the District Assemblies Common Fund Act 455, the National 
Development Planning Systems Act 480 and the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies 
Standing Orders (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992; Kyei–Baffour 2009; Antwi–Boasiako 
2010; Ahwoi 2010).  
 106 
Ghana’s local government structure consists of Regional Coordinating Councils and a 
four–tier and three–tier Municipal/ District Assembly system (see Figure 5.1). Within 
the structure, District/Municipal Assemblies (DAs) appear to be the most ‘influential’ as 
they are entrusted with wide political and administrative authority at the local level 
(Gyimah–Boadi 2009). For example, Section 10 (5) of the Local Government Act 462 
stipulates that all programs and projects, including those approved under the District 
Development Plan and other development programs by Government Ministries and 
Departments and non–governmental organisations, are supposed to be coordinated and 
executed by/or under the supervision of the DAs. They also have responsibility for 
eighty-six functions, sole control over certain public services and the prerogative to 
make decisions regarding some executive and policy issues (Tettey 2006; Gyimah–
Boadi 2009; Ofei–Aboagye 2009; Ahwoi 2010). Despite having these powers, in 
reality, as argued below, DAs seem to be controlled and used for various political 
manoeuvrings by the central government (Crawford 2004; Sumberg & Okali 2006). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Structure of Ghana’s Local Government System in the Fourth Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Ahwoi (2010). 
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While constitutionally mandated to be the hub of development at the local level, the 
operations of Ghana’s DAs appear to offer many loopholes for political machinations. 
Although Article 248 (2) of the Constitution requires that DAs be non–partisan, the 
system seems to be highly politicised (Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009). Ahwoi 
(2010, p. 62) argues that the politicisation of the system stems from the modelling of 
Ghana’s local government structure on that of Canada: ‘partisan central government 
superimposed on a non–partisan local government system’. Others blame the 
politicisation of the DAs on the constitutional provision in Article 243 (2) that allows 
the President to appoint District Chief Executives (DCEs) rather than being elected 
(Tettey 2006; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). DCEs are responsible for the day–to–day 
performance of the executive and administrative functions of the DAs. They are also the 
chief representatives and the principal executors of the central government’s programs 
in the district. Appointed for two terms of four years only, DCEs are nominated by the 
President, but require approval of two–thirds of the Assembly Members present and 
voting (Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992; ILGS & MLGDE 2006; Tettey 
2006; Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010).  
 
It has been suggested that the constitutional provision, which allows for the 
appointment of DCEs, be amended so that they get into office through popular votes.   
In the view of the pro–amendment scholars (see Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; 
Antwi–Boasiako 2010117), revising that constitutional provision will make DCEs 
accountable to the local people. They argue further that the status quo allows DCEs to 
be loyal only to the President rather than the local people they serve. However, Ahwoi 
(2010) disagrees and argues that if DCEs were elected, the entire local government 
structure would be politicised, as political party cronies with little or no administrative 
experience would be voted to manage the system. While successive governments and 
politicians have promised to amend the particular constitutional provision, they appear 
to lack the political will to carry it out (New Patriotic Party Manifesto 2008; National 
Democratic Congress Manifesto 2008; Ex–President J.E.A. Mills First Sectional 
Address, cited in Asante 2009). The main reason, some scholars have observed, is that 
the status quo offers politicians the convenience of political manoeuvrings at the local 
                                                
117 The current Deputy Minister of Local Government and Rural Development and Environment also 
supports the idea (http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=244165,  
retrieved 10 July 2009). 
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level (Crawford 2004; Sumberg & Okali 2006; Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; 
Kyei–Baffour 2009; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). 
 
5.2 Is Ghana’s Local Government System ‘High–Functioning’? 
The discussions so far show that while there are constitutional provisions for a 
decentralised local government in Ghana, the system appears to offer loopholes for 
political machinations. Within this context, this section analyses the state of Ghana’s 
local government system guided by the World Bank’s four indicators of a high–
functioning decentralised system: 1) Decentralisation laws [that] create local 
government autonomous structures; 2) Fiscal decentralisation; 3) Local [government] 
elections; and 4) Devolution of service delivery. 
 
5.2.1 Decentralisation laws [that] create Autonomous Local Government Structures 
 
According to Crawford (2004, p. 32), autonomy of local governments refers to their 
ability to ‘initiate and coordinate local development [programs]’. Although Ghana’s 
1992 Constitution (Article 240, 2b) and the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462) 
provide for the autonomy of Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies (local 
authorities), the statutes appear to be inherently contradictory. Several examples will 
illustrate this. First, whereas the Local Government Act 462 stipulates that the District 
Assemblies (DAs) are responsible for the development at the local level, Article 10 (3) 
requires that their Medium Term Development Plans and budgets be approved by the 
central government (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Section 88 of Act 462 also limits the 
amount of loans DAs can contract to only GHC 2000118; any amount above that requires 
the approval of the central government in accordance with the Financial Administration 
Act 2003 (Act 654). Given these ‘barrier statutes’, the ability [and autonomy] of DAs to 
undertake independent and creative programs is apparently restricted (Ahwoi 2005; 
Tettey 2006).  
 
As earlier indicated, the autonomy of local authorities is further atrophied by the Local 
Government Act 462119, which gives the President the authority to appoint 30% of its 
membership. Gyimah–Boadi (2009) argues that the law invariably advances strong 
partisan politics within the local authorities, as the appointments tend to be 
characterised by political scheming and ethnocentrism, while little premium is placed 
on technical competence and integrity of the officers (see also Democracy Watch 2005, 
                                                
118 Approximately USD 1100. 
119 Reflects the dictates of Article 296 of the 1992 Constitution. 
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cited in Gyimah–Boadi 2009). Others argue that Act 462 encourages allegiance of 
Presidential appointees to the central government and their political parties, rather than 
to the local people (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2005, 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). 
Interestingly, DAs also do not have the power to recruit and retain their own employees, 
relying on the Head of the Civil Service and the Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development and Environment (MLGRDE) to provide staff (Tettey 2006). While 
the Local Government Service Act 2003 (Act 656) sought to address this by vesting 
control of employees of DAs in the local authorities, the process, as Ofei–Aboagye 
(2009) notes, has been hampered by various factors, including resistance to change. 
 
Furthermore, whereas Act 462 stipulates that 70% of the DA membership be elected by 
popular votes, the President [under the same Act] has the Power of Revocation to 
dissolve those s/he deems ‘non–performing’, without consulting the electorates. In fact, 
Gyimah–Boadi (2009) observed in 2005 that President Kufour (2001-2008) used the 
Power of Revocation to summarily dismiss some DA officials across the country. 
Therefore, a President could abuse the Power of Revocation to sack local government 
officials who may be at loggerheads with him (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Considered 
critically, Ghana’s local government sub–structures seem to be constitutionally 
subjected to the whims and mercies of the President and the central government. 
 
The central government’s manipulation of DAs is further complicated by the fact that 
all bye–laws enacted by local authorities are subject to the approval of the Ministry of 
Local Government and Rural Development (Ahwoi 2010). This provision, Tettey 
(2006) argues, weakens the autonomy of local authorities, while allowing politicians to 
interfere in local governance. There have been many instances in which certain 
decongestion and demolition exercises of local authorities [in the interest of the 
country] have been halted by the central government because of their political 
incorrectness or implications for the outcomes parliamentary elections120 (Tettey 2006; 
Antwi Boasiako 2010).  
 
The ensuing discussions show that the existence of decentralisation laws does not offer 
enough ground to categorise a country’s inter-government as high–functioning. In the 
                                                
120http://audio.peacefmonline.com/newsaudio/201201/444.php?pageNum_rsComments=1&totalRows_rs
Comments=17, retrieved February 9, 2012 (The audio attachment is the voice of Mr Yaw Boateng–Gyan, 
who works at the Presidency. On Peacefm, a local radio station, he warned Dr Vandepuye the Mayor of 
Accra, to stop the demolitions of illegal structures (See also Tettey 2006, p. 16;  
http://www.atokd.com/blog Content.aspx? blogID=275, http://www.wakeupghana.com 
/2009/12/22/president-orders-suspension-of-ama-decongestion.htmlall retrieved February 10, 2012. 
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case of Ghana, while the country’s Constitution and the Local Government 462 Act 
provide for the autonomy of local authorities, the same statutes advance certain 
centralising and contradictory tendencies as well as politically exploitable loopholes, 
which compromise the independence of the local government sub–structures. This is 
consistent with Ahwoi’s (2005) description of Ghana’s local government system as 
‘recentralisation within decentralisation’ (see also Sumberg & Okali 2006; Antwi–
Boasiako 2010). 
 
 5.2.2 Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation deals with how public expenditure is organised and financed 
between different levels of government (Owusu 2009). According to Ahwoi (2010), the 
indicators of a strong local government financial framework include: 1) Clear 
assignment of responsibilities; 2) Authority to adjust revenues to needed expenditures; 
3) Authority to generate sufficient local government’s own revenue sources and to 
develop strong positive incentives to strengthen this; 4) Developing an appropriate mix 
in expenditures and in revenues; 5) Efficient democratic and accountable budget 
procedures; 6) Appropriate financial relationship between central and local government; 
7) Appropriate level of redistribution; 8) Efficient and timely transfers from central to 
local governments; and 9) Effective revenue collections. The underlying principle of 
these indicators is the ability of local governments to generate and control its revenues 
(Tettey 2006; Owusu 2009).   
 
Ghana’s 1992 Constitution makes provision for financial directions for local 
governments in Articles 245 and 252121. Despite these legislative provisions, in lieu of 
the nine indicators above, fiscal decentralisation appears not to have been achieved in 
Ghana, a fact widely acknowledged. For example, the Ghana Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper, which was drawn up to free the country from its indebtedness, identified 
the lack of progress with fiscal decentralisation as a barrier to local development 
(Government of Ghana 2004). Owusu (2009) also argues that fiscal decentralisation 
lags far behind administrative and political decentralisations in Ghana, and that there is 
a ‘vertical imbalance’ between the functions of local authorities and the financial 
resources available to them. Ghana’s Minister of Finance and Economic Planning also 
acknowledged this in his 2012 budget statement to the Parliament of the Republic 
(Government of Ghana Budget Statement 2012, p. 6). The literature identifies three 
                                                
121 The same are also catered for in Sections 43, Parts VII, VIII, IX and X of Local Government Act 462. 
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factors as being responsible for the lack of fiscal decentralisation in Ghana: 1) Weak 
revenue base of DAs; 2) Laws, which limit the financial independence of the local 
government structures; and 3) Seeming unwillingness of the central government to 
undertake true fiscal decentralisation (Tettey 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Owusu 2009; 
Ahwoi 2010).  
 
District Assemblies in Ghana seem to have a weak financial base. Available figures 
indicate that 81% of their revenues come from the central government funding through 
the District Assembly Common Funds (DACF)122. According to Ahwoi (2010), 
although the law123, which established the DACF requires that the central government 
transfers a minimum 5% of the total national revenue to the DACF; successive 
governments base this percentage on the total national tax revenue instead. Commenting 
on the DACF, a DCE is quoted by Owusu (2009, p. 36) as saying: “what comes is so 
small that the Assembly can’t carry out any meaningful activity or undertake a physical 
project ... for the whole year you just have only one or two projects”.  
 
Ghanaian local government authorities appear not to determine how and where to utilise 
their DACF. For example, Ahwoi (2010) reveals that in 2007, 41% of the DACF was 
pre–determined by the central government, and that while local authorities had the 
flexibility of determining the proportions of the use of the remaining 59%, they were 
limited to specific sectors. Research by Inanga and Osei–Wusu (2004) also showed that 
not all the ceded sums to local authorities get paid. These challenges have raised 
concerns among some local scholars who argue that the dependence of local authorities 
on central government funding limits them from taking independent, timely and 
responsive initiatives that address on–the–ground needs of the localities, apart from 
allowing for political machinations (Tettey 2006; Asante 2009; Ofei–Aboagye 2009; 
Kyei–Baffour 2009; Ahwoi 2010; Antwi–Boasiako 2010). While local authorities are 
legally allowed to levy and collect taxes, the reality is that they lack the capacity to do 
so effectively (Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Ahwoi 2010). Owusu (2009) and Mahama and 
Otten (2008) attribute the weak tax collection tendency at the local level to the 
inadequate services in local government areas of jurisdiction, poverty and the reluctance 
of local people to pay taxes because of a perception that local authorities do very little 
to address their needs.  
 
                                                
122 In the three Northern Regions it is 95% (Gyimah–Boadi 2009). 
123 District Assembly Common Fund Act 1993 (Act 455). 
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Furthermore, fiscal decentralisation in Ghana seems to be hampered by the existence of 
certain laws, which subject the financial transactions of local authorities to the approval 
of the central government. The 2003 Financial Administration Act 654 is an example. 
The law, which regulates the financial management of the public sector, makes the 
Ministry of Finance the primary authority for the preparation, publication and control of 
the national budget. Other controlling interests include the Financial Administration 
Regulation, 2004; the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003, Act, (Act 655); the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663); and Section 88 of the Local Government Act 462, 
which caps the amount of loan a DA can contract to only GHC 2000. These statutes 
appear to centralise financial administration, while denying local governments the 
needed fiscal autonomy to operate effectively (Kyei–Baffour 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 
2009; Ahwoi 2010). This is further confirmed by the unwillingness of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning to implement composite budgeting to allow the 
separation of DAs from central government budgets, although Section 10 (3) of the 
Local Government Act 462 enjoins them to do so. The attitude seems to indicate a clear 
reluctance on the part of Ghana’s central government to undertake true fiscal 
decentralisation (Owusu 2009).  
 
It is important to acknowledge though that Ghana has seen some progress in fiscal 
decentralisation, including: 1) The merger of central and local government treasuries at 
the District level into one District Finance Office; 2) Decentralisation of awarding and 
payment for contracts up to limits set by the Minister of Finance; and 3) Establishment 
of District Tender Boards (Ahwoi 2010). Even so, fiscal decentralisation is yet to be 
achieved in Ghana as local authorities rely heavily on central government funding, 
while ‘tied’ by several constitutional barriers and weak revenue mobilisation abilities. 
Based on these revelations, it appears that Ghana does not measure–up to the second 
indicator of a high–functioning decentralised system either. 
 
 5.2.3 Local Government Elections 
The World Bank’s third indicator of a high–functioning local government system relates 
to local elections. It is argued here that local government election is not a robust 
indicator for measuring the level of decentralisation. The reason is that while local 
government elections have been held in Ghana since 1978, the process appears not to be 
taken seriously at the central government and local levels. As illustrated in Figure 5.2 
below, Voter turnout to local government elections from 1994–2010 has averaged 
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nearly 36%; significantly lower than the almost 70% patronage of presidential elections 
for the1992–2008 periods (see Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.2 Percentage of National Average of Voter Turnouts in District 
Assembly Elections 1978–2010 
 
 
Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana (2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Percentages of Voter Turnouts to Presidential Elections 1992–2008 
 
Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana (2010). 2000 & 2008 are averages of the first and second round 
voting. 
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Before the 2010 DA elections, which coincided with the fieldwork, there were concerns 
about the level of preparation and readiness of the electoral commission for the polls; 
some even called for its postponement.  For instance, Aborampah–Mensah (2010, p. 1) 
of the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD–Ghana) argued:  
 
We appreciate the chain of avoidable and unavoidable circumstances leading to 
the unfortunate delays in getting the nation adequately prepared for the 2010 
edition of the District level elections. We do recognize the harm being done to 
decentralised local government in Ghana with the District... [CDD–Ghana] is 
also deeply disturbed by the implications of going into an election with so little 
visible preparation...The entire local government election process appears to 
have received very little attention from key election stakeholders such as the 
media and the public at large….We recommend that the electoral commission 
and stakeholders consider the possibility of postponing the polls. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Number of Unit Committees with Zero Nominations per Region in 2010 
 
Source: Ghana Electoral Commission (2010). 
 
 
The elections were not postponed and were so poorly organised that they were ridiculed 
locally as being held in ‘tots’124 (batches). The report of a Special Parliamentary Select 
Committee to investigate the poor organisation and the low turnout of the 2010 DA 
polls indicated that public trust and respect for local government institutions, as a source 
of information and service is low, while central government’s commitment to the entire 
                                                
124 Local expression of ridicule. 
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process is also weak (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana 2011). Many of the issues 
raised by the report were not new, as others had expressed similar concerns (see CDD–
Ghana 2003; Crawford 2004; Commonwealth Local Government Forum cited in Tettey 
2006, Asante 2009).  
 
Ghana’s local government elections are also characterised by low involvement of 
women, although they constitute 51.2% percent of the population (Ghana Statistical 
Service 2012). Although women’s participation in parliamentary elections as candidates 
is also significantly lower, it is better than their involvement in District Assembly and 
Unit Committee elections. For example, in the 2010 DA elections, only 7.3 % and 6.8% 
of women were elected as Assembly and Unit Committee Members respectively; nearly 
two hundred Unit Committee positions were uncontested nationally (see Figure 5.4; 
Electoral Commission 2010). While these figures show an improvement on the 
representation of women in previous DA elections, together with the voter turns as 
illustrated in Figure 5.2, it is evident that Ghanaians seem not to take the process 
seriously. People’s indifference to the political exercise, some have argued, stems from 
the lack of confidence in local governments to fulfil their needs (Tettey 2006; Asante 
2009; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Ahwoi 2010; Government of Ghana 2011).  
 
5.2.4 Devolution of Service Delivery 
Devolution is the third form of administrative decentralisation125. The notion of 
devolution stems from the principle of subsidiarity, and aims at shortening the distance 
between citizens and policymakers, while ensuring that critical services are available at 
the local level (Tettey 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Accordingly, the Local Government Act 462 
and others126 provide for the establishment of several Government Departments in 
Metropolitan (sixteen), Municipal (thirteen) and District (eleven) Assemblies.  Despite 
these provisions, which make administrative decentralisation obligatory for key social 
sector ministries, Gyimah–Boadi (2009) argues that many of them are reluctant to 
decentralise and devolve authority. Consequently, Ahwoi (2010) notes that five critical 
services and departments (Health, Fire, Forestry and Game and Wildlife, and 
Education) are not decentralised in Ghana. Two factors explain this. 
 
                                                
125 The other two include: Deconcentration and Delegation. 
126 The Civil Service Law, 1993, PNDCL 327; Local Government Service Act, 2003, Act 656; and 
National Development Planning Act, 1994, Act 480. 
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First, as discussed above, the Local Government Acts 462 and 656, appear to promote 
centralisation. As a result, most Government Departments in the local authorities tend to 
operate as de–concentrated offices of their parent Ministries in Accra, the capital 
(Sumberg & Okali 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Crawford (2004, p. 33) puts it succinctly: “there 
is little to suggest that District Assemblies have [any] authority ... [as they] merely act 
as agencies for the central government with little or no discretionary powers”. 
Administrative decentralisation in Ghana is also challenged by the lack of infrastructure 
and human resources. Owing to the paucity of infrastructure in some parts of the 
country, many public servants and national service personnel127 continue to refuse 
postings to the northern and other ‘infrastructurally–deprived’ regions of the country, as 
they consider it as a punishment (Gyimah–Boadi 2009). As the Ghana Medical 
Association revealed, for three years running [2007-2009] no medical doctor accepted 
posting to the Upper East Region128 (Ghana Medical Association 2009129). 
 
The stalled nature of administrative decentralisation in Ghana has been described by 
Asante (2009) and Gyimah–Boadi (2009) as contributing to the stagnation in rural 
development, continued rural–urban drift, the worsening of the north–south divide, and 
congestion in Accra.  As of March 2011, when the researcher departed from Ghana, 
having collected the data, people were still queuing at the offices of the former Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Accra to have their passports issued; the regional passport offices 
were not functioning. As Ahwoi (2010, p. 145), Ghana’s longest–serving Minister of 
Local Government since 1951, observed: “there has been no administrative 
decentralisation [devolution] in the real sense of the term”. 
 
5.3 Summary 
Based on the facts presented above, one wonders if Ghana’s local government system is 
highly functional as claimed by the World Bank. While the country’s constitution and 
various Local Government Acts make provision for a decentralised local government 
system, the same statutes appear to promote centralisation, which hinders the autonomy 
of the local authorities, and effective fiscal and administrative decentralisation. As the 
figures from the electoral commission also suggested, Ghanaians appear not to take 
                                                
127 Ghanaian students who graduate from accredited tertiary institutions are required under law to do a one 
year national service to the country. 
128 The doctor–patient ratio in the three Northern Regions in 2009 was 1:57, 333. The national average in 
2009 was 1: 13,000. 
129 See also http://www.modernghana.com/news/223247/1/doctors-refuse-posting-to-upper-east-
region.htmlm retrieved June 15, 2012. 
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local government elections as an important political exercise compared with their 
patronage of presidential elections. Despite the facts presented above, the World Bank 
and many development agencies have long presented Ghana’s inter-government system 
as high functioning, a projection that has influenced the choice of the country as one of 
the preferred destinations for donor support and foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
However, the grounded-realities of Ghana, as the above discussion revealed, appear to 
contradict the picture ‘development experts’ tend to paint of the country.  
 
It is also important to point out that some of the World Bank’s indicators for measuring 
developing countries’ inter–government systems seems imprecise. Considered carefully, 
they appear to concentrate on the mere existence of the benchmarks rather than the 
ground realities. For example, it is not enough to cite local government elections as a 
yardstick for measuring the level of a country’s decentralisation system without stating 
the percentage of patronage indicative of its success or otherwise. Additionally, as 
Ghana’s example has shown, the fact that a country’s constitution and legal framework 
makes provision for decentralised local governance does not make it high functioning. 
The indicators should move beyond constitutional provisions, be precise and include a 
specific focus on issues affecting the functioning of local government institutions. The 
next section, which draws on the empirical data, provides a more realistic analysis of 
some of the issues impacting on the operations of Ghana’s local government 
substructures, specifically, the functions of Assembly Members.  
 
5.4 The Plight of Assembly Members in Ghana 
Assembly Members are key facilitators of developments at the local level in Ghana. 
They are elected for four–year re–electable twice terms (twelve years in all), and are not 
to be identified with any political party. They do not receive salaries, but receive 
transport allowances when they attend the Municipal/District Assembly (MDA) 
meetings (ILGS & MLGDE 2006). While the current government has promised to pay 
all Assembly Members, this payment has not yet materialised (NDC 2008 Manifesto, p. 
86). Because of the dearth of empirical research on the functions of Assembly Members 
in Ghana, many challenges and issues they face appear to be unknown.  As this research 
reveals, the challenges include, but are not limited to: 1) Managing their personal lives 
and people’s expectations in an unpaid job; 2) Relating to their DCE; 3) Working with 
weak Unit Committees; and 4) Relating to Traditional Chiefs. These challenges, which 
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corroborate the lapses inherent in Ghana’s local government system, are discussed in 
turn. 
5.4.1 Managing Personal Life and People’s Expectations in an Unpaid Job 
The personal lifestyles of Assembly Members as well as their electorates’ expectations 
are a source of interesting insights for discussions.  A total of nine male Assembly 
Members were interviewed for this research; the oldest was over sixty and the youngest 
was in his ‘mid–thirties’. They all listed their main occupation as either civil servant or 
self–employed being a part-time Assembly Member. Eight of the Assembly Members 
had at least completed basic education and could read, write and speak English with 
varied fluency130. Almost all the Assembly Members interviewed were married with 
children; some with two or more wives. While most of them lived in the localities they 
served, two lived and worked elsewhere and visited their Electoral Areas occasionally. 
Asked how they combined their city jobs with their roles as Assembly Members, the 
general responds was that, while it was difficult, they could not step down because their 
families would be disappointed; being in the position was considered prestigious and an 
honour for the family. Two of the Assembly Members had served only once and were 
seeking re–election, while the others were stepping down voluntarily – for reasons 
discussed subsequently.  
 
Various reasons, which are categorised into political ambitions, volunteerism and 
family/friends’ pressures, influenced many Assembly Members to take up the role. 
Those with political ambitions explained that the role was a first step into public 
service. Although the underlying principle was to serve the people, they considered it a 
foundation upon which they would build their political careers. The analysis revealed 
that sixty percent of the Assembly Members interviewed considered the position as a 
stepping-stone into a political career. As Kofi Dogbe, a 35-year-old Assembly Member 
from the Volta Region put it, “It’s hard to rise into the political limelight overnight. You 
need a reference and starting point.”  Interestingly, while some of these prospective 
politicians claimed to have no political affiliations, others indicated their leanings.   
 
Nearly twenty percent of the Assembly Members had also taken up the role voluntarily 
as an act of service to the local people. Such Assembly Members claimed having no 
political affiliations or ambitions, and that they were in the role to serve their people. 
                                                
130 Others could only manage ‘broken’ English or could not express themselves in English at all. 
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The final category of Assembly Members interviewed consisted of those whose friends 
or family members asked or influenced them to take up the job. One of them stated that:  
When your people recognise that you can represent them in the District 
Assembly, it’s an honour. If you say no, it will create displeasure and 
disappointment and may even be interpreted to mean disrespecting them. You 
need to honour the recognition given to you … after all, some of them 
contributed to your education. 
 
The Assembly Members interviewed were averagely in charge of twenty or more 
localities, some several kilometres away and accessible only by footpaths and bicycles. 
Interestingly, Section 16 of the Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462 (see ILGS & 
MLGRD 2006) expects an Assembly Member to: 
a) Maintain close contact with his Electoral Area, consult his/her people on 
issues to be discussed in the District Assembly and collate their views, 
opinions and proposals; 
b) Present the views, opinions and proposals to the District Assembly; 
c)  Attend meetings of the District Assembly and meetings of the sub-
committees of which he is a member; 
d)  Meet his/her electorates before each meeting of the Assembly; 
e)  Report to his electorate the general decisions of the Assembly and its 
Executive Committee and the actions s/he has taken to solve the problems 
raised by residents in his Electoral Area; 
f) Draw attention in general debate to national policies which are relevant to 
the subject under discussion; 
g) Actively participate in the work of the sub–committees of the Executive 
Committee [of the District Assembly]; 
h)  Bring to bear on any discussion in the Assembly the benefit of his skill, 
profession, experience or specialised knowledge; 
i)  Maintain frequent liaison with productive economic groupings and other 
persons in the District; and  
j) Take part in communal and development activities in the district. 
 
Confronted with such a realistically impossible task in an unpaid job, most of the 
Assembly Members seemed frustrated. Asked how they managed the situation, five 
explained that they visited each of the localities under their jurisdiction once in a month, 
while four did so only when an emergency ensued. Assembly Members who lived 
outside their localities explained that their Unit Committee Members visited in their 
stead and attended to urgent issues in their absence. Almost all the Assembly Members 
interviewed were not just worried about being unpaid, but the fact that their electorates 
expected so much from them. 
 
The expectation of many local people from their Assembly Members seemed utopian. 
Some expected them to pay school fees, provide business capital, and initiate income–
generating or employment–oriented projects. Thus, while almost 80% percentage of 
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questionnaire respondents admitted knowing their Assembly Members, they always 
remarked, “I know him … but he does nothing for me”. The high expectations from 
Assembly Members may be attributable to the general high poverty levels across the 
country; the lack of public education on local government functions; and particularly, 
the many election campaign promises of the Assembly Members. 
 
Because the position of an Assembly Member is electable, candidates are expected to 
visit their Electoral Areas individually to canvass for votes. During these campaigning 
times, many of them tend to raise the hopes of the people by promising things they 
cannot deliver. During the fieldwork, which coincided with the Ghana’s 2010 local 
government elections, the researcher encountered many potential Assembly Members 
who were promising to construct bridges, roads and schools. Tellingly, many Assembly 
Members disposed redeemable tokens, and doing favours or handing out gifts in 
electorates to win the constituents’ votes. Some revealed that they spent almost 5000 
GHC131 on their campaigns. One was asked why such a huge amount of money was 
spent to get into an unpaid job. He replied:  
This is Ghana. Money is powerful. You can have a great vision or a manifesto; 
if it is not backed with ‘action’ [cash, gifts] people will not have confidence in 
you. For me it’s not a big deal because I’m preparing myself for a bigger 
political future and there I will recoup all my investment. 
 
Another explained: 
It is very difficult to win elections in this place empty–handed. It is a survival of 
the rich or the one who can pay more. Here, votes are for sale … even if you 
don’t want to do it, you will be compelled to do the same, as your opponents 
will be doing it.  
 
The fact that Assembly Members are not paid, but expected to do so much, tend to lead 
to their misappropriation of funds earmarked for local development, one instance being 
the Community–Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP). Because of the 
‘investment’ some Assembly Members made to their work, they appeared to see the 
CBRDP as an opportunity to recoup dividends. As a result, in some localities, the Area 
Council Chairmen and project officials disclosed that some Assembly Members 
awarded the procurement of the project’s materials to themselves and/or inflated the 
prices.  
 
 
 
                                                
131 Almost USD 4000. 
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 5.4.2 Relating to ‘Partisan’ Municipal/District Chief Executives 
As explained in Chapter One, the Community-Based Rural Development Project 
(CBRDP) was designed to strengthen the country’s local government sub–structures 
ultimately, the Area Councils132. Although the Area Councils were expected to be the 
implementers of CBRDP, they relied heavily on the MDAs, because they lacked the 
technical capacities required. As DCEs are the most powerful figures at the MDA level, 
they supervised the selection of the beneficiary Area Councils. DCEs also oversaw the 
MDAs facilitation of the projects, particularly the technical aspects: planning, 
engineering, and accounting, among others. It is therefore important to explain briefly 
how the politicisation of the operations of MDAs in Ghana impacted on the CBRDPs; 
this will clarify the context for understanding how the ‘power’ of DCEs impact on 
Assembly Members. 
 
As DCEs determined which Area Council would benefit from the CBRDP, the 
researcher found that some of the projects were politicised and given to unqualified 
localities133. In Ghana, DCEs are eligible to contest parliamentary elections. As a result, 
some of them used the CBRDPs as the political machines to launch their campaigns or 
win favours for votes. Whitfield (2008) attests to this practice, observing that some 
Ghanaian politicians streamline aid–funded projects so as to get themselves elected or 
for fulfilling their election promises in locations where there is no need. Therefore, 
while the CBRDP required that the projects be implemented in Area Councils having 
functioning offices, the researcher found that some had no offices, although they had 
been given projects. Many sources reported that, whereas the projects were supposed to 
be managed by the Area Councils under the facilitation of professionals at the 
respective Municipal/District Assemblies’ engineers, planning officers and accountants, 
DCEs who were aspiring to be elected as parliamentarians, aberrantly became the 
managers of the projects as a ploy to win political favour from the electorates. An 
Assembly Member whose locality benefitted from the project observed:  
Although I was the Presiding Member and was supposed to be in charge of the 
project, the DCE sidelined me and took charge, working with his party cronies. 
He did this because he labelled me as a member of the opposition party and was 
also contesting one of the parliamentary seats in the district … I’m happy he 
lost. 
 
 
 
                                                
132 This consists of Assembly Members, Unit Committee Member and Government Appointees. 
133 The CBRDP secretariat relied on the DAs to choose deserving Area Councils to pilot the projects. 
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An Area Council Chairman from the Eastern Region also related: 
 
The only project our Area Council got under my chairmanship was the public 
toilet facility the CBRDP brought. But the DCE had a political agenda … but I 
was powerless and could not challenge him. According to the CBRDP officials, 
we were supposed to build a sixteen–seater toilet facility, but the DCE divided 
the project sum of GHC15, 000 and took part to another locality without 
consulting us.  
 
Because DCEs wield so much power in determining which locality does or does not get 
projects, Assembly Members are forced to be obsequious at all cost, including lobbying 
them. According to the Collins Concise Dictionary (2001), lobbying is defined as “an 
attempt to influence [mainly politicians] on behalf of a particular interest”. Therefore 
lobbying involves putting forward arguments in support of a notion; however, 
‘lobbying’ DCEs as used by Assembly Members presents interesting points for 
discussion. While each Assembly Member admitted that lobbying was a necessary skill 
required for success, they all had different ways of getting into the hearts of their 
respective DCEs or other influential officials at the DAs. This ranged from using gifts 
to providing party political contacts. In a discussion with the researcher, an Assembly 
Member revealed his manner of lobbying: 
Assembly Member: Lobbying depends on so many factors. For example if I 
need something like a local school … I will contact the one in–charge of 
education at the District Assembly. Sometimes, I will bring them here to see 
things for themselves … But you don’t bring down ‘big men’ just like that. You 
need to give them something or foodstuff … so that s/he can push your agenda. 
Researcher: Why do you have to do this? The person is doing his job. Is this not 
bribery? 
Assembly Member: My brother, this is Ghana…wheels must always be put 
under files so they move faster. 
 
An Assembly Member from the Eastern Region presented another angle to the lobbying 
discourse. He pontificated: 
Assembly Member: When I was at … Electoral Area I was able to lobby for the 
District Assembly to build a public toilet at the Zongo community. Also the road 
between … was a big problem for the people so I was able to lobby to get the 
road constructed before my term of office ended. Through my lobbying abilities, 
I was able to provide streetlight for the people of ... and also extend electricity 
to…  
 
After commending him for his achievements, the researcher enquired of his lobbying 
skills that enabled him to attain all these projects for his Electoral Area. He said: 
As an Assembly Member you need to play your cards well to win projects to 
meet the needs of your community. Although the [District] Assemblies are 
supposed to be non–partisan, they are in disguise…. In the last eight years my 
government has been in office and that has helped me because the DCE knows 
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that we belong to ‘one family’ [political party]. Because the DCE is my man he 
helps me to win projects for my communities as I have listed. Although some 
Assembly Members would claim that they do not belong to any political party, 
we know each other’s political leanings. Political climates change so I try to 
convince the DCE to help some of my opposition Assembly Members friends 
with projects also so that when their government comes into office they can also 
help me if I’m still in office. 
 
The researcher asked him how he manages to convince the DCE, as there are obviously 
other Assembly Members who may belong to the same political party. He answered 
with an Akan proverb interpreted as: “if you don’t help others to achieve their dreams 
you cannot see your dream come true”. The DCE in question was in a contest to be a 
parliamentarian in a constituency that included the Electoral Area of the Assembly 
Member. Thus there was a certain understanding of reciprocity between the two men. 
This implied that the DCE sent projects (including the CBRDP) to that Electoral Area 
so that the Assembly Member could cite them as evidence of the DCEs generosity and 
therefore competence as a prospective parliamentarian.  
 
However, not all Assembly Members had good relations with the DCEs. This meant 
such Assembly Members were denied such development projects as CBRDP. The 
causes of the strained relations ranged from political rivalry to personality clashes. The 
situation could be so bad that DCEs curse Assembly Members, evidenced in the 
November 13, 2011 headline of the Ghanaian Chronicle newspaper: “Antoa Nyamaa’134 
Will Kill You … District Chief Executive Invokes Local Deity on Assembly 
Members”. The researcher also encountered some Assembly Members whose perceived 
affinity with the opposition party meant that their Electoral Areas received no projects 
during the eight years rule of the opposition New Patriotic Party. One of them shared 
his experiences in the Volta Region:  
I have really suffered under the New Patriotic Party. The DCE perceived me to 
be a member of the opposition [National Democratic Congress]. For eight years 
I only had one project for my Electoral Area. We got that project because it was 
so crucial that he could not overlook it. During the implementation of the project 
he relied on his party faithful and neglected me. Because of this hurdle I have 
lost favour with my electorate and doubt if they would vote for me again if I 
contested. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
134 A dreaded local deity 
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5.4.3 Working with weak Unit Committees 
Unit Committees form the base of Ghana’s local government structure. A Unit consists 
of settlements with a population of between five hundred and one thousand of ten 
elected persons in the Unit and not more than five other persons resident in the Unit to 
be nominated by the District Chief Executive. Following criticisms of there being too 
many Unit Committees in the country135, the membership of fifteen (15) considered too 
large, and the general disinterest in them, the membership has been reduced to five (5) 
elected persons who hold office for four years (L.I. 1967, section 24(1) 2010; Ahwoi, 
2010).  
 
Unit Committees represent their respective Electoral Areas in the Town/Area Council 
(see Figure 1). They are also expected to work closely with the Assembly Members so 
as to be in touch with the people; play important roles in public education; organising 
communal labour; raising revenue; ensuring environmental cleanliness; registering 
births and deaths; enforcing settlement planning; laying out and supervising District 
Assembly bye–laws; implementing taxation; and monitoring of self–help or 
community–based projects (Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462, Section 24 (1). 
Consequently, if the Unit Committee of an Electoral Area is weak, the work of the 
respective Assembly Member would be very daunting.  
 
Nationally, there seems to be a strong case in favour of the abolition of Unit 
Committees, as they appear to be dysfunctional, in spite of their election processes 
being expensive (Ahwoi 2010). In all nine localities researched, almost 85% of 
respondents to the questionnaires indicated they did not know who their Unit 
Committee Members were and their functions. Explaining why the Unit Committees are 
weak, Ahwoi (2010) argues there being a perception among Ghanaians that, considering 
the numbers involved, the cost of Unit Committee elections are not worth the doubtful 
benefits derived from them. He argues further in favour of the suggestion that the 
country should save on costs by revisiting the original plan of holding Unit Committee 
elections by show of hands, as established under the Electoral Commission’s Public 
Elections Regulations, 1995 Constitutional Instrument 10, paragraph 6 (1)136. Another 
explanation for their ineffectiveness is that Unit Committees are not allowed to perform 
their decentralised functions. For instance, while there have been five Unit Committee 
                                                
135 16,000 
136 Ahwoi (2010) explains that because the Constitutional Instrument 10 contradicted Article 49 (1) of the 
1992 Constitution, which requires all public elections to be by secret ballot, it was never implemented. 
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elections have been conducted so far during the era of the Fourth Republic (1992, 1996, 
2000, 2004 and 2008). Kyei–Baffour (2009) and Ahwoi (2010) argue these Committees 
have never performed any visible functions. While legitimate, the weaknesses of the 
Unit Committees go beyond the explanations already given. As the data below will 
show, they are weak because: 1) Partisan politics interfere with their roles; 2) Their 
members are not paid a salary; and 3) Some members do not understand their role. 
 
Ten Unit Committee Members were interviewed, consisting of seven males and three 
females. Interestingly, nine of them expressed frustration about the interference of party 
politics in their work. Unit Committees, form an integral part of Area Councils, which 
also consists of Assembly Members, ordinary residents appointed by the District 
Assemblies and the Government Appointees. Interestingly, in some of the CBRDP 
beneficiary localities researched, Government Appointees were found to be either 
constituency members or local executives of the then ruling political party, the New 
Political Party (NPP). Referred to as ‘foot–soldiers’137 in the media, the Government 
Appointees and other political party faithful tended to hijack the CBRDP: literally 
demanding the sole right to supply project materials, thus compromising the tendering 
process and in some cases inflating the prices of the project materials. As one Unit 
Committee Member from the Eastern Region put it: 
We were elected for nothing. Government Appointees, many of who are staunch 
members of the NPP government, control virtually everything in the Area 
Council. It looks like we are only ceremonial officials. It is very frustrating 
when the Constitution, which spells out our roles, is set aside for partisan 
politics machinations. 
 
Additionally, the analysis indicated that the frustrated Unit Committee Members 
seemed disappointed with the fact that they received no salary, although the role was 
very demanding. The general mood of these Unit Committee Members was that because 
they were in public life, people perceived making a lot of money from implementing 
projects. This perception, they contended, brought pressure on them as people flooded 
them with requests for financial assistance. These requests were complicated by the 
condition that if they did not meet these needs they would not receive constituents’ 
votes at the next elections. These Unit Committee Members, who were either petty 
                                                
137All political parties in Ghana have ‘foot soldiers’. ‘Foot–soldiers’ supposedly are the men and women 
who work hard for their political party at the grassroots level to win elections. There are always stories in 
the local media on the threats disgruntled ‘foot–soldiers’ issue to their National Party Executive if their 
demands are met. They are able to seize government properties or even demand the dismissal of Ministers 
of State and Members of Parliament (see http://elections.peacefmonline.com/politics; 
http://www.modernghana.com/news retrieved November 25, 2011.   
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traders or unemployed, had hoped that the role would come with respect and some 
financial benefits. When they realised that the role did not meet their expectations and 
would even be a drain their limited resources, they became disillusioned and retreated 
from the position.  
 
The data revealed that the frustrated Unit Committee Members did not know what the 
role entailed, although they had received the constituents’ votes. They had contested the 
position because their friends and families had asked them to do so or that there was not 
much competition. When asked what their roles entailed, some of these Unit Committee 
Members managed to state that their essential responsibility was to assist the Assembly 
Member. Apparently, ignorant of their roles when elected, and realising how demanding 
were the tasks, many would not resign, but give excuses for non-performance. Almost 
90% of Assembly Members interviewed explained that their Unit Committee Members 
were inactive, thus giving no support in organising local initiatives. Interestingly, 
because Local Government Act 462 does not bind Unit Committee Members with any 
oath to remain active, it is easy for them to relinquish their roles without fear of any 
consequence. 
 
The only Unit Committee Members who appeared to be enjoying the role was a 40-year 
old lady from the Volta Region. “Action Woman”, as popular called in the locality, the 
lady considered herself as the future Assembly Member of her Electoral Area. Thus, 
while supporting her Assembly Member who did not reside in the locality, the lady 
regarded the role as a marketing strategy for her political ambition. Asked if she was not 
bothered about the sacrificial nature of the job, “Action Woman” remarked that “no 
sweat no gain…those who take up this role must be aware of the consequences.”  
 
During the fieldwork, I observed that because “Action Woman” and her colleague Unit 
Committees Members were comparatively active, efforts were being made to maintain 
the Community–Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP); however, not without 
challenges. The Assembly Member of the Electoral Area remarked: “Because I’m do 
not reside here … most of the time my Unit Committee Members do the job in my 
absence and send me verbal reports and feedback.” Apart from this Assembly Member, 
the others described their Unit Committees Members variously being as being ‘dormant, 
useless, lazy, unhelpful and betrayers’.  
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 5.4.4 Relating to Traditional Chiefs 
Ghana’s local government system is such that Assembly Members would not succeed if 
they are not in league with the Traditional Chiefs of the Electoral Areas they serve. The 
influence of Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs and how it impacted on the outcomes of the 
CBRDP are extensively discussed in Chapter Seven. Analysis of the two case studies 
presented in the chapter shows that, because Ghanaian Traditional Chiefs are 
constitutionally recognised as the custodians of all lands in the country, they tend to 
demand right of control over development projects that fall within their traditional 
areas. Many of the Traditional Chiefs interviewed asserted, “The Assembly Member 
does not own the gong–gong of this village … I do!” This meant that so long as the 
Assembly Member did not submit to the Chiefs’ whims, they could not organise 
anything successfully in the locality. 
 
Relative to the CBRDP, some Traditional Chiefs in the localities researched felt 
sidelined and clashed with Assembly Members, resulting in protracted legal battles and 
abandonment of the projects. This happened because those who designed the CBRDP 
failed to inform the chiefs clearly about the project’s intention to strengthen the local 
government structures - Assembly Members and Area Councils. Frustrated by having to 
act in accordance with the bidding of Traditional Chiefs, some Assembly Members 
indicated that they were voluntarily stepping down and would not encourage others to 
take challenge for the position.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to refute the World Bank’s classification of Ghana’s local 
government system as being highly functional. Ghana’s local government system was 
examined within the framework of the World Bank’s four indicators of a high–
functioning decentralised system. Based on the evidence provided it appears that 
Ghana’s inter–governmental system does not seem to qualify for the ‘highly functional’ 
label. Although the Constitution and other local government statues provide for a 
decentralised system, the principle of subsidiarity appears to be compromised by the 
existence of centralising tendencies in the same statutes. These constitutional 
contradictions weaken the autonomy of local authorities, while posing challenges to the 
realisation of true fiscal and administrative decentralisation in the country. The chapter 
also criticised some of the World Bank’s indicators for measuring the inter-government 
systems of developing countries as being imprecise and lacking robustness. It emerged 
that the indicators appear to focus on mere existence of the benchmarks and not the 
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ground realities of the respective countries. In the case of Ghana, as the last section of 
the chapter showed, such ground realities would, for example, relate to issues that are 
impacting on the functions of Assembly Members: the non-payment of salaries, the 
politicisation of the system, conflicts with Traditional Chiefs and dysfunctional Unit 
Committees.  
 
Because the World Bank considered Ghana’s local government system as being high–
functioning, during the implementation of the CBRDP, the Matching Strategy seem to 
have been applied, meaning that no adjustment was necessary to the country’s 
established decentralisation setup. However, as the above discussions have shown, the 
country’s local government system does not reflect the ‘high-functioning’ label and 
should have been modified to accommodate the CBRDP. This seemed to have been 
ignored, leading to the implementation of a ‘community-driven’ program in localities 
where ‘communities’ technically did not exist, a finding the next chapter discusses. This 
chapter has shown that while Ghana may be benefitting from massive aid money due to 
its ‘misrepresentation’ as a ‘development celebrity’ and having a highly functional 
decentralisation system, the long-term sustainability of development programs are at 
risk of failing, as the country’s grounded realities do not always reflect the ‘experts’’ 
views.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
COMMUNITY: CONTESTED CONCEPTS AND 
MISINTERPRETATIONS 
Community is more than simply a group established for administrative 
convenience (for example an electorate, a school class or a work place group), 
but [an entity] to which people belong as members and where this sense of 
belonging is significant and positively regarded.  
Tesoriero (2010, p. 96)  
 
 
The preceding chapter challenged a view held by the World Bank that Community–
Driven Development programs have a greater chance of succeeding if the implementing 
country’s inter–governmental (or decentralisation) system is ‘highly functional’. 
Despite the stagnated picture painted of Ghana’s decentralisation system in the last 
chapter, because the World Bank classified it as ‘high–functioning’, the designers of the 
Community–Based Rural Development (CBRDP) fashioned and implemented the 
projects on the country’s local government structures. Thus, although labelled 
‘community–based’, the implementers did not build or consider the ‘communities’ 
within which to base the projects, expecting these projects to be endorsed, implemented 
and maintained by the said ‘communities’. The poor state of most of the projects 
studied (see Chapter One) and as argued below, suggests that ‘communities’ barely 
existed in many of the CBRDP beneficiary localities.  
 
‘Community’ is a contested concept and often misused; this chapter portrays what 
becomes of programs that apply it inappropriately. The first part of the chapter will 
briefly explore the literature to show the conceptual controversies around the term. An 
analytical framework for examining what ‘community’ is and what it is not will be 
established in the second part of the chapter. The last section of the chapter discusses 
three empirical case studies from the CBRDP beneficiary localities. An analysis of the 
dynamics of each of the localities in relation to the CBRDP will indicate that 
‘community’ is such a complex term requiring all its key features to be fully operational 
(see Table 6.1). The case studies also show that ‘community’ must be contextually 
conceptualised as its inappropriate application can lead to dire project outcomes.  
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6.1 Community: Conceptual Controversies 
 
Community tends to generate a great deal of discussion and debate. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, some scholars argue that it is a political term, and that its recent 
romanticisation is a return to ‘local organising’ after it was jettisoned for Neoliberalism 
in the 1980s. In the wake of the obvious failures of the neoliberal market economy to 
deliver what it promised (trickle down growth), community organising 
(‘Communitisation’), they argue further, has been revived and repackaged as the ‘Third 
Way’ to reduce public spending by complementing government efforts in meeting 
citizens’ needs (Amin 2005; Marion 2007; Defillippis & Saegert 2008; Defillippis et al. 
2010; Pandey 2010). The other issue that makes community a complex term relates to 
its definition (what it is and what it is not).  
 
Etymologically, ‘community’ comes from the Latin ‘cum’, which means ‘together or 
among each other’ and ‘munus’, which means ‘the gift’138. From its roots therefore, the 
term connotes the sharing of ‘something’ usually among small [human] groups, what 
Ferdinand Tönnies referred to as ‘gemeinschaft’ (Tesoriero 2010).  Even so, the 
Internet, new technologies and urbanisation have given the term a ‘new seductive 
appeal’ (Delanty 2003, p. 2) by stretching its connotation beyond group sizes, 
territoriality and even as a form of manageable human organisation. Consequently, 
many people now live in small localities they do not consider as their ‘community’, but 
claim ‘communitiship’ with such larger entities encompassed as a university or country 
or their workplace, some of which have no geographical boundaries. It is also not 
uncommon to read about a ‘community’ of animals or even plant species (Hall & 
Cooper 1970; Gotelli 1996). Thus, the concerns of scholars such as Marx, Weber, 
Spencer and Compte that modernity has eroded the importance of ‘community’ (Piot 
1999) must be seen in the spatial sense, as new forms of ‘communities’ have emerged 
recently, many of which transcend space, time and geography (Appadurai 1995; Bartle 
2007; Tesoriero 2010, Kenny 2010). 
 
Owing to the complexity of the concept of ‘community’, some scholars argue that the 
term can be inappropriately applied, giving rise to three situations (see Appadurai 1995; 
Guilt & Shah 1998; Botchway 2001; Cleaver 2001; Moncrieff & Eyben 2007; Tesoriero 
2010). The first is the labelling of localities and groups as ‘communities’, where in 
reality ‘community’ does not exist, or exists but not in the traditional and romantic 
                                                
138 See http://www.seek2know.net/word.html, retrieved 23 March, 2012. 
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sense. In most cases, the ground settlement and mobility patterns of people in localities 
labelled as ‘communities’ may not support interaction to the levels required for a 
coherent ‘community’ to exist. Because interaction and membership is a choice, 
‘community’ cannot be forced on people, even if they share spaces or interests (Khwaja 
2001; Platteau 2004; Alesina & Ferrara 2005; Cornish 2006). Tellingly, some scholars 
have observed that the labelling of ‘community’ is sometimes a deliberate policy action 
to direct attention away from the internal politics and from questions of the nature of 
actual social relations in a locality (Fergusson 1995; Scrimgeour 1997; Botchway 2001; 
Cleaver 2001; Moncrieff & Eyben 2007; Tesoriero 2010). 
 
Second, there is also the tendency, as Mansuri and Rao (2004, p. 11) observed, to 
conceptualise the term to denote “a culturally and politically homogeneous social 
system, or one which is, at least implicitly, an internally cohesive and more or less 
harmonious entity”. Referred to as ‘spatialisation’ by Amin (2005), the homogenisation 
inclination presents two challenges. On the one hand, it assumes that everyone within a 
geographic entity (village, town) shares similar values and interests with those therein, 
thereby burying internal differences (Scrimgeour 1997; Shah 1998; Botchway 2001; 
Platteau 2004). On the other, it fails to acknowledge the reality that ‘communities’ can 
and do exist within a ‘community’ (Etzioni 1996; Bartle 2007; Minar & Greer 2007). 
Thus, Mosimane & Aribeb (2005) caution community ideologues and practitioners to 
be aware of the difference between community of ‘place’, which denotes people living 
together in a spatially bounded locality; and community of ‘use’, which refers to a 
scenario where people share a certain resource or identity. As this chapter argues, the 
‘technocrats’ who designed and implemented Ghana’s CBRDP tended to rely on the 
homogenisation and spatialisation of the localities in which they worked, failing to 
acknowledge their complexities (see Table 6.1). 
 
Third, it is possible for identifiable groups or ‘communities’ to be misrepresented on 
matters that may concern them. The literature enumerates a number of instances where 
a few influential people, due to their wealth, political contacts or educational 
backgrounds [termed the elite], have dominated and ‘forcefully’ represented the rest. 
The opposite is also possible, where the voice or representation of a minority group can 
be relegated (Mehmet 1978; Scrimgeour 1997; Zakus & Lysack 1998; Cleaver 2001; 
Cornish 2006; Labonne & Chase 2007; Platteau 2004; 2009).  
 
 132 
In lieu of the complexity of the term, some scholars concede that an attempt to 
universalise a particular definition of community is impossible. For example, Bell and 
Newby (1971) found ninety-eight different definitions that hardly shared any 
commonalities. Drawing on Plant’s (1974) ideas therefore, Tesoriero (2010) argues that 
community should not be considered a description of something that exists, as it is 
almost impossible arriving at one definition (see Table 6.1). This argument resonates 
with Bartle’s (2007139) assertion that community is a  
Sociological construct and model...we cannot see a whole community, we 
cannot touch it, and we cannot directly experience it. It is a set of interactions, 
human behaviours that have meaning and expectations between its members. 
Not just action, but actions based on shared expectations, values, beliefs and 
meanings between individuals...it may not even have physical location, but be 
demarcated by being a group of people with a common interest. 
 
Community is also regarded as both evaluative and normative. By evaluative, it is 
considered as value–driven and its meaning is contested and open to diverse meanings, 
depending on the ideological leanings of the person using it (Amin 2005; Defillippis et 
al. 2010; Tesoriero 2010). Normative community implies that there exist norms and 
rules, which could be developed and used positively to organise people to achieve a 
‘good cause’ or negatively to persecute and exclude ‘the outsider’ (Mosimane & Aribeb 
2005). This assertion is supported by Fisher and Shragge (2007, p. 193), who argues 
that “community has become the dominant form of resistance and social change ... 
around the world.”  
 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of defining what community is and what it is not, 
theoreticians seem to agree on three issues. First, that the term should be appreciated for 
its complexity and that it may be futile attempting to find a universal definition 
(Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010). As a result many scholars circumvent defining the 
concept by describing its core features instead. For example, as Table 6.1 shows below, 
Goode (1957) outlined eight characteristics; McMillan and Chavis (1986) also 
presented four elements; Bartle (2007) discusses four features; while Tesoriero (2010) 
outlines five. Second, that the meaning of ‘community’ should go beyond 
‘spatialisation’ to include ‘functionalisation’. Community as a function relates to people 
having a sense of belonging, solidarity and identity (McMillan & Chavis 1986; 
Appadurai 1995; Delanty 2003; Tesoriero 2010). It is also about common interest or 
understanding between people; a form of social organisation where members share 
                                                
139 Retrieved from http://cec.vcn.bc.ca/cmp/modules/com–wha.htm, March 26, 2012. 
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spaces, including the virtual, interactions and a resource (Puddiffot 1996; Mosimane & 
Aribeb 2005; Tesoriero 2010). Third, that whoever (scholars and policymakers) applies 
the term must clarify the meaning they ascribe to it (Botchway 2001; Bartle 2007; 
Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010). 
 
Table 6.1 Characteristics of a ‘Community’ 
Goode’s 8 characteristics of a community McMillan and Chavis’ 4 characteristics of a 
community  
A social organisation:   
 
1.Whose members are bound by a sense of 
identity 
2. Where few leave, so that it is a terminal or 
continuing status for the most part 
3. Whose members share values in common  
4.Whose role definitions vis–a–vis both 
members and non–members are agreed upon 
and are the same for all members 
5.Who have a common language, which is 
understood only partially by outsiders  
6.That has power over its members  
7.Whose limits are reasonably clear, though 
they are not physical and geo–graphical, but 
social 
8. Whose members encourage others to join 
them (social reproduction) for generational 
continuity.  	  
 
a. Membership (the feeling of belonging) 
b. Influence (a sense of mattering) 
c. Integration and fulfilment of needs members 
d. Shared emotional connections 
 
 Bartle’s 4 characteristics of a community 
i. Boundaries of communities are fuzzy 
ii. Communities can be within communities 
iii. Communities may move (not static) 
iv. Urban communities are special 
 
 Tesoriero’s 5 characteristics of a community 
 
I. Human Scale 
II. Identity and Belonging 
III. Obligation  
IV. Gemeinshaft 
V. Culture 
 
 
Sources: Goode (1957); McMillan & Chavis (1986); Bartle (2007); Tesoriero (2010). 
 
As community was a key component of Ghana’s CBRDP, many of the project’s 
documents were systematically reviewed to establish how the term was conceptualised. 
When no official definition was found, the researcher informally interviewed one of the 
Senior Managers for clarification as follows: 
Researcher: It’s been difficult to pin point how the project defines community. 
Could you please provide me with any relevant documentation that defines the 
concept as used in the project? 
Manager: CBRDP has no special definition for a community. Our use of the 
word ‘community’ agrees with any dictionary definitions. A working definition 
of a community could refer to a group of people living in the same vicinity and 
bound by same culture, beliefs and practices. You may adopt any of the known 
definitions as offered by dictionaries or development practitioners 
(Field notes 2011). 
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The fact that the CBRDP did not have a definition for community illustrates the 
disregard that some development pundits and technocrats tend to have for concepts and 
their contextual relevance in project designs (see also Chapter Seven, 7.2). While this 
tendency has been noted by many scholars as causing project failures, many 
development ‘experts’ appear not to be learning (Mehmet 1978; Botchway 2001; Mosse 
2005; Easterly 2007; Collier 2007; Riddell 2007; Mavrotas 2010; Hancock et al. 2011). 
As the Manager’s response did not provide meaningful clarification of the concept as 
used in the project, it is crucial to establish an analytical framework for what 
community is and what it is not. Meaningful clarification is necessary for the purposes 
of use in this thesis so as to capture, to a greater extent, the complexities of the localities 
researched and the relevant groups therein.  
 
6.2 Community Conceptualised 
A critical review of the characteristics of ‘community’ in Table 6.1 above reveals that 
while the concept is contextually variable, that is, every community is different, it 
seems to relate primarily to relationships (sharing, belonging, solidarity, and collective 
identities) which transcend territoriality, as conceptualised as follows. First, while it 
could be organised around spaces and territories, as used in the thesis, community is 
conceptualised mainly in functional terms. Thus, residents of a given locality are not 
regarded as a community for the mere reason that they share that space, considering that 
not all of them may identify with it. However, as Lavarack and Wallenstein argued 
(2001, p. 180), “heterogeneous groups and individual [who share a given space] can 
actually become a community … [if] programs reflect their shared interests and needs.” 
Consequently, members of a given locality may be referred to as a community if there is 
a function they are committed to or identify with. By implication, communities can be 
developed, if built around functions that relevant people are committed to either 
temporarily or permanently (Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010). 
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Figure 6.1 Conceptual Framework of a ‘Community’ 
 
Sources: Goode (1957); McMillan & Chavis (1986); Bartle (2007); Tesoriero (2010).  
 
 
 
Second, because ‘community’ as a function relates to an idea of belonging, solidarity, 
and shared identities (Appadurai 1995; Delanty 2003), membership is crucial. A 
community may require a leader(s) who perform the rites of initiation and define the 
roles of members and their ethical boundaries (Amin 2005; Bartle 2007; Tesoriero 
2010). While members could belong to other groups (Lavarack and Wallerstein 2001; 
Minar and Greer 2007), they are expected to be conscious of and have a sense of 
belonging to each of the communities they are a part of. Members are also expected to 
be loyal and committed to the community through their willing to contribute time, 
talents and abilities as well as material objects to maintaining the group (McMillan & 
Chavis 1986; Bartle 2007; Tesoriero 2010). 
 
Third, a community should offer members structures and avenues for interaction and 
contact, as a ‘people’ and where ‘non–members’ come in as visitors or invited guests. 
Whether formal or informal, the interaction may have to be small enough for most 
members to know each other, what Ferdinand Tonnies calls ‘gemeinshaft’, which is 
interaction in a small group, as opposed to ‘gessellschaft’, or relationship of mass 
society (Bartle 2007; Tesoriero 2010). Finally, a ‘community’ may have to produce a 
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culture, which differentiates it from others. The culture may be a language or a jargon; 
or the group’s philosophy and ideological leanings. In addition, it is expected that the 
culture is known, accepted, and practised by all members; non–members may have to 
identify it as a unique trait of the community (Tesoriero2010; Kenny 2010). As 
members of a family or a church identify with each other, so should members of a 
community be willing to claim, “This is my community”. 
 
6.3 Research Findings 
 
Thus far, an attempt has been made to conceptualise community as a functional entity, 
small enough for interaction, where members submit to the group’s tenets voluntarily 
and having a distinct culture, which is obvious to ‘outsiders’. Within this framework, 
this section of the thesis draws on the empirical data to examine the extent to which 
three CBRDP beneficiary towns, which shared overarching characteristics with the 
other localities140, qualified as communities.  
 
6.3.1 Case Study I: Tease, Kwawu North District 
Tease benefitted from a forty–shed market structure under the CBRDP, which was 
completed in 2009.  During the fieldwork, the market was not in use and traders were 
seen selling in the sun or under trees (see Photos 6.1 & 6.2 below). Due to the lack of 
maintenance, the aid–funded sheds were deteriorating. This shed had become a home 
for squatters who also used it as a toilet facility. While the failed state of the Tease 
project, in some respects, is attributable to partisan politics as discussed in the preceding 
chapter, it is also because many residents of the locality tended to treat it with ‘a sense 
of temporality’. This attitude, as the paragraphs below highlight, raises doubts about 
why a community–based project was implemented in Tease. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
140 In terms of ethnic heterogeneity, traditional governance et cetera.  
 
 137 
Figure 6.1 Eastern Region: Locating Afram Plains and Kwawu South 
 
Source: Kwawu North Medium Term Development Plan 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Afram Plains: Locating Tease Township 
 
Source: Kwawu North Medium Term Development Plan. Location of Tease by author. 
 
Tease  
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Located in the Kwawu North District of the Eastern Region, Tease is a part of a 5,040 
sq. km vast island, called the Afram Plains, one of the most remote, deprived and 
poverty–stricken parts of Ghana (Ghana Living Standards Survey 2008; Kwawu North 
MTDP 2010). According to the District’s Medium Term Development Plan, the 
population of Tease was estimated to be 4,865. Residents of Tease are predominantly 
farmers and petty traders. In terms of religion, Christians are in the majority, but some 
20% of the residents are Muslims (Kwawu North MTDP 2010). Although the ruling 
National Democratic Congress (NDC) occupies all two electoral constituency seats of 
the district, many Tease residents claimed that the New Patriotic Party, in whose term of 
office the project was implemented, have always won in their electorate.  
 
Three ethnic groups dominate Tease. The Kwawus traditionally own most of the Afram 
Plains. They are an Akan ethnic group from the Kwawu South District (see Figure 6.1). 
Many of them are traders and farmers, some of whom commute to and from Tease at 
least three times in a week, while others have settled, but still maintain ties with their 
extended families in Kwawu South, where they also invest most of their capital. 
Depending on the direction one uses, the distance between the Kwawu South towns and 
the Afram Plains is less than four hours, including the time spent on the ferry. Apart 
from the Kwawus, significant numbers of Ewes and ethnic groups from the northern 
part of Ghana have a presence in Tease and most parts of the Afram plains.141 The Ewes 
are largely from the Volta Region, and enter the Afram Plains through the eastern 
corridor by crossing the largest and longest river in the country, the Volta.  A sizable 
number of people from different ethnic groups in the northern parts of the country, 
many of who are Muslims also live in Tease. Like the Kwawu and the Ewe, most are 
petty traders and animal farmers.   
 
Because of its rural isolation, residents of Tease (and the Afram Plains) I interviewed, 
appeared not to associate with the locality as their hometown or a place worthy of any 
meaningful investments. Interestingly, such residents were either born or had lived there 
for over thirty years. The common maxim in the locality is that “Obiaa enfi Tease”, 
translated “no one hails from Tease”.  The Director of the oldest and most influential 
NGO in the District, the Afram Plains Development Organisation (APDO), explained 
that, “Afram Plains will never develop until the residents change their attitude towards 
                                                
141No statistical data exist on the ethnic distribution of Tease. 
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the place and treat it with some sense of permanence”. Because of this attitude of 
temporality, Anyidoho (forthcoming, pp.1 & 2) describes the Afram Plains as: 
A fascinating reference point for thinking about development in Ghana. They 
are a recurrent site of experimentation in development programming, and yet 
remain persistently ‘undeveloped’ by all accounts ... The paradox of the Afram 
Plains is that while the district, with its agricultural and marine potential, has 
been targeted for development by various governments, it has not met its own 
potential or the expectation of policymakers. The Afram Plains District has a 
dual identity: it attracts migrants from the north and south with its promise of 
abundant yield from land and sea, but it also has an unwelcoming reputation as a 
remote and inaccessible region. 
 
The perception of temporality is further corroborated by the fact that the Assembly 
Member of the town, at the time of implementing the project, is currently not serving in 
Tease. When asked why, he said, “Im not a native of Tease. Nkwatia is my traditional 
home and I would rather serve the people in that traditional area...” 
 
The Area Council Chairman at that time also alluded to that assertion when he said: 
My family lives in Accra and I work here. I visit them often. Afram Plains is 
more of a resettlement area, people move in and out. ... It is therefore difficult to 
build a school [for a locality] as it can be a white elephant in the future. I can 
even cite three places where schools were built: Eduanum, Asikam and Nkubeta, 
but are now of no use”. 
 
The seeming disassociation with the town tends to impact negatively on local 
organising initiatives. While the size of Tease is small enough to allow for face–to–face 
interaction on local development issues, the residents tend to place more emphasis on 
religious and political meetings. When asked by questionnaire if they attended local 
meetings, over 85% answered, “No!” Three reasons emerged. The first related to the 
usual ‘no one hails from Tease’ mantra, while the second was associated with a concern 
that if people expressed dissent with local leaders at meetings, they were persecuted 
afterwards. In a mixed–gender focus group discussion with some Tease traders, many of 
whom were disappointed with the state of the market project, a youngman explained 
that:  
The chief and his elders chair the meetings so you must be careful the way you 
talk ... during meetings you might offend someone and this would bring 
problems. I would rather stay at home and work instead of going for meetings. 
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Photo 6.1: The deteriorating Tease CBRDP Market 
 
 
 
 
Photo 6.2: Tease traders selling the wares in the sun, while the Market Project is empty. 
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A 53–year–old woman also remarked,  
The town is small ... so we are careful of what to say ... if not you are targeted ... 
I remember sometime ago, a senior medical doctor held a meeting with us and 
asked us to tell him about the problems we face at the clinic; one man told him 
that the medical staff did not respect the sick people ... because they always 
shouted on them. One evening this man fell sick and went to the clinic but he 
was sacked because of the point he raised during the meeting. He is now on 
pension and has left Tease for his hometown. 
 
The lack of interest in local meetings also stemmed from failure of previous projects 
that involved the collection of residents’ monies. Residents I interviewed made 
references to a failed water project in 2002. One of the Members of Parliament of the 
area initiated a local self–help project to raise money to construct a borehole for the 
town. It was alleged that the Member of Parliament provided the seed money and the 
local leaders also levied residents to raise the remaining sum. While most residents I 
interacted with claimed to have paid, the project did not eventuate; the residents’ 
monies were also not refunded. A male farmer who had lived in Tease for ten years 
remarked: 
When you ask question about the water project in meetings ... you will see that 
the faces of the leaders have changed ... why worry about projects again? I’m a 
native of Tease? 
 
A female trader confirmed that: 
We paid the money because we wanted access to good drinking water. They 
made it serious to the extent that you would be arrested if you did not pay. Some 
people were arrested for refusing to pay. Most of us paid, but we have not seen 
any good use of the money ... Since then, I decided not to go for local meetings 
any more.  
 
These precedents, many of which tended to be allegations, did impact significantly on 
the implementation and the maintenance of the Tease CBRDP. While the local CBRDP 
officials claimed that they met and discussed the project with the local people, the 
residents maintained they were not consulted about it; all they saw was that a market 
was being built. While the local people, particularly women, admitted taking part in the 
communal labour later on, because the chief called for it, the local officials explained 
that it was initially difficult because of mistrust, the fact that many people tend not 
regard Tease as their hometown, and a mentality of the people that government should 
solve all local problems. Consequently, although the market project was meant for the 
entire community, they had to raise the project’s additional money from among the 
traders who, against the policy of the CBRDP, were each promised a space. 
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Incidentally, while this promise led to the eventual completion of the project, the same 
appears to have bedevilled it.   
 
Before Tease received the market sheds, traders sold their wares or produce under trees 
or straw structures. These trees and structures were broken down to make way for the 
CBRDP market sheds project. The officials assured the traders of spaces in the new 
sheds only if they contributed monies, which the latter did. However, the officials 
realised that they could not allocate the shed as promised because the forty sheds were 
not enough to accommodate the almost two hundred traders who had paid money in 
advance. The situation was further complicated by a directive from the Zone IV 
CBRDP manager who stated that the sheds belonged to the entire Area Council, made 
up of twenty localities, and that they could not be allocated to only the Tease traders 
who had contributed labour and money142. One aggrieved trader said:  
Before they started the project, we were asked to pay some money if you wanted 
a space in the new market. We paid but when the market was completed and we 
asked for our space, they told us to wait ... we have been waiting for three years 
... so we sell outside the market in the sun, while the sheds are empty. 
 
During fieldwork, the project’s officials were embarrassed by the situation and admitted 
that they had made a mistake by over collecting the monies. Even so, they argued that 
because of the attitudes of most of the residents towards the locality, and the mistrust 
that the failed water project had generated in the local leaders, there was no other way 
they could have raised the project’s additional monies. The local officials blamed the 
state of the market on the CBRDP manager’s insistence that the sheds could not be 
allocated to only the Tease traders. The puzzle now was who gets the shed and who gets 
the refund after their traditional structures has been broken down? As of March 2012, 
twelve months after the fieldwork, key informants in Tease confirmed that the market 
was still not being used and the monies of the traders had also not been refunded. 
 
The Tease CBRDP market may best be described as a white elephant. The problem was 
that, like many towns in the Afram Plains, residents of Tease do not associate with the 
town. Analysed within the framework of what is a ‘community’, Tease barely qualified 
as one, as its residents do not regard themselves as members of the town, so do not 
interact, have no obligation to it, or show any culture worthy of commonality. The sense 
of having temporary tendencies, coupled with mistrust of local leaders seemed to have 
made it difficult for the local project’s leaders to organise support for the project. In 
                                                
142 By implication the monetary contribution should have included all the twenty localities. 
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their bid to raise additional monies to complete the project, the local officials over-
collected monetary contributions from traders, who apparently outnumbered the sheds 
available. Tease’s example epitomises the nature of many aid–funded projects in 
developing countries where, in the words of Easterly (2002a), ‘a cartel of good 
intentions’ result in failures’. The Tashie locality of the Greater Accra Region is another 
case in point. 
 
6.3.2 Case Study II: Tashie, Tema Municipality143 
Tashie, a semi–urban locality in the Tema Municipality of the Greater Accra Region, 
benefitted from the CBRDP. Their project was the renovation of the Tashie Presby 
Basic School, whose roof was ripped off by a storm. According to the Head Teacher of 
the school, while the renovation was in the offing, it was not planned to happen under 
the CBRDP. However, the CBRDP coincided with the disaster, which disrupted their 
activities for several weeks and compelled the relocation to church buildings.  
Although important, the renovation of the school was not the topmost priority of the 
residents and the Area Council (Tashie Action Plan 2010). Many residents explained in 
interviews that their topmost priority was and still is a public toilet facility. Owing to 
the urgency of the school’s renovation however, the Municipal Assembly impressed 
upon the Area Council to use the CBRDP funds to renovate the school. As explained 
below, while the project solved a major problem, the residents did not support it during 
and after the renovation.  As of June 2012, fifteen months after the fieldwork, the school 
was still in crises, which in principle, the CBRDP intended that an entity called 
‘community’ would maintain. 
 
Before examining the reasons for the residents’ neglect of the school, the circumstances 
leading to the renovation of the school require more explanation. The Tashie Presby 
Basic School, the only school in the town, houses the Pre–primary, Primary and Junior 
High Schools (JHS) pupils. The school children were largely from the surrounding 
villages. The introduction of the government School Feeding Program in the school led 
to increased enrolments and exacerbated the already overcrowded classrooms (see 
Figure 6.4).  This was against the country’s Ministry of Education stipulation that each 
class should be not more than forty pupils (Ministry of Education 2008/2009). The 
Head Teacher recounted that his teachers were always stressed, as they could not keep 
up with the influx. Thus, after consulting with the Parents and Teachers’ Association of 
                                                
143 The names of the town and respondents have been deidentified. 
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the school, he decided to divide the Upper Primary (Classes Four, Five & Six) and JHS 
(One, Two & Three) to be run on a shift basis, 7:30–12:30 and 12:30–5:00pm 
respectively. The shift system, teachers explained, helped to some extent. Yet, because 
of the ever–growing population of Tashie, it did not solve the overcrowding problem 
and also exerted pressure on the limited resources of the school.  
 
 
Figure 6.3 Greater Accra Region: Locating Tema Municipal Assembly/Tashie 
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Greater_Accra_districts.png. Tashie location: by author 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 6.3: The renovated Tashie Presby School 
 
Tashie 
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Photo 6.4: The deteriorating state of the Tashie Presby School. 
 
 
Importantly, the shift system resulted in the loss of two hours of the teaching contact 
time. Moreover, the integrity of the school’s examinations was also compromised as 
pupils sat close to each other. This was the state of the school until the storm blew the 
school’s roof off. While the government has currently abolished the shift system in all 
schools in the country, the Tashie Presby Basic School still operates the scheme for 
their Upper Primary. Only the JHS has been moved to an uncomplicated structure, 
where pupils had to buy their own furniture. Asked why he continued to admit more 
pupils, the Head Teacher said:  
We cannot deny the kids their right to education. But we have had to repeat 
some of the class six pupils who were due to go to JHS one, not because they are 
not brilliant but because the numbers are just too much and there are not spaces 
for them. 
 
As of the fieldwork, none of the overcrowded classrooms had electricity or fans, and as 
there were not enough textbooks, three or four pupils in some classes shared one. 
Because of the high temperatures, many of the students used the textbooks to fan 
themselves, resulting in many tattered books (see Photos 6.5). There were also visible 
cracks on the floor and on some parts of the structure.  
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Figure 6.4 Tashie Presby Basic School Population by Class 2010 
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Photo 6.5: The state of textbooks at the Tashie Presby School. 
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The Area Council Chairman and the Assembly Member were concerned about the 
indifferent attitudes of the residents to the school and the general welfare of the locality. 
They expected the residents to rally behind the CBRDP and even initiate others to build 
more classrooms for the school.  However, as it turned out, the residents appeared not to 
care much about the school. The local leaders had hoped that the successful 
implementation and maintenance of the CBRDP would attract more community–based 
initiatives from the Municipal Assembly. Of great significance to this thesis was the fact 
that the residents who contributed neither labour nor monies greeted the project with 
apathy. Tellingly, some Tashie residents used the school’s toilet facility and/or 
defecated on the compound. The challenged state of the Tashie CBRDP was attributable 
to the fact that the dynamics of the town hardly qualified it as a ‘community’.  
 
The implementers of the Tashie CBRDP seemed to have underestimated the 
demographic complexities of the town. A community, as established above, goes 
beyond people sharing geographical spaces. With a population of almost 6,000, the 
Tashie Township is one of the fastest growing localities in the region because of its 
proximity to the nation’s capital, approximately twenty minute’s drive away. Thus 
while the GA, who are the traditional owners of the land, have some presence in the 
town, the majority of the residents are from other regions of the country, who either 
work in the capital or in local factories. Not only are many of these residents busy, they 
hardly have time for local meetings and activities. The Area Council Chairman 
explained the difficulty they had in organising the residents to provide labour during the 
implementation of the project. He said: 
Participation in the communal was very poor. So we had to use the project funds 
to hire masons and other building professionals to finish the work. The project 
was supposed to be for the ‘community’ but they did not come. People gave 
excuses that they were going to find work and money. 
 
Because the residents would not lend a hand to the project, the Head Teacher said: 
 
During the renovation, sometimes the pupils had to spend time of school time to 
fetch water for the project. Although the ‘community’ was supposed to 
contribute labour, they did not. Thus a large percentage of the project sum went 
into hiring labour. 
 
The Assembly Member condemned the apathetic attitude of the town residents when he 
said: “The disease in this town is that when you call for meeting they don’t come ... so I 
have formed an elders’ council who help me to plan for the community with.” 
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Asked why they do not participate in local development activities, the residents raised 
many issues, which may be classified into: 1) Perception of corruption of local leaders; 
2) Political factionalism; and 3) A concern that the project did not solve the major 
problem of the town, a public toilet facility.  
 
Many Tashie residents interviewed perceived the local leaders (Assembly and Area 
Council officials) as corrupt. Apart from alleging that the leaders had failed to render 
proper accounts for monies collected for previous projects, the residents tended to label 
them as agents of the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) government of the time. 
Relative to the CBRDP, the Head Teacher corroborated the perception of corruption 
when he explained that the local officials awarded the purchasing contracts of the 
project to ‘themselves’ and inflated the figures for some of the project materials. Thus, 
the project suffered not only from labour cost but also over invoicing. These perceptions 
seemed to have affected local collective tendencies, as they generated mistrust in the 
local leaders and broke down the town’s social capital, an important ingredient for 
community–based initiative (Woolcock 1998; Woolcock & Narayan 2000; Labonne 
&Chase 2008; Tesoriero 2010; Kenny 2010). 
 
There was strong sense of political factionalism in Tashie. The town seemed to have 
been divided along the lines of the two major political parties, the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The division was so intense that 
certain areas of the town were noted as the strongholds of both parties. As a result, the 
Assembly Member, who was perceived to belong to the NPP, did not control the entire 
town. While he denied affinity with the NPP, he confirmed the factionalism in the town 
and indicated how the situation was frustrating his ‘unpaid’ work (see Chapter Five, 
5.4.1). Speaking in the English language, he said:  
Those boys have threatened me several times … they are hooligans and are 
being incited by my political opponents. To counter their mischief, I also formed 
a youth group that I use to champion local developments and spread the good 
news about my achievements. 
 
Members of the ‘opposition youth group’ interviewed alleged that the Assembly 
Member was only in power to execute the agenda of the NPP, and not the interests of 
the local people. They added that he did not consult with anyone in the town except his 
youth group and some elderly people, whom they also tagged as members of the NPP. 
The ‘opposition youth’ vowed to unseat the Assembly in the 2010 local government 
elections. However, they did not succeed, as the Assembly Member retained his job. 
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Despite his victory, he will still be representing a politically factionalised town in the 
Municipal Assembly. Tashie’s factionalism is complicated by the fact that the town had 
no Traditional Chief who could have been a neutral force to organise the local people 
for development activities.  
 
Finally, there was a strong concern by Tashie residents that the CBRDP did not solve 
the topmost problem in the town, which is the lack of public toilet facilities. While 
contemporary houses in Tashie had toilet facilities, many of the old houses (which are 
in the majority) did not. Residents explained that although some old houses did have 
toilet facilities, because the house owners have many rigid rules regarding their use, 
they preferred paying to use the only and poorly maintained public toilet facility in the 
town. Tashie had only one public toilet facility, and apparently could not support the 
growing population. A new one was being built, but since the NDC government took 
over in 2009, the project has been stalled for almost two years. When asked in the 
questionnaire to state the needs of the locality, 80% of the respondents mentioned a 
public toilet facility as the topmost need followed by others needs such as poor drainage 
system and the lack of pipe–borne water. These needs were also captured in the Area 
Council’s list of social services needs in Tashie (Tashie Action Plan 2010). The 
respondents also indicated that a willingness to support wholly any project that would 
meet their needs.  
 
Owing to the absence of adequate public toilets facilities in Tashie, some residents used 
the Tashie Presby Basic School’s toilet facility. One of the teachers of the school 
complained that on most mornings when they reported to school, the students had to use 
some of the class hours to clean up the toilets. Frustrated by the incidents, the Head 
Teacher started locking the toilet after school and reopened it when reporting each 
morning. This did not help that much, as the perpetrators resorted to defecating on the 
school’s compound and under verandas. During the fieldwork the researcher sighted 
some of the toilet residues on the school’s compound. While many residents would not 
openly admit using the schools’ toilet, they were aware of it and condemned it. 
However, they gave responses alluding to the fact that the perpetrators had no 
alternative. Many of these residents explained that, while they did not disregard the 
importance of education, the project officials should have implemented what the 
residents wanted: a public toilet, if they wanted their full cooperation. 
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The Tashie CBRDP has shown the importance of tailoring community–based projects 
to meet the local people’s needs if their participation is to be guaranteed. Tashie lacked 
most of the characteristics of a community, although the local people shared the same 
space: 1) Tashie is a town and not a rural locality; 2) Most of its residents were busy 
city or local factory workers and hardly interacted on local development issues; 3) The 
existence of political factionalism in the town, complicated by the absence of a 
Traditional Chief, meant that organising would always be difficult; and 4) Because 
many of the local people wanted a public toilet facility, the renovation of Tashie Presby 
Basic School was not a ‘function’ strong enough to rally them. If the implementers of 
the project had studied Tashie’s demographics carefully, they might not have 
implemented it as a community–based initiative. While the renovation of the school was 
important, the discussions above have shown that the ‘community’, which was needed 
to maintain and improve the school, did not exist. Agbetor presents other fascinating 
insights into the concept of ‘community’. 
 
6.3.3 Case Study III: Agbetor, Ketu Northwest District, Volta Region144 
 
Agbetor is an old, but a small town in Volta Region of Ghana. Agbetor is inhabited by 
the Ewes ethnic group, many of whom are farmers, and a small herdsmen population, 
who hail from the northern parts of the country. Together, the population is almost one 
thousand.  As of the time of fieldwork, the inhabitants of Agbetor had neither a 
pharmaceutical shop nor a health facility. Until recently, the entire population relied on 
surface water and hand–dug wells for their water needs (Agbetor Area Council Action 
Plan 2006). 
 
Agbetor received a three–classroom school block under the CBRDP. Before this time, 
pupils in the town had to walk four kilometres to school at Gorbeh, which is about four 
kilometres away. Attempts had been made by the leaders of the town to establish a 
school in tents and under trees, but parents would usually avoid the school and still send 
their children to Gorbeh, as the local school lacked teachers and could not function 
anytime it rained. According to the Assembly Member of Agbetor, the fact that the 
children travelled long distances to school became a disincentive for school attendance. 
It was under these circumstances that the Traditional Chief of the town lobbied the 
District Assembly for a primary school. 
                                                
144 For ethical reasons the names of the town and the Traditional Chief have been deidentified with 
pseudonyms. 
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Figure 6.6 Ketu Northwest District Locating Agbetor 
 
 
Source: Ketu Northwest Medium Term Development Plan (2010).                            Agbetor 
 
 
 
 
Photo 6.6: The Agbetor CBRDP Three-Unit Classroom Block. 
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If there was anything special about Agbetor’s CBRDP, it was the role that their Chief, 
Nana Tagboto played in the entire project. While the efforts of Nana Tagboto were 
laudable, the researcher found that community-based projects are likely to have 
sustainability challenges, if Traditional Chiefs remain centre stage in the 
implementation process. Because of the influence they wield constitutionally and the 
fact that they oversee the finances of their respective traditional areas, culturally, it is 
the norm that they initiate and sometimes fund development projects. Having been a 
Chief for over fifteen years, Nana Tagboto typifies the influence of many contemporary 
educated Traditional Chiefs in Ghana145. Officials in the CBRDP National Headquarters 
office would often refer to him as one of the project’s success stories. For example, 
when Agbetor was selected as a beneficiary of the CBRDP, Nana Tagboto requested 
that the project be implemented under the Rapid Response Initiative146. The project’s 
seed money, which was expected in over three months, could only fund a three–
classroom block and one veranda.  Nana Tagboto single–handedly pre–financed the 
entire project and also offered to sponsor the construction of an additional veranda, 
which the school critically needed. 
 
When the project was completed, Nana Tagboto bought books, furniture and other 
educational materials for the school and paid the salaries of the teachers for over two 
years until the Ghana Education Service adopted the school. Moreover, because the 
three classrooms were limited, Nana Tagboto went ahead to construct two more 
pavilion structures to cater for the Upper Primary classes. When asked why he invested 
in the school so much, he would always say: “I believe in education”. The Assembly 
Member of the town confirmed the influence of the Nana Tagboto, when he admitted 
that: “I have not done much Agbetor because Nana Tagboto is influential and is able to 
lobby the powerful people in government to solve the problems in the locality.” 
 
Despite the influence of Nana Tagboto at the time of fieldwork, the school had many 
problems, which were beyond the resources of Nana Tagboto and pointed to the 
inadequacy of one influential person in the sustenance of a community–based project. A 
normal primary school structure in Ghana has ten classrooms147; however, the Agbetor 
School had only five classrooms: Three constructed under the CBRDP and the two 
                                                
145 Nana Tagboto initiated and facilitated the construction of public toilet facilities, pipe–borne water; and 
the presence electricity in Agbetor. 
146 This meant that the project was completed in less than hundred days before the seed money of 
GHC15, 000 would be disbursed. 
147 From Kindergarten to Primary Six 
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pavilion structures constructed under the auspices of Nana Tagboto. Under the 
circumstances, the teachers merged some of the classes as follows: 1) Kindergarten & 
KG One; 2) KG Two & Nursery; 3) Class One; 4) Classes Two & Three; and 5) Classes 
Four & Five. The situation meant that the pupils follow syllabi not appropriate to their 
levels of education. Additionally, the furniture available to the pupils was so limited 
that some of the pupils were literally sitting on the floor during class sessions. While 
Nana Tagboto was doing his best to get the school running, it lacked many crucial 
resources a mainstream school should have: textbooks, toys, writing materials and other 
educational aids. 
 
There seemed to be a sense of frustration among the teachers. Their concern was that 
the paucity of facilities was retarding the progress of the children. A female teacher 
said: 
The children in Primary Four should be writing their names by now, but they 
can’t. Even the Primary Five pupils have problems with reading and solving 
simple arithmetic problems ... it is so sad. The children come to school virtually 
empty–handed, without even a pencil. There have been instances that we have 
tried to help with our own monies, but we can’t do that always. I have only one 
textbook for the Classes Three and Four and had to photocopy the text for the 
entire class out of my own pocket. 
 
Another female teacher explained that: 
 
When I want to teach them about computers, I have to walk all the pupils to 
Nana Tagboto’s office because he is the only one who has the machine in this 
locality. It’s hard to explain to these children the difference between a computer 
mouse and the animal mouse. We lack so many basic learning materials. For 
instance, if I want to teach them about geography, I use an orange because we 
don’t have a globe. We love our jobs as teachers, but working in these 
conditions is too frustrating.   
 
Also, owing to the limited number of classrooms, pupils who completed Primary Five at 
Agbetor Primary School must still travel on foot to Gorbeh to continue their Primary 
Six and Junior High School (JHS) education respectively. Aside from the paucity of 
educational resources, the school had no urinal and toilet facilities. The teachers had the 
option of either using the public facility in the town, Nana Tabgoto’s house or the bush 
– to which most of the pupils resorted. The females found the situation very 
inconvenient. While the teachers commended Nana Tagboto for his efforts, they were 
not enough to sustain a community-based project.  
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The data pointed to a two–fold problem with the Agbetor CBRDP. First, the project 
appears to have been implemented around Nana Tagboto, instead of the entire 
residential population. As pointed out earlier, Agbetor seemed to have received the 
project because of the influence of Nana Tagboto. As a result, the CBRDP secretariat 
appears to have relied on the Chief during the implementation, rather than developing 
and working in collaboration with the Agbetor ‘community’. Because Traditional 
Chiefs are culturally expected to initiate and provide leadership for the maintenance of 
local development projects, Agbetor residents interviewed appeared not to care about 
the school’s welfare. Although, they indicated that they took part in the communal 
labour during the building of the school, they considered it as a normal routine in the 
locality and tended to regard Nana Tagboto as the one who has the responsibility of 
maintaining the school. Interestingly, the residents thought that the project was Nana 
Tabgoto’s own initiative, as they claimed that the CBRDP officials never came to the 
town to explain the process to them. Others claimed that Nana Tagboto was not 
categorical about the project being externally funded. 
 
As a result of the erroneous impression created of the project as being one of the ‘usual’ 
initiatives of Nana Tagboto, the residents saw nothing wrong with not contributing any 
money to buy books or educational materials for the school. The general impression 
gathered through the interviews and questionnaires was that Nana Tagboto kept all the 
funds of the town148, which they expected him to use to develop the school. While they 
would concede that it was the duty of the entire locality to seek welfare for the school, 
the residents’ perceived the maintenance of the school as the duty of the Chief. Thus, 
respondents argued that Nana Tagboto had no right to request funds from the residents 
to run the school. A woman, who had lived in the locality for over twenty years, 
remarked: “the school is for all of us. But as a traditional town, we also have proceeds 
from the sale of stool lands and the... stone quarry ... Nana Tagboto cannot levy anyone 
to pay anything towards the school”.  
 
Asked why the local people have left the entire school’s burden on him, Nana Tagboto 
said out of frustration:  
 [Some] of my people don’t have foresight nor appreciate the value of education
 …they feel it’s my responsibility to meet every need of the school. Although 
 I’m culturally expected to be responsible for the school, I cannot do it all alone.  
 
                                                
148 From the sale of traditional lands. 
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The default ‘elite capture’ scenario discussed above happened also because the local 
people were poor and therefore lacked the financial resources to support the project. 
Agbetor does not offer any jobs to its citizens. Many of them are not engaged in 
profitable economic activities, aside from subsistence farming. Thus, in reality, such 
residents appeared to lack the means to contribute any meaningful sums of money 
towards the project’s upkeep.  For example, 70% of the respondents of the 
questionnaires in Agbetor indicated having no jobs. Being poor, they relinquished the 
maintenance of the school on the shoulders of Nana Tagboto, although they claimed to 
be a part of the Agbetor ‘community’ and attended local meetings. This finding is 
consistent with Botchway’s (2001) observation during the implementation of a 
Canadian water project in the northern parts of Ghana, where the locality but lacked the 
resources to maintain it.  
 
The case study of Agbetor’s CBRDP and the role of Nana Tagboto have demonstrated 
what becomes of community-based projects that are driven by a Traditional Chief and 
not the larger community. Irrespective of the influence of a person or Traditional Chief, 
it is unsound to implement community-based projects around one person. Broader 
support from the beneficiary ‘community’ must be established, if development projects 
are to be sustainable. If this is ignored, ‘elite capture’ could happen by default, through 
cultural institutions.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter had one focus: were the so–called ‘communities’, which benefited from the 
CBRDP worthy of the label? In answering this question, a conceptual framework for 
‘community’, which drew on the works of several theoreticians, was outlined. The 
framework, which showed the complexity of community, established its key attributes 
and characteristics. These included the idea that: 1) Community is understood in the 
functional sense; 2) Community must have a membership which is conscious of and 
willing to contribute to it; 3) The group provides opportunity and structures for 
interaction; and 4) The group has a unique culture, which non-members can identify. 
Underlying these features was the notion that communities can be developed, if built 
around functions to which a group is committed. 
  
Drawing on the data from three localities, two conclusions emerged. The first was that 
‘communities’ appeared not to exist in the selected CBRDP beneficiary localities. 
Consequently, not only did the projects lack local support during their implementation, 
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but also that they have been left unmaintained. As argued, the residents of Tease tended 
not to associate with the town as ‘members’ and therefore had an attitude of 
‘temporarility’ towards the locality because of its remoteness. The data on Tashie 
showed that the residents were politically factionalised, apart from the common feeling 
that the CBRDP did not meet their most crucial need, a public toilet facility. Agbetor 
pointed to two basic issues that it is risky to build a community–based project around 
one influential Traditional Chief, and the economic conditions of beneficiary localities 
must be considered, and at best improved before the implementation of community–
based projects to forestall the possibility of an ‘elite capture’.  
 
The second conclusion drawn was that the CBRDP designers and implementers 
appeared not to have made any effort to build the ‘communities’ upon which to base the 
projects. While many functions around which the CBRDP could have been built 
abounded, they were ignored. Thus, the projects appeared to have been implemented in 
‘spaces’ rather than ‘communities’. As they turned out, because there were no 
‘communities’ to maintain the CBRDPs, they appeared to be in a state of complete 
disarray at the time of the fieldwork.  
 
This chapter has shown that it is not enough to base development projects on idealised, 
yet complex and contested terms such as community. As the conceptual framework 
indicated, community is a multi–faceted concept, and each of its features must be in 
place or developed before its benefits can be realised. However, the analysis of the 
empirical case studies showed that the four key attributes of the concept of community 
were lacking in the selected CBRDP beneficiary localities. The discussions so far have 
emphasised the importance of conceptualising key terms in development programs to 
serve as road maps during implementation; while at the same time investing in social 
research to understand local contexts before the designing projects meant to ‘improve’ 
the lives of people. The following chapter provides further insights into the reasons for 
such an exercise being crucial to CDD programs by examining another ubiquitous, yet 
complex and often misused term, ‘empowerment’.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
WHEN EMPOWERMENT DISEMPOWERS:  
THE CASE OF GHANAIAN TRADITIONAL CHIEFS AND  
LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
 
Of all the buzzwords that have entered the development lexicon in the past thirty years, 
‘empowerment’ is probably the most widely used and abused 
(Batliwala 2007)149 
 
The concept of ‘empowerment’ plays a pivotal role in Community–Driven 
Development (CDD). This stems from the supposition that CDD programs are able to 
transform community social capital through the ‘empowerment’ of groups traditionally 
disempowered or excluded from decision-making (Mansuri & Rao 2004). This chapter 
argues that, like ‘community’, the concept of ‘empowerment’, as applied in Ghana’s 
Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP), appears to have been 
conceptualised vaguely, overlooking the need to have considered the country’s 
Chieftaincy institution, while monitoring the project for unintended outcomes. As 
examined below, the CBRDP’s misguided application of the term ‘empowerment’ is 
partly attributable to romanticising of the term in the literature.  
 
Argued from the normative theoretical perspective  (Nozick 1974; Scheffler 1982; 
Dreier 1993) ‘empowerment’ seems to be ‘marketed’ as being inherently ‘good’ and a 
value that the powerless should pursue, or that they should be aided in their obvious 
quest to become empowered (World Bank 2000a; 2002; Binswanger et al. 2010; 
Anyidoho & Manuh 2010). However, this chapter sees the concept of ‘empowerment’ 
as problematic, providing theoretical and empirical arguments for the need to go beyond 
conceptualising the term normatively to appreciating its complexity and contextualised 
application. Three sections are presented to support this assertion.  
 
The first section briefly explores the concept of ‘empowerment’ to show its complexity. 
The theoretical section begins by defining the term and discussing its supposed 
advantages. A critical analysis of the term that follows depicts ‘empowerment’ as a term 
that is: 1) Gendered; 2) Not easily measurable; and 3) Predicated on the notion of 
‘power’. Drawing on the last point, the section argues that because ‘empowerment’ 
pivots on the notion of ‘power’, it is a value–laden term. In other words, because 
                                                
149 http://www.opendemocracy.net/article/putting_power_back_into_empowerment_0, retrieved July 20, 
2012. 
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‘power’ is non–neutral and has to be reclaimed from the ‘powerful’ and given to the 
‘less powerful’, ‘empowering’ one group actually ‘disempowers’ others; and that 
‘empowerment’ and related programs can potentially lead to conflicts. This is especially 
so in terms of this thesis as it found that if a program’s concepts, implementation and 
outcomes are not carefully monitored and managed with tact, problems ensue.  
 
The second section examines the CBRDP documents to unravel the seemingly vague 
conceptualisation of ‘empowerment’ in the project’s design and implementation. The 
final section, which consists predominantly of empirical data collected by the researcher 
during fieldwork in Ghana, discusses certain unintended outcomes of the CBRDP. It 
presents the cases of Aboloo (Greater Accra Region) and Ntoaso (Eastern Region) to 
demonstrate the incidence of power struggles and conflicts between Traditional Chiefs, 
who felt sidelined, and local government officials (Assembly Members and Unit 
Committee Members). The conflicts are related to the question of who manages the 
project. The analysis suggests that in their pursuit to strengthen Ghana’s 
decentralisation process through the CBRDP, the designers of the project150 appear to 
have focused only on the local government sub–structures, overlooking the country’s 
influential politico–cultural heritage. The oversight, which has led to intense feuds, also 
impacted negatively on the maintenance and outcomes of the CBRDP at the time of the 
fieldwork.  
 
7.1 Empowerment: Background and Conceptual Issues 
 
‘Empowerment’ discourse has its roots in Frierean philosophy (Cleaver 2001). The 
concept has, since 2000, become increasingly popular in development studies with a 
significant body of literature, typically divided into distinct schools of thought, 
discussing it in various ways (World Bank 2000a; 2002; Clifford 2001; Mosse 2001; 
Narayan 2002; Parpart 2002; Stern et al. 2005; Cornish 2006; Binswanger et al. 2010; 
Hancock et al. 2011; Maseno & Kilonzo 2011). The World Bank defines 
‘empowerment’ as, “the expansion of freedom of choice and action. It means increasing 
one’s authority and control over the resources and decisions that affect one’s life” 
(World Bank 2002, p. 11). The World Bank argues that there is no single model of 
‘empowerment’, and has put forward four elements which characterise the concept: 1) 
Access to information; 2) Inclusion and participation; 3) Accountability; and 4) Local 
organisational capacity. It argues further that regardless of the context within which it is 
                                                
150 Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and World Bank Advisors.  
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applied, ‘empowerment’ outcomes are determined by:  1) The nature of public action; 
2) Patterns of exclusion and conflict; 3) The extent of decentralisation; 4) The strength 
of local–level institutions and civil society; and 5) The extent of political freedom 
(World Bank 2002; Binswanger et al. 2010). 
 
In tandem with the World Bank’s definition and drawing on Gidden’s (1984) 
sociological theory of structure and agency, Apusigah (2004a), Binswanger et al. (2010) 
and Tesoriero (2010) are of the opinion that in order to empower the powerless, their 
‘assets’ must be developed, for assets determine a person or a group’s ability [agency] 
to deal with structure [institutions and systems]. The World Bank has since 2000 been 
arguing that attempts to empower the weak and poor should aim at promoting their right 
of inclusion and participation, and capacity to make choices, while demanding 
accountability from their leaders (World Bank 2000a; 2002; 2003b).  
 
When targeted populations are ‘empowered’, the proponents of the concept argue, 
powerless and vulnerable people may be able to participate in their ‘communities’, 
reduce their poverty levels, and have a sense of confidence and independence.  Central 
to their argument is the notion that the common elements underlying poverty is the 
exclusion, voicelessness and powerlessness of the poor; and that, faced with unequal 
power relations, the poor lack the influence to negotiate better terms for themselves. 
Thus, unequal power relations have to be addressed in order to expand the opportunities 
and choices of the poor (Botchway 2001; World Bank 2000a; 2002; 2003b; Mosse 
2001; Narayan 1995; 2002; Stern et al. 2005; Cornish 2006; Anyidoho & Manuh 2010; 
Binswanger et al. 2010).  
 
Consequently, ‘empowerment’ has become the objective of many development 
initiatives of the UNDP, the World Bank and most aid agencies. For example, UN 
MDG 3 aims to “promote gender equality and empower women” (Sachs 2005; MDG 
Report 2011). Currently, operating through its ‘Empowerment’ Team, the World Bank 
is one of the chief campaigners of the concept and employs it in a range of sectors, 
including the provision of basic services; improving local and national governance, pro–
poor market development; and the enhancement of access to justice and legal aid151. On 
the face of it, these arguments seem logical, and a solution simple. However, based on 
                                                
151 http://go.worldbank.org/EEU9PYCWU0; retrieved February 25, 2012. According to Alsop et al. 
(2006) in 2005, over 1,800 projects in the World Bank’s lending portfolio related to ‘empowerment’. 
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the data collected in this thesis, ‘empowerment’ is too complex a concept and should be 
employed with trepidation. 
 
The term ‘empowerment’ is criticised for various reasons. Three arguments are 
considered in turn. First, although the term is inherently generic, its contemporary use 
and application appears to have been made ‘gender–specific’ in many contexts. Since 
2001, there seems to have been a consistent effort by the World Bank to ‘engender 
empowerment’. A World Bank policy document, Engendering Development Through 
Gender Equality in Rights, Resources, and Voice (Word Bank 2001), provides insights 
into tools for integrating gender into development work. Furthermore, between 2006 
and 2010, more than $65 billion, representing 37% of all the World Bank’s lending and 
grants, were allocated to gender–informed operations.152The notion of engendering 
‘empowerment’ also seems to underlie MDG 3, the 2012 World Development Report 
and the ideals of organisations such as United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and 
the Empowerment of Women153.  
 
While ‘empowerment’ is applicable to either gender, due to gender inequality and the 
prevalence of patriarchy globally, a focus on women is justified and should continue 
until equality is achieved (Apusigah 2004a; 2004b; Anyidoho & Manuh 2010; Cornwall 
& Edwards 2010; Hancock et al. 2011). However, negative outcomes result when the 
term is used vaguely and is not theoretically explicit vis-a-vis gender specific outcomes, 
and ‘forced’ into or applied to romanticise development projects, as Ghana’s CBRDP 
seem to have done (see Section 7.2).  
 
Scholars also disagree on whether ‘empowerment’ refers to a process or an outcome or 
both. According to Mosedale (2003) ‘empowerment’ is an ongoing process rather than a 
product, and that there is no final goal. Put in absolute terms, Mosedale argues that one 
does not arrive at a stage of being empowered. Others argue that ‘empowerment’ is both 
a process and an outcome. As a process, it involves building the capacities, skills and 
competencies of either an individual or a group of people over a period of time, from a 
lower to a higher state of ‘empowerment’. As an outcome, ‘empowerment’ becomes an 
end in itself, where an individual or group enjoys a state of ‘empowerment’ (Arnstein 
                                                
152In 2011, nearly 50% of the World Bank’s lending related to gender issues. 
http://go.worldbank.org/YHU5EJL1I0, retrieved May 15, 2012.  
153 http://www.unwomen.org/ retrieved May 15, 2012. 
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1971; Lavarack & Wallenstein 2001; Cornish 2006; Binswanger et al. 2010; Tesoriero 
2010154).  
 
The lack of consensus on whether ‘empowerment’ is a process or an outcome or both 
has critical implications for its measurement. Measuring ‘empowerment’ according to 
Yaron (2008) is an important indicator of a country’s performance and opportunities 
available to an individual. At the country level, they argued that, ‘empowerment’ 
indicators contribute to the process of strengthening governance and reducing 
corruption. They further argue that empowerment aims at developing the capabilities of 
the individual not just as beneficiaries, but also as agents capable of effecting 
institutional change. What then are the indicators for measuring empowerment 
outcomes?  
 
Many independent scholars have suggested various indicators for measuring 
‘empowerment’. These include, but are not limited to Mosedale’s (2003) ‘constraints to 
action’, Alsop et al.’s (2006) ‘availability and use of choices’ and Yaron’s (2008) 
‘mixed method diagnostic tools’. As individuals and groups may seek different forms of 
‘empowerment’, the models above appear to be contextualised and cannot be 
generalised (Zimmermann 1995; Lavarack & Wallenstein 2001; Cornish 2006). The 
United Nations Gender Empowerment Measure, the Global Gender Inequality Index 
and Global Gender Gap Index155 have also been criticised as being irrelevant to many 
contexts (Beteta 2006; Klasen & Schelen 2007; Hancock et al. 2011). In lieu of the 
impossibility of measuring empowerment, Yaron (2008, p. 8) observed that:  
We cannot measure empowerment in a way that does justice to its inherent 
complexity and … satisfactorily ... What we can do, however, is to identify 
measurements that capture, albeit imperfectly, important dimensions of changes 
in power, and that can be complemented by more interpretive and explanatory 
forms of qualitative research. 
 
The last and the most critical theoretical problem with ‘empowerment’ relates to the 
concept on which it is pivoted, ‘power’ (Nelson & Wright 1995; Batliwala 2007).  A 
great deal of literature has tended to conceptualise ‘empowerment’ as a tool for 
correcting unequal power relations or a way of increasing the power of the 
disadvantaged (World Bank 2000a; Mosse 2001; Narayan 2002; Parpart 2002; Cornish 
2006; Tesoriero 2010). Reference to ‘unequal power’ assumes that someone is 
                                                
154 See also http://go.worldbank.org/V45HD4P100, retrieved February 26, 2012. 
155 These are three gendered indicators for measuring women’s empowerment (see UNDP 2007; World 
Economic Forum 2008; 2010). 
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disempowered or disadvantaged in relation to another (Mosse 2001; Mosedale 2003). 
While scholars generally agree that power is a complex and multi–layered concept, they 
disagree on its form, definition and dimensions.  
 
Attempts to define the concept of power since the late 1980s include the works of Clegg 
(1989), who categorises the different interactions of power relations; and Rowlands 
(1997), who examines the four main forms of power as: 1) Power over; 2) Power to; 3) 
Power with; and 4) Power from within. Others have also examined the concept of 
power, including Klasen and Miller (2002), who explored different aspects of political 
power; Csaszar’s (2004) conflictual or consensual approaches to power; and Vails’ 
discussion of ‘A Theory of Power’. Even so, Tesoriero’s (2010) discussion of power is 
more appropriate for the purpose of this chapter because of its currency, conciseness, 
and the fact that he draws on earlier theorists, such as Wright Mills, Robert Dahl, 
Talcott Parsons and Michel Foucault. 
 
According to Tesoriero (2010) the nature of power in modern societies is categorised 
into Pluralistic, Elite, Structural and Post–structural perspectives. The Pluralistic 
Perspective considers power as a type of game which the individuals and groups in a 
given locality or society play competitively. It glosses over the disadvantages an 
individual or group may have by virtue of their class, gender, race, ethnicity, age, 
disability, sexuality and geographical location, postulating that all people have equal 
opportunity to participate, as there is none all–powerful. To win or gain power, one 
must be equipped or empowered with the capacity or assertiveness to compete 
effectively, apart from understanding the rules of the game.  The Elitist Perspective 
Tesoriero argues, does not regard power as a game where all the players have equal 
opportunities to win. Rather, it views society as hierarchical with a certain few groups 
having more power than they should. Termed ‘elites’, they wield the influence to 
control key institutions and decide on issues that affect the majority. To gain power in 
an elitist domain, one has to become an elite.   
 
The Structural Perspective of power, Tesoriero (2010) argues, relates to structural or 
systemic inequality or even oppression as a form of power. By emphasising the 
importance of class, race and gender, structural power holders, mainly the elites, 
reinforce inequalities by putting barriers in place that will keep the disadvantaged 
perpetually disempowered. Finally, the Post–structural Perspective of power relates to 
the way language and discourse is used as mechanisms of control (Rabinow 1984). 
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Drawing on the works of Michel Foucault, Tesoriero argues that power is not just about 
action, as the earlier perspectives seem to portray; but rather other forms of power 
which may relate to the way certain discourses are used by the ‘powerful’ as the norm 
that should guide and shape communication, for example. 
 
The fact that ‘empowerment’ is predicated on power gives the term a competitive slant. 
According to Michel Foucault (1980; 1982) power is not neutral or a ‘zero sum’ 
concept and that it is required to overcome other forms of power, be they negative or 
positive (Csaszar 2004; Cornish 2006). In lieu of its competitive tendencies, it can be 
argued therefore that power cannot be ‘shared’ between the ‘powerful’ and the 
‘powerless’. By implication, ‘empowerment’ actually means disempowering the one 
wielding power. Depending on the context, ‘empowerment’ may dis–empower others 
by breaking cultural norms, practices and /or certain monopolies and exclusivities 
enjoyed by a few, usually the elite.   
 
Owing to the simultaneity of ‘empowerment’ and ‘disempowerment’, it is crucial 
development projects that seek to ‘empower’ people, facilitate, monitor outcomes, and 
have project staff made aware of the adverse impact of power rather than just using it 
normatively. Failure to address these concerns could lead to conflicts between those 
supposedly being ‘empowered’ and the ‘traditionally powerful’, and from whom 
‘power’ is being reclaimed. As the research findings show below however, although the 
‘concept of empowerment’ was central in the design and implementation of Ghana’s 
CBRDP, less attention appeared to have been paid to the complexity of the term as well 
as the monitoring and managing of unintended outcomes.  Owing to the conflicts that 
the notion of power tends to generate, the project could have been more effective if 
Traditional Chiefs were briefed to appreciate its theoretical intent as strengthening the 
country’s local government sub–structures, and not as a challenge to their authority (see 
section 7.3). 
 
7.2 The CBRDP and the Concept of Empowerment 
As described in Chapter One, Ghana’s CBRDP was designed to contribute to the overall 
‘empowerment’ of the rural population, while simultaneously strengthening the 
country’s decentralisation system. Despite being pivotal in the design and 
implementation of the CBRDP, the project’s application of ‘empowerment’ had four 
major flaws.  
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First, a review of most of the CBRDP documents revealed that ‘empowerment’ was not 
theoretically conceptualised, the researcher not being able to find a working definition 
of the term (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2005; CBRDP Annual Reports 2005–
2010; Zone IV Annual Reports 2005–2010). Consequently, the project’s managers and 
local government officials interviewed conceded that they did not receive any 
background briefing on the theoretical intricacies of the term. As the empirical data will 
show in the next section, local government officials seemed to understand 
‘empowerment’ more in terms of having an oversight responsibility to manage the 
project as well as rendering proper fiscal accounts to the CBRDP Headquarters in 
Accra, the nation’s capital.  
 
Second, the CBRDP officials on the ground targeted women and vulnerable groups, 
while the project sought to ‘empower’ the general rural population (CBRDP 
Implementation Manual 2006). During the interviews, most of the officials stated that 
they involved women in local meetings during the implementation of the project. For 
these officials, having women sit in meetings, meant ‘empowering’ them, while as 
argued below, most of them were ‘coerced by culture’ to participate. Women’s 
‘empowerment’ is a major topic for discussion in Ghana (Apusigah 2004a; 2004b; 
Anyidoho & Manuh 2010) and was therefore not out of place in the CBRDP. However, 
because the project was not explicit about having a gender–focus, it seemed to have 
contradicted its aim of empowering the general population as stated in the CBRDP 
Implementation Manual (2006, p. 1). Because of the lack of clarity on its gender–focus, 
the project also failed to provide the necessary resources required for the 
implementation of an effective gender–based ‘empowerment’ program (Mosedale 2003; 
Apusigah 2004a; Anyidoho & Manuh 2010; Hancock et al. 2011).  
 
Owing to the apparent disjunction between what the CBRDP sought to achieve relative 
to ‘empowerment’, and its focus on the ground, the project appeared to have measured 
‘empowerment’ more in terms of ‘participation’ by women and vulnerable peoples. For 
example, each of the CBRDP Annual Reports (2005–2010) tended to measure women’s 
‘empowerment’ in the project’s beneficiary localities by the numbers of women present 
in local meetings. Interestingly, most women interviewed or who responded to the 
questionnaires explained that they attended community meetings as a marital or cultural 
obligation. For example, many Fulani women in one of the towns in the Volta Region 
disclosed that they attended the local meetings as a gesture of respect for the Traditional 
Chiefs and their husbands. Like these respondents, others from the Eastern Region 
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made similar assertions; 80% of the women respondents from the Volta and Eastern 
Regions conceded as having never contributed to discussions in local meetings. In the 
Greater Accra Region 70% of women attending local meetings were non–contributors. 
Furthermore, some of the married women, who admitted speaking in community 
meetings, indicated that their husbands were unhappy, if their contribution sounded 
dissenting. 
 
Many scholars criticise participation as a yardstick for measuring ‘empowerment’ 
because of its coercive tendencies (Cooke & Kothari 2001; Cleaver 2001; Mosse 2001; 
Cornish 2006). Moreover, because ‘empowerment’ is a broad concept and may not 
always relate to participation of marginalised groups, many theorists argue that attention 
should rather be paid to addressing the conditions that perpetuate any form of 
disempowerment (Chambers 1983; Nelson & Wright 1995; Cleaver 2001; Mosse 2001; 
Cornwall & Edwards 2010; Tesoriero 2010). 
 
The discussions so far point to a rather nebulous conceptualisation and application of 
the term ‘empowerment’ in the CBRDP. When development projects are unclear about 
what they seek to achieve and how these ill-defined achievements are measured, as the 
above typifies, unintended outcomes are inevitable. The section also implied that the 
project’s designers overlooked the country’s traditional institutions, while no strategy 
was put in place to monitor unplanned outcomes. The next section draws on two case 
studies from the empirical data to support this assertion. It discusses the manner in 
which tensions between Traditional Chiefs and local government officials, which were 
unplanned consequences of the apparent misguided application of ‘empowerment’, 
negatively impacted on the CBRDPs. 
 
7.3 Traditional Chiefs versus Local Government Officials 
As discussed in Chapter One, Traditional Chiefs are much respected in Ghana and in the 
West African subregion156. Regarded as the custodians of the lands in the country, the 
chieftaincy institution is recognised and enshrined in Article 246 of Ghana’s 
Constitution, which restricts the state from interfering in its affairs. Aside from being 
constitutionally recognised, 30% of the seats of District Assemblies are also reserved 
for Traditional Chiefs, while the Assembly also pays them 22.5% of the revenue from 
                                                
156 However, not all parts of the country have strong Traditional Chieftaincy institutions. 
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Stool Lands (Donkor 2005; Ahwoi 2010; Knierzinger 2011).157 Obviously, 
development projects (such as the CBRDP) that sideline them will have dire 
consequences, as the two case studies below illustrate.  
 7.3.1 Aboloo, Greater Accra Region158 
Aboloo is a semi–urban town in the Greater Accra Region. The locality is less than an 
hour’s drive from the nation’s capital. The population of Aboloo was estimated in 2010 
to be two thousand five hundred (District Medium Term Development Plan 2010). The 
town is inhabited by a variety of ethnic groups: GAs form 55%, Ewes 25% and other 
groups, including the Akan and people from the northern part of the country, account 
for the remaining 20% (DMTDP 2010). The main occupation of the residents is 
agriculture, specifically peasant crop and animal farming, while others are engaged in 
petty trading. Aboloo had no health centre or clinic; thus, residents relied on health 
facilities in nearby towns such as Yamfo and Twibloh. While Aboloo had electricity, 
significant sections of the town used kerosene for lighting. The town also had four 
standpipes and three bore holes (DMTDP 2010; Aboloo Area Council Action Plan 
2006; Fieldnotes 2011).   
The fieldwork revealed Aboloo to have four basic schools: three privately–owned and 
one government–owned, the Awoyo Basic School. This was the basis for constructing a 
Community Library under the CBRDP to lift the low academic performance of the 
locality. This problem, the Area Council Action Plan (2006) stated, was due to the 
absence of a library facility in the locality and the generally poor state of the educational 
infrastructure at the government–owned school, which was a disincentive to teachers 
posted to the town. The absence of a library facility in Aboloo, the Action Plan 
explained further, led to high rate of school dropouts, as parents could not cope with 
spending lots of money on extra tuition. The construction of a Community Library was 
therefore regarded as a measure intended to motivate local school children to study, 
while attracting teachers to the town (Area Council Action Plan 2006). In the words of 
the Team Leader of the project: 
We were worried that many pupils could not read in the town. In fact in the 
lower primary of the Awoyo Basic School only thirty-four [out of 130] could 
read. So we made it our target to raise that number to eighty-four by September 
2007 [through the library project]. 
 
                                                
157 In a survey conducted in Greater Accra in 2005, over 50% of the 1005 respondents stated that 
Traditional Chiefs were more powerful than Members of Parliament (Knierzinger 2011). 
158 The original names of the locality and towns have been concealed for ethical reasons. 
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The Senior Linguist159 of Aboloo also explained that the library was built to “help the 
school children with their reading and writing ... [and] also prevent the pupils from 
going to video game centres at the nights and involving themselves in vices.” Because 
of the urgency to improve the academic performance in the locality, the Assembly 
Member of Aboloo explained that the project was implemented as a Rapid Response 
Initiative160 and strategically situated on the compound of the Awoyo Basic School.161  
 
Despite the good intentions that informed the construction of the library, the researcher 
found it in a state of dereliction. As argued below, the state of the project was largely 
attributable to a power contest between Aboloo’s Traditional Chiefs and local 
government officials resulting in a legal tussle. The problem, which was not envisaged 
by the CBRDP Headquarters or the World Bank, has left the facility unmaintained since 
its construction.  
 
Aboloo has ‘powerful’ Traditional Chiefs who constantly make news for various 
advocacy issues in the interest of the locality162. Because of their influence, they tended 
to regard themselves as those to control all development projects in the town, including 
the CBRDP Library Project. For example, the Senior Linguist of Aboloo when 
interviewed kept emphasising his assertion that, “Aboloo is a GA traditional town, so 
we [Traditional Chiefs and Elders] wield the power to control and manage all 
development projects in the locality.”163 He went further in arguing that Aboloo 
benefitted from the CBRDP because of the influence of the Traditional Chiefs in the 
Municipal Assembly, a claim the local government officials refuted. 
 
 
                                                
159 The spokesman of the Aboloo Traditional Chief. 
160Constructed in a hundred days. 
161 Private schools and individuals could access the library. 
162 See for example, http://sethbnews09.blogspot.com.au/2010/02/arrest-this-man-page-3.html, retrieved 
June 28, 2012. 
163 Traditional Chiefs in other parts of the country tend to make similar assertions, and have been 
condemned in the media as insinuating ethnocentric tendencies are practiced in the country under the 
guise of culture and tradition (Daily Graphic of October 16, 2011). 
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   Photo 7.1: Exterior of the Aboloo CBRDP library. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Photo 7.2: Interior of the Aboloo CBRDP library. 
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As indicated above, the fundamental aim of the CBRDP was to empower the rural 
population and the weak local government sub–structures164 to make the Area Councils, 
Assembly Members and Unit Committees highly functional. Before the implementation 
of the CBRDP, Area Councils and Unit Committees, for example, were virtually in a 
state of inertia, some scholars contending they be dissolved (Gyimah–Boadi 2009; 
Ahwoi 2010). The CBRDP was therefore a seminal initiative that tested the 
implementation capabilities of the local government sub–structure to make them 
effective (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006). Thus, by its design, the CBRDP was 
supposed to be managed by the local government officials, albeit in an ‘undefined’ 
consultation arrangement with Traditional Chiefs (CBRDP Implementation Manual 
2006).  
  
Mandated to manage the CBRDPs, the local government officials of Aboloo were not 
prepared to be dictated to by the Traditional Chiefs. These officials, some of who did 
not hail from the town, argued that the CBRDP was explicit about empowering local 
government officials to manage the project. While admitting that Traditional Chiefs 
were important stakeholders in the CBRDP implementation processes, the local 
government officials indicated that their role was only ceremonial. A 48-year-old man, 
who was a Unit Committee Member of Aboloo, captured this attitude succinctly when 
he argued that:  
At the training session, the CBRDP officials from Accra told us that we must 
manage the project and render all accounts. So, we have a duty to the CBRDP 
Headquarters and the people who elected us and not to Traditional Chiefs … the 
[CBRDP] officials explained that if anything went wrong with the project, they 
would hold us responsible and Aboloo may not get such a project again.  
 
After the project was completed and commissioned on November 08, 2007165, the 
Senior Linguist explained that the Traditional Chiefs and Elders of Aboloo demanded 
the local government officials to hand over all documents and render accounts on the 
project to them. Led by the Project’s Team Leader, who was also a Unit Committee 
Member, the local government officials refused to heed the Chiefs’ requests on the 
grounds that the CBRDP officials in Accra had not authorised the directive. Apparently 
annoyed by the actions of the local government officials, the Traditional Chiefs of 
Aboloo announced, in a dawn broadcast, that the Unit Committees Members had been 
suspended indefinitely from operating in the locality. The announcement went further to 
                                                
164See Chapter Five. 
165 See The Ghanaian Times of November 08, 2007. 
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indicate, “The Unit Committees Members would have themselves to blame if they 
flouted the order”. Confirming the suspension, the Senior Linguist of Aboloo explained 
that they took the action because, as he put it, “the local government officials were 
challenging our authority”. 
   
Threatened by the broadcast, a Unit Committee Member indicated that they had to 
“wash their hands of” the library for fear of their lives. The project’s Team Leader 
criticised the Chiefs’ action as unconstitutional and, in consultation with the Municipal 
Assembly, filed a lawsuit against the Traditional Chief and Elders of Aboloo at the 
Accra High Court. Although the Assembly Member would not comment on the issue, 
he hinted that the attitudes of the Elders were impacting on his work and the organising 
of assets in the locality. Indicating his resolve not to contest the 2010 local government 
elections because of the conflict, the Assembly Member explained that the state of the 
library was an embarrassment to the locality. Asked how best the situation could be 
resolved, he indicated that, “Aboloo Traditional Chiefs need to come out of their power 
stupor and imperialist mentality.”  
 
Many local people, from whom the data was drawn, in apparent ignorance of the 
lawsuit and the local power struggles, appeared to be disappointed with the performance 
of their Assembly Member. In fact, 55% of the respondents to the questionnaire 
indicated that they did not know the Assembly Member, while almost 90% had no 
knowledge of their Unit Committee Members. As explained in Chapter Five (see 5.5), 
Unit Committees are the bridge between the local people and the Area Councils. 
Working with the Assembly Member, they relate to people at the grassroots level; they 
listen to their concerns for onward discussions during the Area Council meetings. Unit 
Committees are very instrumental in local mobilisation and project maintenance 
(Article 240 [4–8], Constitution of the Republic of Ghana 1992). Owing to their 
suspension, between November 2007 and March 2011, when the fieldwork was 
completed, Aboloo did not have a functioning Unit Committee that would have 
otherwise mobilised the local people to maintain the library. While the Senior Linguist 
indicated that the Traditional Chiefs were sourcing resources for maintaining the library 
the researcher did not witness the project improve in any way throughout the seven 
months fieldwork.  
 
Of all the projects studied in Zone IV, the researcher found the Aboloo Library to be the 
most neglected. Several cracks were visible in the structure and staircase (see photo 
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7.1). Many of the windows either had no louvers or were broken. The library had no 
electricity connected and there were no fans. In the afternoons the place could be so hot 
that one female JHS 1 pupil remarked, “It’s difficult to concentrate in the heat. It is 
terrible to study without fans. Some of my friends even use the books to fan 
themselves”. A majority of pupils in the JHS 2 and above also explained that most of 
the books in the library were irrelevant to their studies or were outdated. Furthermore, 
there were not enough books for some sections and subjects, while others had none. For 
example, the French, Information and Communication Technology and Ghanaian 
languages sections had no books, while the mathematics section had only five; the 
library also had no computer. The Librarian explained: 
We haven’t got any books since the library was commissioned. Those here were 
made possible by the out–gone District Education Director. Sometimes, good 
people also walk in and give us books ... because of the book deficits [when they 
are torn] I mend the pieces and put them back on the shelves, even if some pages 
are missing. 
 
Because of the conflict, many crucial administrative and resource challenges impacted 
on the efficiency of the library. The first related to the library’s operating hours. The 
library opened and closed during the Awoyo Basic School’s operating hours (8:00 am–
3:30pm). It was not opened at nights, during weekends or on holidays. Pupils in the 
private schools also found the opening and closing times of the library discriminatory. 
A male JHS 2 student of one of the private schools said, “we are not experiencing the 
benefits of the library because they close at the government school times, whilst we 
finish later. They don’t also open it on Saturdays and Sundays.” When asked why the 
library closes early, does not open in the nights, on weekend and holidays, the Head 
Teacher of the Awoyo Basic School explained:   
Hmm [deep sigh] I have discussed it with the librarian. But I have discovered 
that he needs an incentive to do those extra hours. But the motivation is not 
forthcoming because of the problem between the local government officials and 
the Traditional Chiefs. Another issue is that unlike librarians employed by the 
Ghana Library Board who work on weekends, in the evenings and on holidays, 
our librarian is a teacher employed by the Ghana Education Service and 
expected to work within our 8:00am –3:30pm opening and closing times.   
 
She suggested that: 
 
The community support has to support and pay him some extra money, if they 
want the library opened outside the school hours. We hope the court matter is 
resolved quickly so that the local opinion leaders can organise community 
volunteers to man the library after school. Otherwise it will not be serving the 
purpose for which it was built. 
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Although the library was meant for all pupils in the locality, it could not accommodate a 
standard class of forty pupils, as the quantity of furniture was inadequate. Whenever the 
library was full, the other pupils had the options of either sitting on the floor or standing 
to read. If the class was large, those who could not access the library had to sit in the 
classroom, having missed the allocated “library hour” on the timetable. A teacher from 
one of the private schools explained that they scarcely visited the library as it was 
always full and there were not enough relevant textbooks. He was also of the opinion 
that each school in the locality should be allocated days and times to use the facility. In 
separate interviews, the Librarian, Head Teacher and the Senior Linguist appealed for 
support for the library. The Project’s Team Leader expressed similar concerns when he 
said:  
I visited the library last week and I saw how the project has been left 
unmaintained. The staircase has cracks all over and some of the louvers are off. 
On top, there are not enough books ... this is becoming disgraceful. But what can 
we do when ‘the powers that be’ would not allow us the freedom to operate? 
 
The above analysis points to what could become of ‘good’ project such as Aboloo’s 
Library Project, that are based on complex concepts, but whose outcomes are not 
monitored and managed. While the CBRDP aimed to ‘empower’ Aboloo’s local 
government officials, it seemed not to have envisaged the consequences of sidelining 
the locality’s influential Traditional Chiefs; in fact the final outcome was 
disempowering for many. Aboloo is just one of the many localities in Ghana where 
fracas between Traditional Chiefs and local government officials negatively impact on 
development projects (see Abotchie 2006; Ahwoi 2010). Ntoaso, a town in the Eastern 
Region, is another case in point.  
 
7.3.2 Ntoaso, Eastern Region166 
Ntoaso received a sixteen-seater public toilet facility from the CBRDP. Located almost 
seventy-five kilometres from Accra, Ghana’s capital city, Ntoaso falls under the 
Asempa Municipality of the Eastern Region of Ghana. The town is inhabited by 
Akyems, the traditional land owners, Ewes, Akwapims and people from the northern 
parts of the country. Many of the residents engage in palm oil business, farming and 
petty trading. Because the locality is not far from major trading spots such as Kwabre, 
Winneba and Accra, many of the traders and farmers commute to these centres to sell 
                                                
166 The original name of the town and others mentioned have been deidentified for ethical reasons. 
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their wares and return the same day. Ntoaso has electricity, pipe born water and one 
government–owned basic school (Asempa Municipal MTDP 2010167). 
 
Before the implementation of the CBRDP’s sixteen-seater facility in 2008, Ntoaso had 
only one public toilet facility, which was donated by the European Union. As of 2009, 
this facility located north of the town was insufficient to serve the town’s population of 
almost nearly four thousand, (Ntoaso Area Council Action Plan 2006). Those on the 
south opined it was too far from them, apart from the fact that they had to sometime join 
long queues to use it. In fact, up to the period of the fieldwork, the EU toilet facility was 
not in use as it had cracks and posed dangers for users. The lack of public toilet in the 
town, the Ntoaso Area Council Action Plan (2006) stated, had led to indiscriminate 
defecation in the town, a situation that led to the outbreak of cholera in the town. Thus, 
when the town was chosen as a beneficiary of the CBRDP, it was greeted with joy as 
many deemed it timely. The project was completed and in use as the fieldwork finished. 
 
However, during most visits to the facility, the researcher observed that it was not being 
well–maintained. For example, although tokens were being charged for using it, the 
facility appeared to be untidy. This annoyed many of the users, some of who refused to 
pay the token on the grounds that the monies were not being used for its maintenance. 
Frustrated by the situation, the caretaker explained that she could not enforce the 
payment of the user fees as the facility looked unkempt. As this case study will show, 
the project was in this state because the Traditional Chief of the Town was quarrelling 
with the Area Council Chairman and Assembly Member of the town over who had the 
‘power’ to manage the facility.  
 
An indigene of Yakoko, the Traditional Chief had ruled Ntoaso for twenty-one years. 
As most Traditional Chiefs in Ghana would claim, the Ntoaso Chief indicated that his 
ancestors owned the land of Ntoaso and therefore had a default right to oversee all 
development projects in the locality, including the CBRDP public toilet facility. Since 
October 2008, when it was completed, the Chief had complained about what he termed 
as the “arrogance of the Assembly Member” of the locality. He argued that:   
The Assembly Member and his so–called [Unit] Committee Members, who 
manage the project, are over stepping their borders. Before he became the 
Assembly Member I was the Chief. Yet, he is still holding unto the keys of the 
toilet and has refused to hand them over to me and my Elders. 
 
                                                
167 See also http://westakim.ghanadistricts.gov.gh/, retrieved July 15, 2012. 
 174 
The Chief considered the Assembly Member’s refusal to hand over the keys as a 
challenge to his traditional authority and indicated that he was in a process of auditing 
the facility’s user fee proceeds. Further probes during the interviews with him revealed 
his poor understanding of the fact that the CBRDP was designed to be managed by local 
government officials. For example, when the researcher asked him what he knew about 
the project, he claimed that the CBRDP was sponsored from the coffers of the 
Municipal Assembly; and that it was a way of thanking the residents for being stalwart 
followers of the New Patriotic Party, under whose government (2001–2008) the project 
was implemented. Apparently ignorant about the terms of the CBRDP, the Chief was 
drawing on his traditional ‘powers’ to demand the right to control the project. 
 
The Assembly Member in question had been in office for eight years (2003–2010) and 
also served as the Area Council Chairman for four years (2006–2010). He recounted the 
frustrations he encountered in getting the Municipal authorities to approve Ntoaso as a 
beneficiary of CBRDP funds. Interestingly, the Chief also claimed that it was his 
goodwill with the Municipal Chief Executive (MCE) that led to the choice of Ntoaso as 
the location of the new toilet facility.  The Assembly Member denied this, explaining 
that the CBRDP was not for Traditional Chiefs, but about the strengthening of local 
government institutions. As a result, he and the Unit Committees owed a duty to the 
Government of Ghana to manage the project and not to the Traditional Chief, although 
he was ready to render accounts to the latter, if asked.  
 
During one of my visits to the town, the Traditional Chief and Elders had summoned 
the Assembly Member to render accounts on the project. The Chief reported: 
Last week the Assembly Member came and rendered the accounts on the 
project. But we [the Chief and his Elders] were dissatisfied and doubted the 
figures …We feel there is something fishy somewhere because although the 
Assembly Member claimed that he sponsored part of the project with his 
personal money and that the community owes him a total sum of about GHC 
5000168, we are aware that that the District Assembly fully funded it, while the 
community contributed labour.  
 
According to the Assembly Member, as briefly explained in Chapter Five, when the 
project was approved by the CBRDP secretariat, it was supposed to be a sixteen–seat 
facility. When the work started, it was not known that the MCE had ordered the project 
sum be equally divided between Ntoaso and Adoagyiri, a town in the Municipality also 
                                                
168 At the time GHC 1 = USD 0.5. 
 175 
in need of a toilet facility. This brought the Ntoaso project to a standstill for a while as 
the local government officials were finding it difficult to change the project to an eight-
seater facility. However, the Assembly Member decided to go ahead with the original 
sixteen-seater plan and hoped that the local people would help with tokens. 
Unfortunately, while some residents contributed, many did not. Under the 
circumstances, he had to use his own monies to complete the project, hoping that he 
would be reimbursed later from the facility’s user fee proceeds.  
 
 
Photo 7.3: Male entrance of the Ntoaso CBRDP. 
 
 
 
Photo 7.4: Female entrance of the Ntoaso CBRDP. 
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The Assembly Member explained further that the Unit Committee Members and the 
Zone IV Headquarters of the CBRDP were aware of the monies owed him. Further, he 
explained that although he had produced receipts to support his claims, the Traditional 
Chief and his Elders suspected that he had concocted the figures.  He asserted that until 
he recouped all the debt owed him, he was not ready to hand over the project to the 
Chief.  
 
Concerning the maintenance of the toilet facility, the Assembly Member indicated this 
to be the responsibility of all the residents, the user fees not being enough for the 
upkeep of the facility. In addition, because the facility was constructed as a community–
based project, the he expected that the Chiefs would support him to organise communal 
labour for its maintenance. However, owing to the lack of cooperation from the 
Traditional Chief and his Elders, he explained that he was reluctant to call for 
communal labour to clean the toilets or clear the bushes around it (see photos above). 
Such an initiative could be interpreted to mean he undermining the authority of the 
Traditional Chief169. Some women the researcher interviewed indicated that as the 
facility was surrounded by bushes they were concerned about being bitten by snakes if 
they made use of it in the early morning or at night times.  
 
The questionnaires and other informal interviews indicated that the Assembly Member 
had the support of most residents in the locality, but he admitted to fearing for his life. 
Consequently, although he was eligible to contest the 2010 local government elections, 
he voluntarily stepped down, blaming the decision on his dispute with the Traditional 
Chief and his Elders. He said: 
I have had enough of the nonsense of these Chiefs, who know nothing about 
local governance. I’m out and out for good. I’m only biding the time to recoup 
my money and then hand over the keys to the CBRDP officials, who put me in 
charge of the project. If they give the project to the Traditional Chiefs to manage 
it, I care less. 
 
Meanwhile, as of July 2012, key informants from Ntoaso contacted by the researcher 
indicated the toilet facility to be in no better state than it was in March 2011 when the 
fieldwork was concluded. Furthermore, while the former Assembly Member had 
handed over the keys, the CBRDP authorised the new local government officials to 
manage it. Consequently, as of July 2012 the Traditional Chief and his Elders have not 
                                                
169 In many traditional areas in Ghana, Traditional Chiefs call for communal labour. 
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been cooperating with the new officers to organise communal labour to maintain the 
toilet facility.  
 
Notwithstanding the above case studies, the researcher found one example of positive 
power relations between the Chief and the Assembly Member of Pakro in the Eastern 
Region, one of the CBRDP beneficiary localities. During the fieldwork, the researcher 
witnessed several instances where the two were conferring on local issues. In separate 
interview sessions, both spoke kindly of each other and related several instances where 
they had collaborated to solve problems in the locality. In the latter stages of collecting 
data in Pakro, the researcher learned that the mutual respect between the Chief and the 
Assembly Member was partly due to their familial ties. Nevertheless, the Pakro 
mechanised borehole project was faced with challenges that were unrelated to power 
relations, but involved technical issues and community resistance to paying user fees. 
On a positive note, the Chief and Assembly Member were working hard to resolve these 
problems. 
 
7.4 Conclusion  
This chapter set out to show how the vague application of the term ‘empowerment’ in 
the design and implementation of Ghana’s CBRDP impacted on the project’s outcomes. 
The first section of the chapter explained why ‘empowerment’ is too complex a concept 
to be ‘cut and pasted’ into development aid project designs. It was argued that while 
‘empowerment’ offers many advantages if used appropriately, the concept presents 
many theoretical challenges. Aside from the tendency to be gender- specific, despite 
being a generic term, measuring ‘empowerment’ can be challenging, as scholars 
disagree on whether the term is a process or an outcome or both.  The fact that 
‘empowerment’ is pivotal to the concept of ‘power’ makes it even more problematic. 
Because ‘power’ is not a neutral concept and cannot be shared, empowering one group 
may mean disempowering others by breaking certain traditional norms or monopolies. 
This may lead to conflicts if outcomes are not properly monitored. 
 
The second section examined the CBRDP documents to reveal the manner in which 
‘empowerment’ was applied in the project’s design and implementation. The section 
showed that ‘empowerment’ was loosely applied by the CBRDP as the project: 1) Had 
no working definition of ‘empowerment’; 2) Targeted women and vulnerable groups, 
although it was meant to empower the general population; and 3) Measured 
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‘empowerment’ only in terms of participation, ignoring the conditions that perpetuated 
the ‘powerlessness’. As a result of the imprecise application of ‘empowerment’ in the 
CBRDP, Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Environment 
and the World Bank’s Advisory Team, who designed the project, appeared to have 
overlooked the country’s institution of Traditional Chiefs and had no strategy in place 
to monitor unintended outcomes.   
 
To support this assertion, the last section of the chapter drew on the empirical data to 
illustrate the manner in which power struggles and conflicts between Traditional Chief 
and local government officials negatively impacted on the CBRDPs. The analysis 
suggest that in their pursuit of strengthening Ghana’s decentralisation process through 
the CBRDPs, the designers of the project appeared to have focused only on the local 
government sub–structures, overlooking the country’s influential traditional 
establishment. While the intent to empower Assembly and Unit Committee Members 
was important, the project’s designers should have realised that the local government 
officials did not function in isolation, but were a part of a very complex socio–cultural 
system. It was therefore essential to have considered the whole context within which the 
project was implemented, while having a strategy to monitor unintended outcomes.  
 
As the case studies showed, the Traditional Chiefs of Aboloo and Ntoaso seemed to 
have been uninformed about the CBRDP’s inherent intent of empowering the country’s 
local government sub–structures, contradicting the World Bank’s claim that Ghana’s 
decentralisation system is highly functional (see Chapter Five).  Acting within their 
usual traditional ‘powers’, the Traditional Chiefs clashed with the newly empowered 
local government officials, who refused to pander to their whims. These conflicts have 
left the projects poorly maintained and in a state of dereliction. The Aboloo Library 
Project was faced with many crucial administrative and resource challenges that 
impacted on its efficiency, while the Ntoaso public toilet facility was left almost always 
in an untidy state, as the Traditional Chief of the locality refused to collaborate with the 
Assembly Member to organise the residents to clean it periodically. Hence the two 
CBRDP outcomes were not being fully utilised by the people for whom they were 
designed, becoming the centre of a protracted legal battle. 
 
The CBRDP Headquarters was aware of the state of the projects, expressing their 
disappointment at the outcomes. Some of the Managers argued that, as the projects were 
only pilots; their states were of no concern, as one of them asserted, “To be pedantic 
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about terms and concepts”. The Managers appeared to be more concerned about the 
sanctity of the financial accounts on the project that had to be rendered to the 
government and the World Bank. The findings presented in the chapter reflect the 
observation of many scholars that international development discourse is full of 
normative and idealised terms that are not matched by clear conceptualisations. 
Moreover the data and case studies presented in this chapter clearly show a ‘breakdown 
of development’ as a result of power struggles and problems around ‘empowerment’. 
As a result the project led to a poorly functioning local government system, the exact 
opposite of what it was supposed to achieve.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
Bad policies can easily destroy development and defy common sense…. This 
has been one of our weaknesses in Africa over the last 50 years. Our policies 
have been very much externally–driven, shaped and financed rather than 
endogenous. Worse, they were often based on frequently shifting trends in 
development thinking and practice, rather than our own internally generated 
consensuses. 
Donald Kaberuka170 (2011, p. 3) 
 
This thesis has taken its researcher and now its reader from the macro–perspectives of 
International Development Aid (aid) to the nuanced meanings derived from doctoral 
fieldwork in three regions of Ghana. In between, the thesis has focused on the manner in 
which the inappropriate application decentralisation theories and normative concepts, 
such as community and empowerment, influenced the outcomes of the World Bank-
funded Community–Based Rural Development Project (CBRDP) in Ghana. To remind 
the reader the Primary Research Question was: 
How were the outcomes of the Community–Based Rural Development Projects 
in selected Districts of Ghana influenced by contested decentralisation theories 
and complex concepts such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’? 
 
Three key findings stood out in the thesis: 1) The World Bank’s mistaken categorisation 
of Ghana’s decentralisation system as highly functional negatively impacted on the 
design and outcomes of the CBRDP; 2) The lack of ‘community’ in the CBRDP 
beneficiary localities affected the implementation and the maintenance of the projects; 
and 3) The CBRDP’s inappropriate application of the concept of ‘empowerment’ led to 
tensions between Traditional Chiefs and Local Government Officials. Below the 
findings are discussed in turn, followed with a discussion of their implication for 
development theory and practice.   
 
Finding I: The World Bank’s Mistaken Categorisation of Ghana’s 
Decentralisation System as Highly Functional Negatively Impacted on the Design 
of the CBRDP 
 
The thesis found that Ghana’s inter–governmental system is not highly functional, as 
the World Bank claims. Although Traditional Chiefs play key roles in Ghana’s local 
government system, it is inherently partisan and effectively controlled by central 
government. Given this limitation, the CBRDP documents indicated that: “the CBRDP 
                                                
170 President of the African Development Bank. 
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was designed to strengthen the country’s weak local government sub–structures”  
(CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006, CBRDP Annual Reports 2005–2010, CBRDP 
Zone IV Annual Reports 2005–2010). While this clearly contradicts the categorisation 
of Ghana’s inter-government system as being highly functional, an analysis of the 
country’s decentralisation set up within the framework of the World Bank’s four 
indicators is even more revealing. The World Bank’s indicators of a highly functional 
inter–government system include settings where there are: 1) Decentralisation laws that 
create local government structures with autonomy in resource management; 2) Local 
elections; 3) Fiscal decentralisation and; 4) Devolution of service delivery. Examined 
within these indicators, Ghana falls short of the high-functioning labelling, and casts 
serious doubts on the robustness of the World Bank’s indicators. 
 
While the Ghana’s constitution and various Local Government Acts make provision for 
a decentralised local government system, the same statutes appear to promote 
centralisation, which hinders the autonomy of local authorities, and the realisation of an 
effective fiscal and administrative decentralisation. Examples of such statutes include 
Act 462, which allows the President to both appoint 30% of the DA membership and 
sack those who constitute the other 70% elected by popular votes; Article 10 (3) of Act 
462 that subjects the Medium Term Development Plans and budgets of DAs to central 
government’s approval; and Act 462 (Section 88) and Financial Administration Act 
2003 (Act 654), which limit the amount of loans DAs can contract. This finding shows 
that the fact that a country’s constitution and legal framework makes provision for 
decentralised local governance does not necessarily make it high functioning.  
 
Fiscal decentralisation has not been achieved in Ghana. This is attributable to the weak 
revenue base of DAs, existence of laws that limit the financial independence of local 
government structures; and the unwillingness of the central government to undertake 
true fiscal decentralisation. 81% of the revenues of DAs come from the central 
government funding, specifically, the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF). Even 
so, while the law that established the DACF enjoins the central government to transfer a 
minimum of 5% of the total national revenue to the DACF, successive governments 
base this percentage on the total national tax revenue instead. Additionally, DAs appear 
not to determine how and where to utilise their DACF, as nearly 60% are limited to 
specific sectors. While the realisation of true fiscal decentralisation has many benefits, 
the central government seem unwilling to implement the composite budget, although 
Section 10 (3) of the Local Government Act 462 directs them to do same.  
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Securitized within the framework of local elections, the third indicator of a high-
functioning inter-governmental system, Ghana’s decentralisation set up still falls short.  
Statistics from the country’s electoral commission shows that Ghanaians seem not to 
take local government elections as a serious political exercise, when compared with 
their patronage at presidential elections. For example, Voter turnout at local government 
elections held between 1994–2010 averaged nearly 36%, considerably lower than the 
approximately 70% patronage of presidential elections held for the 1992–2008 periods.  
 
Administrative decentralisation (Devolution of Service) in Ghana is challenged by the 
centralising tendencies of the Local Government Act 462 and the lack of infrastructure. 
Therefore, government departments in the districts appear to function only as de–
concentrated offices of their parent Ministries in the capital, Accra. Owing to the 
paucity of infrastructure in most regional areas, public servants tend to refuse posting to 
such places; they consider it as punishment. The situation is impacting on the 
availability of human resources needed to achieve true administrative decentralisation in 
the country.  
 
Aside from the evidence discussed above, analysis of the empirical data presented in 
Chapter Five on issues affecting local government officials in Ghana, further confirms 
the stalled nature of the country’s decentralisation system. The last section of Chapter 
Five discussed the plights of Assembly Members, key facilitators of development at the 
local. It was found that Assembly Members are challenged by the non-payment of 
salary, working with partisan DCEs, weak Unit Committees and power-seeking 
Traditional Chiefs. These challenges, the chapter revealed, do impact significant on 
their overall role in the local government machinery. 
 
The World Bank’s endorsement of Ghana’s decentralisation system as highly functional 
meant that the CBRDP was designed under the so–called Matching Strategy. By this, 
the project was designed and implemented on the country’s existing political systems 
without adjustments. The design of the CBRDP on Ghana’s highly politicised local 
government structures led to three problems. First, by its design, the CBRDP was 
subjected to political machinations. District Chief Executives, who are appointees of the 
central government and the most influential government representatives at the local 
areas, had the freedom to choose which locality benefitted from the project and who did 
not. As indicated above, some localities that did not qualify for the project benefited. In 
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other instances, some DCEs used the projects as political campaign tool for their 
political party and to seek election into parliament. 
 
Second, the fact that the CBRDP was implemented on a system, which did not pay 
salaries to Assembly Members, meant that the project could be bedevilled by corrupt 
practises. Assembly Members work so hard, but earn virtually nothing. This explains 
why, as Chapter Six showed, some Assembly Members awarded the CBRDP 
purchasing contracts to themselves and cronies. Such corrupt practices, the thesis 
argued, impacted on the overall quality of the projects. 
 
Finally, the World Bank’s categorisation of Ghana’s decentralisation as highly 
functional made them lose sight of the fact that the CBRDP was theoretically fashioned 
on concepts, such as ‘community’ and ‘empowerment’, which were at variance with the 
demographical realities of the country and the beneficiary localities. As it turned out 
‘communities’ did not practically exist in the beneficiary localities, leading to the poor 
maintenance of the projects. Furthermore, the inappropriate application of 
‘empowerment’ in the CBRDP led to tensions between local government officials and 
Traditional Chiefs. The impact of the inappropriate application of the concepts of 
‘community’ and ‘empowerment’ on the outcomes of the CBRDP are discussed in 
Findings II and III respectively.  
 
Finding II: The lack of ‘community’ in the CBRDP beneficiary localities affected 
the implementation and maintenance of the projects  
 
The concept of ‘community’ is appealing, yet deceptive. Although a complex term, 
community is often misused in development program designs, Ghana’s CBRDP being 
no exception. As argued in Chapter Six, the designers of the CBRDP appeared not to 
have appreciated the complexity of the term, conceptualising it in the spatial sense, 
although the concept transcends the notion of territoriality. A community, it was argued, 
must have: 1) Function that drives the group; 2) Opportunity for interaction; 3) 
Membership who identifies with and contributes to it; and 4) Culture that makes it 
distinct from others.  
 
Analysis of the empirical data in the sixth chapter of the thesis showed that the 
dynamics, ground settlement and mobility patterns of the CBRDP beneficiary localities 
did not support interaction to the levels required for a coherent ‘community’ to exist, or 
simply put, ‘communities’ did not seem to exist there.  For example, the residents of 
 184 
Tease in the Afram Plains tended not to associate with the town as ‘members’ and 
therefore had an attitude of the members being transient towards the locality because of 
its remoteness. In the case of Tashie in the Tema Municipality, the data showed that the 
residents were politically factionalised, apart from feeling in common that the CBRDP 
did not meet their most crucial need, a public toilet facility. Furthermore, most 
inhabitants of Tashie, some of whom had moved from other parts of the country to live 
there or work in the capital171, tended not to regard themselves as members of the 
locality who must, according to CBRDP official documents, contribute to its 
development. The data from Agbetor in the Volta Region showed it to be risky to build 
a community–based project around one influential Traditional Chief. Furthermore, it 
revealed the importance of improving the economic conditions of development 
beneficiaries, so that they can maintain and ‘own’ the said projects responsibly.  
 
Despite these challenges, the designers of the CBRDP, it was found, did not developed 
the communities within which to base the project in the beneficiary localities. Although 
a complex term, the theoretical discussions revealed that communities could be nurtured 
around a function. For example, the CBRDP officials could have developed a strong 
Traders Community in Tease before implementing the market sheds project. This way, 
the traders would have taken ownership of and maintained the shed better than was 
apparent during the fieldwork. However, those who designed the project clearly ignored 
the need to develop a community in Tease before constructing the now abandoned 
market sheds.  This explains why most of the CBRDP studied were in a state of 
complete disarray at the time of the fieldwork as there were no ‘communities’, such as 
those described above, in the localities to maintain them. Therefore the conclusion is 
that projects such as CPRDP cannot be sufficiently based on idealised, yet complex and 
contested terms such as community. It is important that programs attempting to apply 
the concepts clearly define and conceptualise it within the confines of the grounded 
realities and social dynamics of beneficiary localities. In this way development projects 
may receive maximum local support and be more likely to be effectively maintained. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
171 Tashie is less than an hour drive to the nation’s capital, Accra. 
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Finding III: The CBRDP’s inappropriate application of the Concept of 
‘Empowerment’ led to tensions between Traditional Chiefs and Local Government 
Officials 
 
The term ‘empowerment’ was inappropriately applied in the implementation of the 
CBRDP as it led to tension between local government officials and Traditional Chiefs. 
Like ‘community’, ‘empowerment’ is a complex term concept that presents many 
theoretical difficulties when attempts to define it are made. Aside from the tendency to 
be gender–specific and despite being a generic term, measuring empowerment presents 
many challenges, scholars disagreeing on whether the term is a process or an outcome 
or both.  The fact that ‘empowerment’ is predicated on the concept of ‘power’ makes it 
even more complicated. The reason for this dilemma is that ‘power’ is not a neutral 
concept and cannot be shared; empowering one group may mean disempowering others 
by breaking certain traditional norms or monopolies. This may lead to conflicts, if 
outcomes are not properly monitored as shown in this thesis. 
 
Despite these theoretical challenges ‘empowerment’ was loosely applied in the CBRDP 
as the project: 1) Had no working definition of ‘empowerment’; 2) Targeted women and 
vulnerable groups, although it was meant to empower the general population; and 3) 
Measured ‘empowerment’ only in term of participation, ignoring the conditions that 
perpetuated the ‘powerlessness’. As a result of the inappropriate application of 
‘empowerment’ in the CBRDP, Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development and the World Bank’s Advisory Team, designers of the project, appeared 
to have overlooked the country’s Traditional Chiefs and had no strategy in place to 
monitor unintended outcomes.   
 
Analysis of the data drawn from Ntoaso in the Eastern Region and Aboloo in the 
Greater Accra Region points to a policy error. In their pursuit to strengthen Ghana’s 
decentralisation process through the CBRDP, the designers of the project appeared to 
have focused only on the local government sub–structures, and overlooked the 
country’s influential traditional establishment. While the intent to empower Assembly 
and Unit Committee Members was important, the project’s designers ignored the reality 
that the local government officials do not function in isolation, but are part of a very 
complex socio–cultural system; a system that draws heavily on the influence of 
Traditional Chiefs to provide social capital. 
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As the two case studies showed, the Traditional Chiefs of Aboloo and Ntoaso appeared 
to have been uninformed about the CBRDP’s objective of empowering the country’s 
local government sub–structures. Acting within their usual traditional ‘powers’, the 
Traditional Chiefs clashed with the ‘newly empowered’ local government officials. 
These conflicts have left the projects poorly maintained and in a state of dereliction, as 
the Chiefs who wield the social capital to organise such maintenance activities felt 
sidelined. The Aboloo Library Project was faced with many crucial administrative and 
resource challenges that impacted on its efficiency, while the Ntoaso Public Toilet 
Facility was almost always left in an untidy state. In the latter case, the Traditional 
Chief of the locality refused to collaborate with the Assembly Member to organise the 
residents to clean the toilet facility periodically. Hence the researcher found that the 
CBRDP’s two major assets were not being fully utilised by the people for whom they 
were designed; instead they had become the centre of a protracted legal battle.  
 
Implication for Development Theory and Practice 
The most important implications from this thesis is that international development 
agencies and donors need to understand the contextual realities of countries and 
localities in which they wish to bring about improvements. In the case of Ghana, those 
who designed the CBRDP failed to appreciate the dynamics of the country and the 
beneficiary ‘communities’, leading to the poor maintenance of the aid-funded project. 
The lack of appreciation for the CBRDP beneficiary localities was evident in the 
designers’ failure to adjust the project and its pivotal concepts to suit the country’s 
highly politicised, weak local government and influential chieftaincy systems. Four 
themes that emerged strongly in the thesis may be considered for their implications for 
aid effectiveness discussion, development theory and practice.  
 
First, the findings have brought to the fore the need for international development 
agencies to move beyond conferences and mechanisms that are results-based in their 
quest for ways of making their aid effective. It is crucial that stakeholders in aid 
effectiveness discussions carefully consider aid recipients’ social, political, economic 
and cultural settings in the design of program-based aid initiatives. For example, while 
Community-Driven Development Program is hailed as a ‘messianic’ aid delivery 
mechanism at the World Bank, the thesis has shown that CDD, in itself, is not the 
panacea to aid ineffectiveness. While it offers some advantages for delivering aid 
effectively, the thesis has exposed its operations as systematically underpinned by 
 187 
theories and concepts that may have little relevance to the social and politico–cultural 
realities of beneficiaries.  
 
The findings of the thesis resonate with the ‘Principle of Alignment’, captured in the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The principle enjoins donors to arrange 
their aid through the recipient countries’ priorities and make better use of their policies 
and systems (OECD 2011). The thesis has provided the empirical basis for extending 
the principle to include “the need for donors to align and design their aid programs to 
suit the social and politico–cultural realities of aid beneficiaries”. This is important 
because although the Paris Declaration (2005) instructs donors to commit and 
implement 66% of their aid as programs, the findings of the thesis show that aid 
programs cannot produce any positive outcomes, if they are based on theories and 
concepts that are contextually flawed.  
 
Second, the thesis has underscored the importance of investing in social research before, 
during and after the design and implementation of aid programs. Researching aid 
beneficiary settings is crucial, as it provides empirical grounds for designing and 
implementing programs in a contextually appropriate manner. Such an exercise may be 
cost effective, compared to the consequences of ignoring it. The thesis has established 
the usefulness of ethno–methodology as a credible technique for understanding how aid 
works on the ground. Termed ‘aidnography’, the qualitative study of aid, the data and 
insights produced herewith confirm the potency of the research methodology. Beyond 
the ‘politicised’ depiction of Ghana as an ‘evidence that developments works’172 and the 
country’s economic–centric aid literature, aidnography enabled the researcher to 
experience the convoluted nature of the contexts in which aid programs are 
implemented. The technique also allowed the researcher to examine the CBRDP 
through the eyes and the lived–experiences of the beneficiaries. 
 
Development pundits and donor agencies tend always to cite Ghana as the ‘Star of 
Africa’. This labelling appears to mask the realities of the country’s political and 
cultural systems, while discouraging investment in social research before development 
programs are designed and implemented there. This projection, which has made Ghana 
one of the preferred destinations for donor support in Sub–Saharan Africa, the thesis has 
shown, has not necessarily guaranteed the success of aid programs implemented in the 
country; Structural Adjustments, Millennium Development Goals and the Community-
                                                
172 See DFID Ghana webpage: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/ghana, retrieved August 10, 2012. 
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Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP) being cases in point. While Ghana may be 
benefitting from the ‘misrepresentation’ in the short term, the researcher argues that the 
distortion of the country’s grounded realities is detrimental to the country’s overall 
growth in the long term. To obtain first hand information on aid beneficiary grounded 
realities, it is important that international development organisations move beyond 
‘celebrity labels’, and meticulously study the country or locality’s relevant 
demographical dynamics.  
 
The thesis has also underscored the need for international development organisations to 
expose local project officials to the theoretical intricacies of key terms and concepts that 
underpin their development projects. Such terms as community, community 
engagement, empowerment, participation, sustainability, gender–equality, social capital 
and power are discussed at length in the thesis. Relative to the Ghana’s CBRDP, the 
research findings showed that the CBRDP Managers and Officials involved with the 
project did not have a clear theoretical or even practical understanding of the key 
concepts on which the project was based. As a result, they appeared to be ignorant about 
the fact that they were: 1) Implementing a community–based project in a location where 
a coherent ‘community’ did not seem to exist; and 2) Creating tensions by focusing only 
on ‘empowering’ local government officials, while sidelining local Traditional Chiefs, 
forgetting that the former were a part of a very complex socio–cultural system. In lieu 
of their apparent misapprehension of the complexity of the key concepts on which the 
CBRDP was predicated, there were no contingency plans and strategies in place for 
monitoring and managing the project’s unintended outcomes. This oversight, the thesis 
has shown, had a debilitating impact on the maintenance of the CBRDP projects, some 
of which were completely abandoned.  
 
Finally, the thesis has highlighted the importance of channelling aid funds into 
improving the political institutions of developing countries, as the latter invariably 
impact on how development programs work on the ground. The thesis revealed the fate 
of the CBRDP, when it interacted directly with Ghana’s political institutions and 
culture. It showed that it is not enough to blame the failure of aid programs on 
international development agencies alone, as the outcomes of the CBRDP may have 
been different, if Ghana had an efficient decentralisation system. While it is essential for 
donors to invest directly in health, education and transportation programs, the thesis has 
revealed that the poor functioning of these interventions is directly linked to the state of 
the beneficiaries’ political systems. Interestingly, on December 12, 2012, Janmejay 
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Singh, a World Bank CDD expert, posted an article on the institution’s website calling 
on practitioners to put institutions at the centre of CDD programs173. 
 
While seeking to wean itself off aid in the long term, the Ghanaian Government may 
have to seek development assistance to address the following. First, the country’s 
Constitutional Review Commission may need to consider drafting legislative 
instruments to strengthen the country’s local government institutions. Specifically, such 
legislation should consider reducing the powers of District/ Municipal Chief Executives 
or make [DCE/MCEs] electable by popular vote rather than continuing to employ the 
existing practice of appointment by the President. It may also be worthwhile to make 
DCE/MCEs ineligible to contest for parliamentary elections; this way, the politicisation 
of the system may be reduced considerably.  
 
Second, the government may also have to consider enacting laws that support policies 
for engendering effective fiscal decentralisation. As the thesis showed, local 
government authorities in the country seem to be constitutionally subjected to the 
whims of the central government; the situation breeds corruption and political 
machinations. It may be crucial for the state to amend laws which subject the financial 
transactions of local authorities to the approval of the central government and caps the 
amount of loan a District Assemblies can contract to only GHC 2000. Such statutes 
include the 2003 Financial Administration Act 654, the Financial Administration 
Regulation, 2004; the Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003, Act, (Act 655); the Public 
Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663); and Section 88 of the Local Government Act 462 
(Kyei–Baffour 2006; Gyimah–Boadi 2009; Ahwoi 2010). As argued in the thesis, these 
statutes appear to centralise financial administration and deny local authorities the 
needed fiscal autonomy to operate effectively. It is therefore important that the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning heed Section 10 (3) of the Local Government Act 
462, which enjoins them to implement a composite budget. When implemented, these 
structures would strengthen the country’s fiscal decentralisation agenda, as local 
government authorities would have the authority to control their revenues, budgets and 
expenditure. 
 
                                                
173http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/0,,content
MDK:23327793~menuPK:199462~pagePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSitePK:244363,00.html. 
Retrieved Januarys 05, 2013.  
 190 
Finally, it would be useful if Ghana’s Ministry of Local Government and Rural 
Development put in place structures that screen and orientate prospective Assembly and 
Unit Committee Members. This is important because some of these aspirants, as this 
thesis showed, take up the role and later become disillusioned when faced with the 
sacrificial realities of the job. At the same time, the state should consider paying these 
officials salaries if the expectation is that they work with dedication. It is also equally 
important that Traditional Chiefs be educated on the country’s local government system 
so as to avoid their tendency to feel sidelined, and therefore compelled to draw on 
traditional powers to control, or as the case may be, frustrate development projects in 
their localities. Being agents of social capital at the local level, Traditional Chiefs wield 
the power to influence the outcomes of development programs in their traditional areas.  
 
In sum, global efforts at making aid effective should pay closer attention to the use of 
contested theories and normative, yet complex concepts in aid-program designs. Such 
attention should begin with investing in social research activities that employ credible 
methodologies for understanding the grounded realities of development beneficiaries. 
This is crucial if projects meant to improve the lives of people in developing countries 
are to be sustainable. As the thesis has shown, understanding the grounded realities of 
‘development’ beneficiaries is more important than heeding the politicised and 
contested theories espoused by leading international aid agencies and institutions, who 
seem to be constantly moving, shifting and changing the aid discourse ‘landscape’ at 
times without empirical justification. These changes appear to be at variance with the 
contextual realities of ‘development’ recipients. 
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APPENDIX A: CBRDP Components 
Like most CDD programs, Ghana’s CBRDP strategy was aimed at investing in 
community capacity building and empowerment. The project had six components 
namely:   (I) Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building (ISCB); (II) 
Infrastructure for Agricultural Development (IAD); (III) Rural Enterprise and Learning 
Centres (RELC); (IV) Infrastructure for Social and Human Development (ISHD); (V) 
Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM); and (VI) Project 
Management (PM). The first and last components were predominantly administrative 
and had no subprojects. The other four components included subprojects which ranged 
from: rehabilitation of feeder roads; building of schools; health facilities; providing 
potable water; skills training to the unemployed; and dams for agricultural purposes; to 
protecting the environment and natural resources (CBRDP Imple. Manual 2005).  
 
I. Institutional Strengthening and Capacity Building  
The ISCB component had three main objectives. (i) Strengthen the capacity and skills 
of Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), Regional 
Coordinating Councils (RCCs), District Assemblies (DAs), Area Councils (ACs), 
Community-Based Organizations, (CBOs), Not-For-Profit and Non –Governmental 
Organizations (FNGOs), private and public service providers, and rural communities to 
deliver cost-effective services to rural communities, manage, monitor, evaluate and 
maintain public and private goods and strengthen functional and governance capacities. 
(ii) Strengthen the financial and procurement management capacities of MLGRD and 
regional and district tender boards, committees, councils, ACs and other procurement 
entities. (iii) Strengthen the decentralization secretariat to pursue the decentralization 
agenda pursuant to the Local Government Service Act.  
 
This category was largely borne by the CBRDP secretariat in conjunction with the 
RICUs. Primarily, it involved a training process, which was delivered by the project’s 
consultants. The above listed organizations and institutions were taken through two or 
three weeks workshops on the CBRDP (the other four components), Ghana’s 
decentralization concept, participatory planning, monitoring and evaluation, resource 
mobilization, leadership, communication, community decision- making processes, how 
to prepare community action plans, records keeping, procurement and contract 
management, and financial management. All who attended were given handouts 
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(CBRDP Trainers Manual for Area Councils Members and Opinion Leaders, 2005; 
Annual Reports 2006-2010).  
 
II. Infrastructure for agricultural development 
Under this component, beneficiaries ACs were given grants for four purposes: (i) Water 
for agriculture, including small-scale irrigation from stream flow diversions, pumping 
and run-off management, ponds, dugouts and tube wells; earthen banks, bunds and 
other flow control structures. (ii) Improving skills for management of facilities, 
including development of basic skills of beneficiaries for the appropriate application of 
recommended best catchment management practices and operation and maintenance of 
investments in water. (iii) Rehabilitation of priority feeder roads, provision of culverts 
and appropriate drainage; and upgrading of farm-to-village tracks and trails to facilitate 
use of bicycle trailers, donkey carts and other light vehicles. (iv) Post-harvest 
infrastructure, including provision of storage facilities, drying floors, cribs, crop 
processing and smoking units, and other processing equipment and facilities (CBRDP 
Implementation Manual 2006; CBRDP Annual Reports 2006-2010). 
 
III. Rural Enterprise Development 
This component advanced grants to beneficiaries for training in technical and 
business management for (i) the acquisition of employable skills in rural areas, 
establishment of agro-based micro enterprises, and upgrading and rehabilitation of 
equipment; (ii) establishment of learning centers to serve as focal points for processing 
units, marketing outlets, and empowering the poor through the acquisition of knowledge 
and skills; (iii) and the establishment of rural enterprises, including co-operative 
business activities, market research, business linkages and joint ventures (CBRDP 
Implementation Manual 2006; CBRDP Annual Reports 2006-2010). 
IV. Infrastructure for social and human development  
Many of the projects studied fell in this category. It provided sums for rehabilitating and 
improving existing rural community educational structures and constructing new 
community health compounds and nutrition centres. It aimed at constructing health 
compounds for the community health planning services, rehabilitating nutrition centres 
in association with the World Food Program; and also potable water and sanitation 
facilities for rural communities (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006; CBRDP 
Annual Reports 2006-2010). 
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V. Community- based natural resource management 
 The last component prepared natural resources management plans in DAs, ACs and 
local communities’ in collaboration with relevant public agencies including the 
Environmental Protection Agency, Savannah Resources Management Centre, Ministries 
of Food and Agriculture, Lands and Forestry and the Wildlife Division. It also targeted 
establishing tree and tree-crop nurseries for the production of seedlings, adoption of soil 
and water conservation measures, control of bush fires, and establishment of wood lots, 
rehabilitation of critically degraded watershed areas to ensure regular flow of water and 
effective management and use of water resources. Finally, the component sought to 
provide incentive schemes to natural resource collectors, processors and traders, wood 
carvers, traditional medical practitioners, wildlife traders and breeders and rural eco-
tourism operators, excluding loggers, to increase income earning capacities of 
beneficiaries and provide skills to the rural unemployed (CBRDP Implementation 
Manual 2006; Annual Reports 2006-2010).  
 
VI. Project Management 
This component was more administrative. It financially supported the management and 
implementation of the five components above in areas such as technical assistance and 
services to communities to prepare development and investment plans, feasibility 
studies, detailed engineering designs, procurement, supervision contracts and 
monitoring (CBRDP Implementation Manual 2006; Annual Reports 2006-2010).  
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APPENDIX B: Questionnaire 
 
EDITH COWAN UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF PSYCHOLOGY& SOCIAL SCIENCE 
JOONDALUP CAMPUS, WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CBRDP BENEFICIARY LOCALITIES 
 
This study, funded by the above University, aims at understanding how theories and 
concepts impact on aid funded development projects. The questionnaire is meant to 
elicit information on what you know about the CBRDP, your involvement in local 
initiatives as well as the functions of the Assembly and Unit Committee Members. 
There are seven questions in all and will take fifteen to twenty minutes to complete.  It 
is meant for purely academic purposes. You are assured of confidentiality; however you 
may withdraw from answering any question that makes you feel insecure. 
 
Locality…………………………………Project Type……………………………… 
Age.........................................................Gender........................................................              
Religion..................................................Marital status..............................................       
No of Children..................... …………..Profession................................................... 
 
 
1. How long have you lived in this locality?.............................................................. 
 
 
2. What are the five most important needs in this locality? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
3. What do you know about the CBRD Project?............................................................. 
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................... 
 
4. What did you contribute towards the implementation of the CBRDP?  
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................. 
 
5. Do you take attend local meetings? If yes what issues are discussed often?  
If No why?  
............................................................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
 
 
6. How do you rate the function of your Assembly and Unit Committee Members? 
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............................................................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................. 
 
 
7. Could you identify some causes of developmental problems in this locality? 
............................................................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................. 
.............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................ 
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APPENDIX C: Permission to Study the CBRDP 
 
 
 
 
Joondalup Campus 
270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup 
Western Australia 6127 
Telephone 134328 
Facsimile (08) 93001257 
August 03, 2010 
To: 
The Country Director 
CBRDP-Ghana 
Accra, Ghana 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
PERMISSION TO USE YOUR COMMUNITY-BASED RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
 
I am a Ghanaian and a PhD student in the above named university. As part of my 
research on ‘Communities and International Development Aid’, I am expected to carry 
out fieldwork to collect data on an Aid funded development project. I am greatly 
interested in your Community-based Rural Development Project funded by the World 
Bank that I would use as a case study to inform theory and practice in International 
Development Studies. I am by this letter asking for permission to use the project for the 
study and also obtain relevant documents. These will be used to produce an academic 
thesis, which will incorporate your organization’s views on some of the issues that may 
emerge out of the communities who are involved in the above-mentioned project.  
 
I am due to arrive in Ghana in 26 August, 2010 and collect the data until March 31st 
2011. I would be grateful if this is granted. 
 
I count on your cooperation. 
 
Please contact me with any further questions. 
 
Sincerely Yours, 
Kwadwo Adusei-Asante 
PhD Candidate 
School of Psychology and Social Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Joondalup Campus 
Ph 61 0404509736 
Kaduseia@our.ecu.edu.au  
 
 
 222 
 
APPENDIX D: Letter of Introduction from the CBRDP 
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APPENDIX E: Letter of Introduction from the Edith Cowan 
University 
 
 
 
Joondalup Campus 
270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup 
Western Australia 6127 
Telephone 134328 
Facsimile (08) 93001257 
 
August 15, 2010 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION: KWADWO ADUSEI-ASANTE (10136963) 
 
The above named person is a PhD student at our university. I am his Principal 
Supervisor. He is on an Australian Doctoral Scholarship and as part of his proposed 
research on how theories and complex concepts influence foreign aid outcomes. He will 
be carrying out fieldwork to collect data in Ghana (September 2010-March 2011) using 
the Community-Based Rural Development Projects (CBRDP) as a case study. The data 
collected will be used to produce an academic thesis. I would be grateful if you could 
offer him the assistance he needs. 
 
We count on your cooperation. Please contact me with any further questions. 
 
Sincerely Yours, 
 
Dr Peter Hancock 
Senior Lecturer 
School of Psychology and Social Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Joondalup Campus 
Ph 61 8 6304 5804 
Fax 61 8 6304 5957 
p.hancock@ecu.edu.au 
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APPENDIX F: Permission to Obtain Secondary Data from Ghana’s 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
 
 
Joondalup Campus 
270 Joondalup Drive, Joondalup 
Western Australia 6127 
Telephone 134328 
Facsimile (08) 93001257 
 
January 27, 2010 
 
The Hon Minister of Finance 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
Accra 
 
ATTN:  
The Chief Director 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
Accra 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
REQUEST FOR SECONDARY DATA ON AID TRENDS IN GHANA 
I am a Ghanaian postgraduate student at the Edith Cowan University, Perth in Western 
Australia. My research focus is on International Development, particularly how theories 
and concepts impact on aid funded projects. 
Currently, I am collecting data on a World Bank funded project in Ghana for my thesis. 
To produce a good one, I would need to provide some background information on aid 
trends in the country. I am therefore by this letter kindly requesting your good offices to 
provide me with some secondary data on: 
 
1) The history of Ghana-World Bank Relations 
2) The trend and quantum of ODA/Foreign Aid in Ghana from 1980-2010 by: 
o Net ODA or official aid  
o Aid per capita  
o Aid as a % of GNI  
o Net ODA as a % of government expenditure               
 
I am counting on your cooperation.  
 
Regards.  
 
Sincerely Yours 
Kwadwo Adusei-Asante 
(ECU DETAILS) 
